Black's Military Geography

THE BALKAN PENINSULA

IN PREPARATION

SOUTH-WEST ASIA

IN THE SAME SERIES

A

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

OF

THE BALKAN PENINSULA

BY

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PREFACE

As this series is intended specially for military students, we ought to explain at once that it should not be regarded by a student as in any sense exhaustive of the subject, though we hope that it will be found complete from the point of view of the general reader. That success in war without previous geographical study of the theatre of operations is difficult, if not impossible, is our firm belief; and in this volume we have attempted to outline, for one small area, the sort of geographical knowledge that is required.

The choice of the particular area for the first volume was dictated by the fact that it is not only part of the (politically) most important continent, but also the part in which complications are, unfortunately, always present, and most likely to cause active trouble.

Two mechanical difficulties have presented themselves to us—the spelling of place-names, and the use of duplicate terms having very different meanings in geographical and military science.

With regard to the former, we have followed, as far

as possible, Mr. Chisholm's admirable 'Gazetteer.' The names of well-known places—*e.g.*, Belgrade—will be found in the conventional spelling, while those of comparatively unknown places appear as nearly as possible in their native form, but in Roman characters—the normal *ts* sound of final *c* in the Slav names being marked only in the index, not in the text. This, of course, is not logical; but we believe that it is a useful compromise for military students who may have to serve in the particular area.

With regard to the second difficulty, we did not think it necessary to avoid the use of duplicate terms —*e.g.*, 'line of least resistance'—simply because they have quite different meanings in the two sciences; but wherever there seemed to be a reasonable possibility of confusion, the geographical use has been emphasized by inverted commas, as above.

We desire to acknowledge much courteous help in the compilation of Appendix I. from H.B.M.'s Consuls at Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, and Constantinople, and from Professor E. A. Gardner.

A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN
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MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE great land features which make history repeat itself are the essential subject-matter of Military Geography; and the problems which they present are eternally the same, though genius may from time to time find some new solution of them.

These problems are of three kinds, concerned respectively with the general control exercised by the earth on human activities, the planning of some particular projected campaign, or the actual distribution of troops in time of war on or near an enemy's territory; but in each case the fundamental problem is geographical, and even the last of the three may to a certain extent be studied beforehand.

The sole reason for the soldier's being is war, and it is with a view to prepare him for war that his peace-time is occupied largely with drill and instruction in military duties. If, when war comes, he is found wanting—if he is physically unfit to face the rigours of a campaign, or if he has neglected to make himself proficient in

the professional knowledge required of him, then he has defrauded his country.

But, if that is true of the private soldier, it is still more true of the officer, who is aware of the fact that he is responsible for the lives of his subordinates, and aware also that the art of war is a science calling for deep and constant study. In the annals of war there is no instance of an officer having risen suddenly on the battlefield to lasting fame; the 'military genius' and the 'born soldier' do not exist of themselves; and inquiry into the early lives of the great generals shows that each one of them devoted years of careful study to his profession, reading greedily all the available military literature, in order to learn what others before him had done.

In this manner—*i.e.*, on past experience—have been built up the laws of strategy and the rules of tactics, none of which, therefore, can be considered creations of an imaginative writer. The general principles underlying the laws of strategy remain fairly good for all time; but in the matter of tactics modern inventions are always introducing modifications and variations, and the goal of the military student is to gain an understanding of all possible variations and combinations.

Military history, systematically studied, is the foundation of military knowledge; but its systematic study, and the proper application of the knowledge so gained, are only possible to the man who has a thorough acquaintance with military geography. Even apart from

its intimate connection with military history, military geography as a separate study is of vital importance to the officer; and for statesmen it is a necessity. In their hands lie all the preliminary arrangements for war, if not the actual plan of campaign; on their responsibility treaties are made; and in all treaties concerning territory boundaries are the principal consideration. How can a statesman ignorant of military geography understand the strategic value of a proposed boundary or frontier-line? So it is in daily life with the whole community; the newspaper each morning tells us of military operations, or of political situations likely to culminate in military operations, in various quarters of the globe. The man who writes of these matters, and the reader who wishes to understand them, must each have a clear knowledge of the general principles of military geography; otherwise the one will be at fault in what he writes, and the other will fail to grasp the importance of the subject about which he is reading.

War has been compared with the game of chess, but the comparison is a poor one. In chess the player sees his adversary's moves throughout; and, except in so far as the various pieces are restricted to certain routes, the moves are made on a level surface, without obstacles of any kind. This may be war in theory, but in practice war is an outdoor game—a rough-and-tumble played in the open; and the man who would win must know—directly or by analogy—the ground on which the game is to be played. A veil—the 'fog of war'—is drawn over his adversary's intentions; they can only be sur-

mised; but a knowledge of the country in which the enemy is operating, will assist materially in lifting the veil.

Deeply-laid plans are of little use without a knowledge of the ground on which they are to be put into execution; on the contrary, ignorance of the geography of a theatre of operations has before now wrecked a campaign, and ignorance of the topographical details of a comparatively small area has cost thousands of lives—*e.g.*, in Natal, in January, 1900. The country between the Upper Tugela and Ladysmith, although it had been in British possession for upwards of half a century, was unsurveyed and unknown. Yet ground alone is not everything; for into military geography there enter a hundred and one other things, each often seemingly in itself unimportant, but, when taken in combination with the others, producing results of the greatest value.

At one time the term 'military topography' was used in a wide sense to embrace everything connected with military geography; now, however, it has come to be regarded as perhaps a branch of military geography, but having more to do with survey work and reconnaissances carried out during the course of a campaign. Used in this latter sense, therefore, it might almost be said that military topography bears to military geography the relation that tactics bears to strategy; it deals with the same materials, but under different conditions. In the planning of a campaign, the objects demanding most attention are: the general 'relief' of the theatre

of war, especially with regard to 'lines of least resistance' —*i.e.*, river-routes—and natural centres—*e.g.*, railway-junctions; the general climate, with special reference to frost hard enough to facilitate or interfere with transport, and rain heavy enough to damage roads or flood streams; and economic questions—*e.g.*, the probable supplies of food, remounts, etc., which can be relied on.

In the carrying out of this plan, items may have to be changed, owing to immediate needs and particular conditions; but it is always possible to apply to the new case the general principles underlying the main scheme, whether the question is one of local geographical 'relief' and route or of local food and water supply.

Now, strategy has been defined as 'the art of making war upon a map' (Jomini), and as 'the movements of two armies before they come in sight of each other, or before they come within cannon-range' (Bülow); while the term 'tactics' is applied to all movements and operations within striking distance of the enemy. In 'Combined Training' (1902), strategy was defined as 'the methods by which a commander seeks to bring his enemy to battle,' and tactics as 'the methods by which he seeks to defeat him in that battle.' That is to say, strategy is concerned with the whole theatre of war, tactics with the battlefield; though, as with geography and topography, the one must of necessity cut into the other, and it is not possible to draw a hard-and-fast line between the two. Military topography, in fact, is part and parcel of military geography.

Without good physical maps no strategist is able to plan a campaign, and no general is able to carry the plan through; but even the best maps fail to convey all the necessary information. Besides the plan of campaign, the strategist has to consider the safest and most suitable situation for the base of operations, how the troops will reach the base, how they can be supplied when there. He has to consider the routes by which they can advance from the base into the enemy's country, how the supplies can follow them, and, when the army gets deeper into the enemy's country, where fresh supply-depots can be established and maintained from the original base. He must know also the nature of the country, in order to decide the proportionate strength of the various arms of the service to be employed, as well as the class of transport to be used; which are the decisive strategical points;* where an endeavour should be made to give battle; to what extent an army can subsist on the country; and how the climate will affect the health of the troops. In addition, he has to calculate with considerable accuracy how all his contemplated movements will be met by the enemy; and he must therefore have some knowledge of the temperament of the enemy. Neither can he

* The Archduke Charles says: 'A point is deemed strategical when the possession of it secures important advantages for the intended operations. But it is *decisive* only when it assures the communications which lead to it; when it is likely to be maintained, and when it cannot be turned with impunity by the enemy; and, finally, when its position is such that we may start from it in different directions.'

neglect to consider the possibility of defeat and the consequent retreat of his army.

These and many other matters have to be fully appreciated and carefully weighed before the first unit is put in the field. Then, when the plans of the strategist are completed, and the commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions, take up the thread and commence operations, each one of them is continually thinking of what is before him; he is on strange ground, and if he has not studied its geography, he will be working in the dark.

To know all that can be known about the country over which it is intended that an army shall operate, requires the collection of a mass of information, which it would be impossible to put together in a hurry at the last moment; and such information, therefore, is always being gathered in by the Intelligence Staff attached to the War Department of every civilized nation. The bulk of the information thus collected, however, is treated as private property, so that the ordinary officer and the public are unable to benefit by it. The soundness of this policy it is not within our province to discuss, though we would point out that to be ignorant and unprepared is to court disaster, as witness the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), for which the Germans had prepared themselves by long years of careful geographical study, while the French had neglected to make themselves acquainted with the military geography of even their own country, though they are said to have studied that of Germany. However, it is

no longer necessary to emphasize the teaching of the Franco-Prussian War as to the value of geographical knowledge, though one may still be amazed at the French inability to form an effective plan for the defence of the Moselle, one of the most tortuous rivers of Europe.

During actual hostilities—*i.e.*, when in touch with the enemy—minor reconnaissances are undertaken over limited areas, in order to collect information which it has been found impossible to collect beforehand; but it is on his previous knowledge of the military geography of the whole theatre of operations that the officer must rely, if he is to successfully cope with the many difficulties likely to arise during the course of a campaign. To all intents and purposes, therefore, military geography, in its widest sense, may be considered to be a great reconnaisance report, concerning a wide area of country, prepared beforehand and available to the military students of all nations; and, other things being equal, victory will ultimately rest with the army of that nation whose officers have realized in time of peace the importance of the study of the geography of war.

In order that the student of military history and military geography may fully appreciate the works that he reads, he should already have acquired some elementary knowledge of strategy and tactics. Thus equipped, he can enter on his further studies with a clear understanding of the reasons for the movements of each commander throughout a campaign; but, until he has learnt the geography of the country in which the particular campaign has taken place, he will be at a

loss to understand why certain movements were or were not made. The object of the present series is to do something to assist the student of military history in his course of reading; it is hoped that it may suggest such lines of training in geography in general, and in military geography in particular, that, for instance, on reading in his newspaper of a possible outbreak of hostilities between two Powers, an officer may be able, with the aid of his maps, to form just opinions as to the plan of campaign likely to follow the declaration of war. In the event of a man able to form such opinions being called upon to take the field in a foreign country, he would be able to anticipate the actual course of events in that country—how the strategy of the campaign would be influenced by the natural features of the land, as well as by such artificial things as fortresses, railways, roads, and telegraph-lines,—how the tactical dispositions would have to conform to the topographical details of the ground,—and countless minor matters.

It is not, of course, imagined that all difficulties in warfare can be overcome by the previous study of maps and military geography. It is at best only theory that can be propounded in this manner, and it is not at all desirable that the military student should confine himself to arm-chair study. The best school is practical experience in the field; but, even if a man were able to spend the whole term of his natural life on active service, he would still fail to meet with scores of the ordinary problems of war—for they are innumerable; and the officer who would be proficient in the art of

war should know something of them all. Certainly, theory comes first; but, when one's mind is ripe for the acquirement of practical details, theory must be complemented by travel in foreign countries, battle-fields should be visited, campaigns worked out on the actual ground. Then one realizes how far theoretical training has been a benefit. 'The object of theory,' says Clausewitz, 'is to spare a fresh student the trouble of classifying and subdividing the subject he studies, in order that he may carefully examine it in all its bearings. Theory brings the subject before him classified and arranged; it forms the mind of the future commander, or, rather, it points out how he may form it for himself.'

All that we are attempting to do in this series is to classify and analyse the geography of past and probable theatres of war, and to present the result to the student in such form as will enable him to obtain a fair starting-point for further study; but there are certain matters connected with military geography that apply equally to nearly all countries.

In the first place, it cannot be too much emphasized that war has become in modern times very largely a matter of transport. Battles are vital, but occasional, crises; marching is a normal condition; food and medicine for man and beast are daily necessaries. Indeed, the connection between war and commerce may become so intimate as to make the former an almost impossible extravagance.

In reading military history, one soon becomes aware

of the fact that, in Europe and elsewhere, certain general routes have from time immemorial been adopted by successive invading armies. The cause of this is not far to seek; the invader masses his troops on his own frontier, but the frontier—whether a natural one such as a river or mountain range, or an artificial line of boundary-posts on an open plain—can only be crossed by large armies at certain points, viz., where good roads are to be found entering the enemy's country. Even the possession of a seaboard by the defender does not naturally alter these conditions: an invader arriving by sea desires only to land at points adjacent to roads; and, for the greater facility of landing his troops and for the safety of his transports, he will endeavour to possess himself of one or more of the enemy's harbours.

Good roads—nowadays supplemented by railways—are essential to the movements of an army, and the old main-roads of most countries will be found to follow the course of the valleys, thus minimizing the engineering difficulties of the early road-makers. So invading lines have usually taken the valleys as the best means of reaching the theatre of war, and railways have made little alteration in the general lines of invasion, for the simple reason that the natural features of the land never change, and therefore the main frontier crossing-points are practically the same to-day as they were a thousand years ago. Moreover, the railways, where they have not been made purely for strategical purposes, tend to adhere to the course of the original roads. In

mountainous countries this is especially noticeable; a deep narrow valley will frequently contain, by the side of the river, the old main-road, and parallel with it the modern railroad, the latter only separating from the former when the valley has to be left. The old road then crosses into the neighbouring valley by a mountain pass, while for the railroad a tunnel is cut through the obstructing hillside.

That railways have increased the facilities for the supply and movements of armies is, of course, undeniable; and that all the great European Powers have of late years displayed immense energy in developing their military railway systems is true; but at the same time it must be understood that, when once the invader enters the theatre of war, he cannot rely on being able immediately to use the enemy's railways, and he must, therefore, employ roads for the movement of his troops and supplies. This must always be so, and the importance of having good and many roads for military purposes will rather increase than diminish as the advantages of motor traction become recognised.

The general lines of invasion being so well known, everything has been done to close the avenues of approach; the main crossing-places of rivers, the defiles and passes of mountains, and other points on probable invasion routes, have all (in civilized countries) been strengthened by fortifications, in order to check the invader's progress; strategic railways have also been constructed with a view to expedite concentration at threatened points. Still, the plans of a determined

enemy, though they may be delayed for a time, are not frustrated by fortifications. He knows where they are, and he makes his arrangements accordingly. If, for example, the passage of a river cannot be forced at one point, there are usually other points; and, if all are equally strongly fortified, and if the passage of the river cannot be effected by surprise or other means, the invader has recourse to bombardments and sieges. But it is seldom that the forces of a defending nation are sufficiently powerful to admit of several large garrisons being locked up in fortresses, and so debarred from acting on the offensive. To say more about this, however, would be to go beyond the scope of the present work.

Nor in a work dealing with geography rather than with strategy would it be advisable to enter into such wide and interesting subjects as the command of the sea and the influence of sea-power on land campaigns. Many valuable books have in recent years been written on these matters,* and the whole question of sea-power is in the minds of all maritime nations. So far as military geography is concerned, it is the coast-line that is of supreme importance to an invader; and about this a great deal can, of course, be discovered from good maps and charts. From these it is not too much to expect to obtain full information as to the harbours, roadsteads, anchorage, soundings, tides, and currents; but this will not suffice. It is necessary to know also

* Notably by Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Caldwell, R.A.; Sir G. S. Clarke; Dr. T. Miller Maguire; etc.

about the coast defences, *e.g.* even, if possible, where submarine mines or batteries are concealed, and how these are armed. It is helpful to know also the nature of the whole coast-line, whether sandy, rocky, shelving, or with cliffs, and the country for some few miles inland, with the roads, hills, and commanding positions likely to be taken up by the defenders. Some coast-lines are studded with islands, while others are exposed to the full force of the sea; and all such things are important, since it is not only disembarkation that the invader has to provide for, but also the possible re-embarkation of the army at some other point in the event of defeat. Similarly, a maritime power acting on the defensive must be well acquainted with its own coast-line, must know where to expect an enemy to attempt a landing, and how best to oppose him. Again, when troops are to be conveyed long distances by sea, the coaling-stations of the world have to be taken into consideration, for the coal-carrying capacities of steamships are limited.

Such necessary preliminaries of war are, however, less important, for our present purpose, than study of the theatre of actual operations; and, as far as that is concerned, it cannot be too strongly impressed on the military student that, without a practically complete knowledge of the routes available for the movement of troops, it is absolutely impossible to formulate any successful plans. The whole essence of strategy is timely concentration for a decisive stroke. If the routes to be followed are not known, or if their condition is a matter of uncertainty, the best plans are likely to

fail; and information is required not only about the main routes, but also about good branch or cross roads. Such information must be full; everything must be known about the roadway itself, the surrounding country, the bridges, and similar things.

The length of road occupied by an army on the march is often forgotten; but, to give an idea of what it is, we need only say that in Europe—*i.e.*, under the most favourable circumstances—the transport by rail of an ordinary English Army Corps (say 40,000 men) would require at least one hundred very long trains for the combatant section, and at least fifty more for baggage. By road the same unit would cover a continuous stretch of fifteen or sixteen miles, and in bad weather it would make the road impassable for a second corps.

Now, an Army Corps is, in European warfare, a mere handful of men; and it is obvious, therefore, that an invading force must move by several roads, more or less parallel to one another. Moreover, each column must keep up communication with its neighbouring column, or risk destruction by the enemy without the possibility of support. As the campaign progresses, the importance of being able to time a concentration of several columns at a given point increases, and a faulty calculation of a few minutes may result in the loss of a battle. Again, it must be remembered that an army requires food, clothing, and ammunition; sick have to be conveyed to the rear, and reinforcements sent forward to replace them. Consequently, the roads must be not only numerous, but also good, otherwise constant

traffic will speedily destroy them. There are countless instances in modern warfare of the difficulties brought about by culpable ignorance of the condition of the roads, or how the weather would be likely to affect them; much of this ignorance could have been avoided by a previous study of the geography of the country, and by some acquaintance with the general principles of land 'relief' and climate. Many of these instances will be referred to later, when the various theatres of war and campaigns are dealt with from a geographical and topographical point of view.

An army on the defensive also operates by several roads. The object of the defender is, as a rule, the protection of the capital or some strategic point; and, as the invader will be moving on his objective by several lines, it is obviously necessary for the defender to be able to oppose him on each principal avenue of approach.

With regard to railroads, there is no great difficulty in discovering all the routes that exist in the world, since modern maps show them clearly enough; but there are matters connected with them that are not so easy to discover, and which in warfare are important—*e.g.*, the gauge, gradients, cuttings, embankments, tunnels, bridges, stations, rolling-stock, stores, and fuel depôts, how and where the line can be destroyed or obstructed, and how repaired in the event of its destruction by the enemy.

The importance of railways lies mainly in the fact that both time and cost demand that all general, as

opposed to detailed, supplies should be sent by rail—not by road, still less by by-roads; and it seems probable that this difficulty of supply, whether from the base or from depôts provided in the theatre of operations, will cause all great wars in future to be conducted strictly along geographical 'lines of least resistance'; indeed, the magnitude of the operations will be so gigantic that this will be the only possible means of keeping the large bodies of troops—moving on more or less parallel lines—in touch with one another, and properly supplied with necessaries.

These 'lines of least resistance' in all civilized lands are now the routes of trunk-railways; and, as the invader will not be able to rely on local supplies of food even in the most fertile districts, any more than the defender can make certain of closing the railway by the destruction of tunnels or viaducts, branch lines, especially those which command the invader's road home or to his base, will be sometimes the objects of the finest strategy and the scenes of the fiercest fighting.

Still more important will be transverse trunk-lines commanding the routes which would probably be used as lines of operation. In Europe these routes certainly run east and west, and therefore the great 'isthmian' railways will be of immense strategic importance—*e.g.*, that from the Baltic to the Black Sea (Pillau to Odessa), where Europe suddenly narrows from 1,600 to 800 miles, with a water-parting between the two seas of under 500 feet; or that from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean (Bordeaux to Narbonne), where the distance is not

250 miles, and the water-parting is not much over 600 feet.

In both cases the countries concerned are moving towards a large canal system, Kiev playing the part of Toulouse; but Spain still commands the Garonne basin, as Constantinople commands the Black Sea, though in the former case it is really a question of sea-power, and in the latter a question of land-power.

The relief of the Garonne-Aude water-parting, especially in the Naurouze Pass, gives France no choice as to the route of such a canal, although the necessary route is commanded at both ends by the Ariège and Upper Aude valleys, which are dangerously convenient to the Segre tributary of the Ebro. But the 'relief' of Western Russia allows the route of the proposed canal to be laid well within the western frontier, and almost every section of it is behind some place of strength. Dünamünde and Dvinsk (Dünaburg) protect the Düna portion, and the connection with the Beresina is covered west and east by Vilna and Vitebsk; the Beresina itself lies behind the unhealthy Pinsk marshes; the fortresses of Bendery and Akkerman command the west flank of the Lower Dnieper; and the two ends of the whole route are controlled by the great naval stations of Libau and Nikolaiev. On the other hand, the Canal du Midi will be perennially open, while the Russian waterway will be closed by ice for at least 130 days every year.

Canals such as these and large rivers, when available for transport, play an important part in a campaign; but, as in the case of railways, it is necessary to know

full details concerning them, such as width, depth, rate of current, position of locks, liability to flood or to be frozen in winter, as well as the number and description of steamers and boats likely to be found on them.

It is as obstacles, however, to the advance or retirement of armies that rivers or canals affect most the operations of war. It may be necessary to bridge or ford them, or to take up a defensive position along their banks; they may be so situated as to be a source of great annoyance, or as to materially assist the operations. In any case their peculiarities should be known, and as much information as possible should be gathered by everyone who is likely to operate in the neighbourhood of a river, on such points as the bridges, ferries and fords, the nature of the river bed and banks, which bank commands the other, the situation of the bends, islands, tributaries, and the fortifications along its course.

Other natural obstacles to the operations of an army are marshes, forests, and mountains. Of marshes, the principal information required is their extent, the roads through them, their depth, whether they dry up in summer, and whether they are frozen over in winter, and, if so, sufficiently for the passage of troops. Forests are of more importance: they may impede the progress of troops; they may provide good cover, and thus conceal movements; and their extent, shape, and nature enter into the serious matter of 'wood-fighting.' As a source also of fuel for the troops and of timber for

bridging and other purposes, their value is often considerable.

But it is the distribution of mountains that affects most directly the operations of war. A mountain range may form an obstacle or barrier to the one side, and at the same time a strong defensive line to the other side; if the range is formidable, it will probably be passable only at a few points, which will, of course, be carefully guarded. Again, mountains may be useful for screening the movements of troops, but they may also be dangerous as necessitating columns marching without the possibility of mutual support. Indeed, in mountainous countries the usual methods of warfare cannot be followed, and mountain warfare is a science of itself, complicated by the fact that mountaineers are specially dangerous when on the defensive. The numerous obstacles and varied surface of their mountainous homes have given them a lifelong training in the subdivision of armies and the handling of different kinds of troops, and such an experience develops exceptional intelligence and resourcefulness in the individual soldier.

But even low hills and undulating ground enter into strategical and tactical calculations to a considerable extent; and the more that is known about such features, the easier will be the conduct of the operations. Maps of countries that have been properly surveyed, should show clearly the height and all the ramifications of the mountains, as well as the routes across them; but more information than this should be forthcoming, for it is important to know the nature of their slopes,

whether wooded or rocky, whether in places precipitous, whether snow renders them impassable, and, if so, during what months of the year.

Such approach to geographical 'omniscience' implies very arduous study, but it should be aimed at, for ignorance of one vital detail may be fatal to the prospects of a campaign, and ignorance of what can be discovered with a little trouble is the one unforgivable sin. Consequently, an officer should concern himself also with geological or semi-geological matters, in order to get an idea of the general land-forms likely to occur, to arrange for the construction of temporary roads, to make certain that the water-supply will always be ample, to select sites for camps, etc. Practice in sketching should have given him a fair working knowledge of the shape which particular formations of rock usually take; but, though such knowledge may be very useful—*e.g.*, recognition that the water-supply is coming from magnesian limestone may prevent a serious epidemic of goitre—it is not essential. It is not the classified geological character of the soil so much as its physical properties that one needs to know—the properties which influence the distribution of disease, *e.g.*, temperature, dryness, porosity, freedom from organic impurity. There must sometimes be no alternative to camping on damp, impervious soil; but the knowledge that it is impervious, which can be proved by the spade in three minutes, enables some precautions to be taken against diphtheria and lung diseases, as against dysentery and enteric.

The latter may be further guarded against by a

previous study of even a single river-basin at home. There is scarcely one within 100 miles of Aldershot where a few experiments will not prove—by useful object-lessons in testing water—the main stream to be a much more dangerous source of water-supply than its tributaries; and such experiments can be confirmed only too easily by statistics of the actual spread of disease by a large main stream—*e.g.*, the spread of cholera in 1892 by the Volga, Don, Vistula, and especially the Elbe (at Hamburg).

Again, a fair working knowledge of 'climate' may be of infinite use. Knowledge of the time when the rainy season may be expected in any particular country, enables special precautions to be taken against enteric—such as might have saved many lives in and round Bloemfontein in 1900. So, warm weather, especially when and where there has been considerable disturbance of soil, may warn one against attacks of malaria, such as the 'railway' epidemics of 1893 in the Transvaal and 1895 at Galle; colder weather, especially if food has run short, may be a hint that every possible cheering influence should at once be employed to strengthen the men against attacks of typhus, such as were rampant in the Russo-Turkish and Franco-Prussian wars, especially in Metz.

A severe winter, a scorching summer, heavy rains, sudden changes of temperature, bad water, will each and all swell the sick-rolls; and it must be borne in mind that, even with the improved arrangements of modern times, for every man killed or wounded, ten will be invalided

to the rear. Climate and weather are factors in warfare which cannot be disregarded; in no two countries are they alike, and, since they are never constant, they require peculiar attention, even apart from their effect on local supplies of food.

If provisions can be found on the spot, the labour of forwarding supplies from the base will be lessened; but an army passing through even the most fertile provinces of Europe can subsist only for a very short time on the country. Still, in most civilized countries there are granaries and supply depôts of considerable size, and the situation of all these should be known to the commissariat officers of an invading army, who should likewise be acquainted with the nature and amount of the growing crops, the timber available for fuel, the water-supply, and other matters. Even in uncivilized countries there is usually something to be found; a pastoral people will have animals, and an agricultural people will grow crops of some kind, and in both cases the particular kind of food will probably be peculiarly suited to the locality.

Lastly, there are the people, whose importance is at least equal, if not superior, to that of the land on which they dwell; for not to know the enemy is to reckon without one's host. But it is not the enemy alone that has to be studied, for an army may form part of an allied force, and the theatre of war may be in a friendly, though foreign, country. The racial peculiarities of friend and foe alike should, therefore, be studied, as well as their numbers, religion, language, mode of living,

and habitations, the strength of their forces, their armaments, and their methods of warfare.

It is useful, also, to be acquainted with the temperament of one's adversary—to have some idea, for instance, whether he will take the initiative or incline, rather, to a passive defence; and this temperament is often the appropriate expression of the effect of the place on the people: it was not an accident that the deep ravines of Aragon and wild mountains of Catalonia bred a race of warriors, or that men like Henri IV. and Soult should come from a land famous alike for its light infantry and cavalry horses.

To the British officer more than to any other is such information of importance; for his campaigning-grounds are all over the world, and the conditions under which he takes the field are ever varying. He must be prepared for all eventualities; therefore to him, more than to any other, a good working knowledge of military geography is a matter of supreme importance.

CHAPTER II

THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHY

THE area here treated as the Balkan Peninsula is at once more and less than is generally included in the name; for Roumania is included, and the 'Balkan' provinces of Austria-Hungary are excluded. Reasons for the inclusion of Roumania will appear later; the Austro-Hungarian provinces are excluded because they form now such an important outpost of the dual monarchy, especially with reference to the command of the Adriatic, that they can scarcely be treated apart from the monarchy. On the other hand, the peculiar fitness of the area, especially in Herzegovina, for guerilla warfare, as well as its Servian sympathies, may almost be inferred from what is said about Montenegro and Servia.

The latter is the only country in Europe except Switzerland that has no sea-coast; and, therefore, even if it did not contain an enormously important international through-route, its relations with its neighbours, more particularly those on the 'Continental' side, would be delicate and difficult.

To a certain extent this is also true of Roumania and

Bulgaria, with their common control of the international waterway of the Lower Danube; but the waterway, though much improved in late years, has become relatively less important since the completion of the Orient-Express route to Constantinople, the one centre in the peninsula where land and water control are equally important, and can be exercised with equal ease.

The whole peninsula is, of course, a natural link between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well as between Europe and Asia, and its typical features emphasize this; but its intricate geography was always adverse to its becoming a satisfactory political unit, and its history as the Vanguard of the West still further complicated the matter by an unblending intermixture of peoples. Consequently, both the political difficulties and the commercial possibilities are focussed round the Golden Horn.

The different destinies of the Iberian and Balkan peninsulas might almost be read in the difference of their links with Continental Europe; for the one is essentially isolated by the formidable double range of the Pyrenees, while the other is closely joined by a waterway which has mountains on both sides of it nowhere except at one point—the Iron Gates of Orsova. The Danube is deep enough and broad enough to be very useful for trade and a great military obstacle, though information has been carried across it by a strong swimmer with impunity—under a hail of bullets from the northern bank; but every facility for access inland

is given by its Morava tributary, the valley of which is the real land-link between north and south.

The sea-link has a double importance. As far as north and south traffic is concerned, the Austrian goal of Salonica is the terminus of the shortest route between the Suez Canal and Central or Eastern Europe, and it need not fear competition from Corinth. The Corinthian Canal is, indeed, a shorter and safer route from Brindisi than the one south of the Morea, and has the attraction of very fine scenery; but, even if it could be used at all in time of war, the bed of the canal—only 52 feet wide, compared with 72 on the Suez—is too narrow for the really important traffic. At present, no doubt, there is a somewhat similar objection to the port of Salonica, which is being silted up by the Vardar after its tumultuous descent from the 10,000 feet of Shar Dagh; but the cost of dredging would be comparatively insignificant.

As far as east and west traffic is concerned, there is a paucity of harbours except on the constricted parts of the route, and the length of these parts is often not realized. For forty miles west, *i.e.*, foewards, of the great naval station of Gallipoli, the Strait of the Dardanelles—known to the Turks as Bahr Sefid Boghaz (the Mouth of the White Sea)—is never more than about 7,000 yards wide, and sometimes less than 1,500; and for twenty miles east, *i.e.*, again foewards, of Constantinople the Bosporus—or Boghaz (the Mouth)—is generally less than 3,000 yards wide, and in some places less than 800.

The deficiency of harbours, of course, increases the importance of the few which are available, as Volos; but political considerations demand the use of very inferior ports, most of which are mere roadsteads. The Balkan coast of the Black Sea, reflecting the peculiar features of the Danube trough, is low and marshy in the north, and barren and rocky in the south; in the one case Sulina monopolizes attention, while in the other neither Varna nor Burgas reaches even second rank as a port. A similarly rocky coast girds the Morea from the Gulf of Nauplia to the Gulf of Patras; the Akrokeraunian coast is simply precipitous; and elsewhere most of the natural landing-points are either surrounded by low and unhealthy marshes, as at Arta and Mesolonggi, or front on to very shallow water, as north of Cape Glossa.

The deficiencies of the mainland are, no doubt, more or less compensated by the islands; but the importance of the latter, especially of Crete, has been exaggerated. The Cretan soil is fertile, and the climate is much more salubrious than is generally supposed; but the supply of ports is very scanty. In calm weather the roadsteads of Sphakia and Hierapetra* can be used for peaceful purposes, and large vessels can anchor with safety in Sitia Bay except during an easterly gale; but the only safe refuge for vessels of all sizes in all kinds of weather is Suda Bay.

Again, Delos—probably from historical associations—has a reputation beyond its merits. Its old impor-

* Or *Gerapetra* or *Kasteli*.

tance, outside the sphere of superstition, was due to its central position between Corinth and Miletus rather than to any command of the Ægean Sea. Melos, with at least an equally good harbour, has a better strategical position, and the commercial centre of the area is certainly Hermoupolis (Syra).

At the same time, perhaps, more attention is due to the islands immediately off the coast, such as Corfu, which is at once fertile, very near the mainland, and provided with an excellent harbour off an otherwise harbourless coast;—Poros, which commands the approach from the south to the Gulf of Ægina, as Zante commands that to the Gulf of Patras;—and Thasos, with available ports in both the north-east and the south-west, or Eubœa, equally valuable as a bulwark from the absence of such ports. But almost everywhere the islands, with their coves, caves, and wooded defiles—like a large proportion of the mainland—are much more suitable for smuggling, piracy, and guerilla warfare, than for formal military or naval operations.

In this respect Greece is a typical area. The coast is at least twice as long in proportion to the size as that even of Great Britain, and the surface is an intricate system of mountains, most of which run out into the sea as bold peninsulas. It was always easiest, therefore, to conduct even domestic trade by sea; and the winding bays and wooded islands offered every facility for illegitimate trade and informal hostilities. Internally the valleys are so near to one another that intercourse could not be avoided, which encouraged trade, but so

small and compact that they could easily be governed from single centres, which developed faction, though common speech, common religion, and common games did tend to unity.

This is more or less true of the whole peninsula, and helps to explain the far from scientifically accurate ethnological statistics. The general character of the area is that of a series of mountain-crowned plateaus, furrowed—like the Iberian plateau—with very deep river-valleys; and it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that every important fluvial basin has its own distinct speech, creed, and political interests, resulting naturally in the profound unrest which is such a terrible drag on social and economic progress. Hope lies in the ruling out of minor interests.

In this expanse of mountainous tableland there are three knots round which definite interests seem to be focussed, or where rival interests clash. Of the three, the Bulgarian knot, with its trinity of heights in Muss-Alla, Rila, and Vitoša, is really the most important; and its features are a curious comment on, if not a reasonable explanation of, Bulgarian ambitions.

Its river systems drain to the four winds, and dominate the eastern half of the peninsula. The two least important, the northern and southern, those of the Isker and the Struma, far overlap, and approach within twenty miles of each other, though the actual gorge of the Isker is not passable, and the Struma gorges below Köstendil are as difficult as the pass over the shoulder of Vitoša (7,518 feet) to Sofia. The two most im-

portant, those of the Nišava (Morava) and Maritsa, make the Sofia basin the strategic centre of the peninsula. Their typical valleys are too narrow and too steep for any natural routes N.E.—S.W., except at Sofia, where the projected Bucharest-Salonica route crosses the Belgrade-Constantinople route; and, therefore, traffic is forced into the Dragoman and Vakarel Passes. The Orient-Express route goes round, not actually through, Trajan's Gate—the old landmark between Illyrium and the Orient; but that point is the epitome and climax of the controlling forces in the funnel-head where the Balkan and Rhodope (Despoto Dagh) ranges meet.

What Muss-Alla is to Bulgaria, Shar Dagh is to Servia; and there will be no permanent peace in Servia so long as 'Old Servia' is more correctly known as the Turkish vilayet of Kossovo, or the Austrian garrison of Novi-Bazar can picnic on the site of Raskha. In the meantime the traditions of Prizren and Ipek, facing each other across the White Drin Valley from the base of Shar Dagh and of Shlieb, lose nothing by retelling in the Monastery of Studeniča, at the base of the Kopaonik.

Again we have rivers draining to every point of the compass—the Drin, Vardar, Morava, and Ibar; and in former times Prizren, which more or less commands the upper basins of all the four, was the natural military and political centre. Now Skoplje (Üsküb) is more important than Prizren, as Mitrovitsa is than Novi-Bazar; for the gully between the Shar Dagh and Muss-Alla knots is a great commercial route, while the old

Roman road across the rugged Albanian highlands has little or no value even for military emergencies.

The strategic centre of the Hellenic area is the Metsovo Pass, below the Zygos knot of the Pindus. The old Roman and military road to Byzantium, the Via Egnatia, naturally started from Dyrrhachium (Durazzo), and used the Shkumbi and Vardar valleys as the shortest route to Salonica; and in those days, as in the time of the Crusades, the command of these two valleys and the convergence of roads on the lower end of Lake Okhrida made Albanon (Elbasan), Herakleia (Monastir), and Lychnidos (Okhrida), the important centres. The Shkumbi valley is still the most vulnerable point of Albania, which is split by it into two portions; but Albania has no separate political existence, and the key even of a large part of it lies in the easier valley of the Viosa (Voyutsa), which practically commands the strategic centre of Berat northwards, and leads southwards directly up to the Metsovo Pass. This pass is also the natural objective of the Arta and Aspropotamo (Mesolonggi) valleys from the south-west, the lower Vistritsa valley from the north-east, and the Salamvria valley from the south-east; and the last is already provided with a railway from Kalabaka—across the battlefield of Pharsalos—to the port of Volos and the great grain-market of Larissa. The head of rail between Kalabaka and Trikkala commands, therefore, the natural routes between Thessaly and Albania, Epirus (Yanina), and Macedonia (Salonica).

The mountain systems of which these knots are the

vital points, may be roughly described as lying in two angles—obtuse in the west, and acute in the east [><], converging precisely at the point where now Serb, Bulgarian, and Turkish frontiers meet; and, when political maps begin to shadow geographical features, as commercial maps must always do, it may be assumed that the settlement is at all events more or less a natural one. The balance of power lies, therefore, considerably to the north of the peninsula; and it is noticeable that the whole mass deliberately turns its back on Italy, even the Ionian islands doing the same. In any case, the Pindus is suitable only for guerilla warfare; and, as the Rhodope range is utterly impracticable, the Balkans remain as the one possible area for formal military operations. That is to say, as far as the mountain system is concerned, Bulgaria is the most important factor in the political problem.

The real importance of a 'Buffer State' depends on the risk of its neutrality being violated either by its own Government or by a victorious neighbour. In the case of a country like Switzerland, which is entirely cut off by other nations from the outside world, its neutrality is guaranteed by the fact that its very existence depends on its remaining neutral; but in the case of a country like Bulgaria—especially when its neighbours are at a stage of civilization considerably below that of France, Germany, Italy, and Austria—there is no such guarantee.

It happens, too, that Bulgaria is physically a typical, or ideal, Buffer State, consisting essentially of the Balkan

Mountains with their 'Russian' and 'Turkish' foregrounds. This position and 'relief' make it an admirable base for offensive operations or defence against them, especially northwards; but the instincts of the people, following the richer and lower slope of their land, are for expansion southwards—*i.e.*, the annexation of the Slav part of European Turkey, especially Macedonia. That is to say, the national ambition conflicts with that of Servia and Greece as well as with that of Austria-Hungary.

Northwards the Balkan foreground consists of a terraced plateau of limestone and sandstone largely covered with loose and porous, but very fertile, soil (loess); and the rivers which descend to the Danube through this formation, in the normally dry climate, have naturally ploughed for themselves narrow steep-sided channels (cañons). This characteristic, added to the fact that both summer and winter are very dry, causes the plateau to be curiously deficient in water, and therefore in good fodder; and, though the fertile soil produces abundance of grass under the spring and autumn rains, the loose soil is converted by them into a sea of mud. From the military point of view, however, there are compensations, for it is only necessary to watch the few fords or bridges across a river where the gulley can be ascended, in order to guard the whole line.

It adds to the difficulty of locomotion that the rivers constantly change their direction, and flow, with a marked independence of one another, to separate con-

fluences with the Danube, involving at least half a dozen serious crossings on a journey from east to west across the country; and therefore the essential object of road-making was to skirt the Danube from Vidin to Silistria, and the Balkans from Vrača to Varna, with links between the strategic centres on both lines. With the advent of railways, less dependent than roads on the ordinary 'relief' of the land, it became feasible to make the shortest (in time) route between Sofia and Varna a railway, capable of supplying either of the road-routes between, and parallel to, which it runs, and covering the 300 odd miles between capital and port, viâ the fortress-depôt of Plevna, in less than twenty-four hours.

This railway is of supreme importance, because it ascends the valley of the Isker—previously impassable—the only river which cuts across the Balkans, and in the valley of which, therefore, there must be one of the great strategic centres of the peninsula. This centre was bound to be where the Belgrade-Constantinople road—the Orient-Express line—crosses the Isker-Struma road—the projected Bucharest-Salonica line—*i.e.*, Sofia.

The railway connects (*cf.* p. 58) with the Danube at the centre of the river-frontier near Nikopoli, the river-bank being in itself an excellent bulwark and very easily fortified. In the first place, it is hard and high, while the opposite shore is low and swampy; and the natural curve of the river—which represents, as in the case of the Po, the exact superiority of the northern tributaries

over the southern in pace and volume—makes the south bank always command the north. Further, as almost all the islands lie along the north bank, there is no cover in the southern waters for an attack on the Bulgarian coast. The chief 'passages' are, however, also protected by fortresses, especially at the frontier posts of Silistria and marsh-girt Vidin, and at Rushchuk, the farthest point eastward from which a railway can run—at a safe distance inside, but parallel to, the Roumanian land-frontier—to the port of Varna, *i.e.*, from the Danube to the Black Sea, in direct rivalry of the Černavoda-Kustenji line.

Rushchuk is, of course, not the only fortress between Vidin and Silistria. Wherever a convex reach of the river 'holds a pistol to the opposite bank'—*e.g.*, at Tutrakan (Turtukai), opposite the estuary of the Arges (Arjish) and the Arges valley route to Bucharest—some attention has been paid to defensive works, just as commercial ports have been developed where concave reaches give a certain amount of access inland—*e.g.*, at Lom Palanka and Svištov (Sistova). But Rushchuk, like the submontane positions of Shumla and Vrača, is a divisional headquarters, and needs special defence at the same time that it has special advantages.

The main routes from the fortresses and passages of the Danube converge in the first instance on railway (old road) stations in the central zone—*e.g.*, Plevna and Razgrad—previous to concentrating on bases of operation for the Balkan passes—*e.g.*, Trnovo and Shumla, Lovča and Osman-Bazar, Pravadia and Bazarjik;

and the distribution of these bases reflects the difference between the eastern and western sections of the range and between their northern and southern slopes.

The extreme length of the Balkans is from Cape Emine to the Timok, the valley of which was the old Roman thoroughfare to and from Transylvania. They are rounded hills, richly wooded, and rocky only towards the base; and there are at least thirty more or less practicable driving-roads across them, though most of them are of very little importance. The position of the Bulgarian quadrilateral (Rushchuk, Silistria, Shumla, and Varna), now unimportant, would suggest that the eastern section of the range is naturally the weaker; and none of the numerous eastern roads seem to reach any height above 1,600 feet. But there is more in the problem, and it is not a new problem. The passes of the Hindu Kush (Killer of Hindus—by avalanches) have been for centuries the chosen routes for traffic, in spite of the well-earned name of the range, because a single great scramble, though necessary, is *sufficient* to cross the whole range; and the choice of Andermatt as a military centre, and of the Brenner Pass as the route of the first Transalpine railway, are comments on the same problem.

In the case of the Balkans, the route from Sliven to Trnovo or Shumla (Šumen) through the Demir Kapu (Iron Gate) Pass is the most easterly pass which gives access between Bulgaria proper and Roumelia, with a single climb of 3,600 feet. In the west the whole Stara Planina section of the range is a single ridge, and even

the longitudinal route from Sofia to Lom Palanka, viâ Berkoviča, ascends to over 4,700 feet in the Ginči Pass.

The considerable height of even the most important passes is a feature common to the whole range. It is usually at least as great as that of Snowdon, and the Shipka is nearly 1,000 feet higher than that. West of the Yantra valley, too, they are overhung by peaks of twice that height, which are covered with snow till the middle of June. Apart from climatic results, this is more important on the south than on the north of the range, for the slope to the low Maritsa plain is much steeper and rougher than that to the comparatively high Bulgarian plateau; and this, so long as there is unity of race on both sides of the range, increases its strategic value to the principality.

Obviously, however, the possession by an enemy of Varna or Burgas turns the east end of the range, as the possession of Sofia turns the west end; and it might seem from the decreasing height of the 'Little' Balkans eastward that it could also be easily turned by a Varna-Burgas land-route. There is such a route, and it is of a double character; but it contains a series of very strong, though low, defensive positions, and, even if undefended, offers serious obstacles. Its only advantages are that the actual coast-road, viâ Misivri, is more or less commanded from the sea, and that communication with the parallel Aiwajik road can be kept up by the transverse valleys of the rivers which both routes cross at right angles.

In any case, the Nadir Derbend Pass between Aitos and the road and rail junction of Pravadia offers a better route only a few miles to the west. The Nadir owes its alternative name of Kiskgetshid (Forty Fords) to the fact that it can be forded almost everywhere at any season of the year; and again there are parallel routes connected by transverse valleys. The Köprikoi route goes through one very dangerous defile, but crosses the main stream of the Kamčik or Kamchyk (The Stony) below the confluence of its two head-streams (The Wild and The Tame); the Jenikoi route avoids the defile, but crosses the two head-streams separately. The pass is inferior to the Dobral (1,465 feet), but has often been used by artillery; and the road surface is certainly not worse than it used to be.

The really critical points, however, are the two ends of the Great Balkans—the Upper Isker valley and the Shipka Pass, and the central route across the Little Balkans—this Dobral Pass. The construction of the railway has made the Upper Isker much the easiest and most important, even apart from its command of the Orient-Express route; Sofia and Tatar Bazarjik control the whole road system through or round Trajan's Gate, and the Maritsa valley is the natural 'line of least resistance' on Adrianople and Constantinople.

The Dobral Pass, though the most difficult, is most convenient for a line of advance supported by sea. The principal roads from Rushchuk and Silistria as well as from Varna and the Dobruja converge on Shumla, and from Shumla there are two routes on the pass, the sea-

ward route, viâ Smadova, being the better for guns. The landward route viâ Eski Stambul,* can be supported, however, from farther west by a road from Osman-Bazar, viâ Kazan, the latter avoiding the Dobral altogether, and joining the other road at Karnabat. In both cases the difficulties of the route *decrease* southward. (*Cf.* The Koja Balkan Pass, p. 52.)

The Shipka Pass also has a comparatively easy, though very winding, approach from the south—the Kazanlük valley; and the northward Yantra valley presents few of the difficulties presented farther eastward by the two transverse branches of the Kamčik. Trnovo is also an even more important road-junction than Shumla; and so this pass is the most used and the most important strategically. But the route itself is not easy, and the Demir Kapu support debouches fifty miles east of Kazanlük. It may be added that the importance of the Shipka Pass has been magnified by the vast military operations of which it has been the scene; but the reputation of the most extensive was originally due to Suleiman's despatches about his own exploits, and their extent was the result of his disgraceful incompetence or deliberate treachery rather than to the geographical importance of the position.

The mountain system thus gives the balance of power to Bulgaria, but the river system gives it to Servia, though the Serbs must bestir themselves if they mean to keep it. Their rivals are the Austrian rulers of the sister-land of Bosnia, which resembles Servia very

* Prjeslav.

closely in the character of its rivers, its climate, its economic products, and its Slav inhabitants; but its Teutonic rulers have developed a fine road system, which is sorely lacking in Servia, to feed the railway, and are projecting a fine railway system. The Bosna-Narenta line already connects the main Austro-Hungarian system with the fortresses of Sarajevo, Mostar, and Trebinje, and through them with the ports of Metkovicz, Gravosa (Ragusa), and Zelenika (Cattaro); and Russian intrigues in Herzegovina and Montenegro offer sufficient reason, on strategic grounds, for extending the line from Sarajevo through the 'Austrian' Sanjak of Novi-Bazar to the Mitrovitsa terminus of the Turkish branch-line from Üsküb. This extension will greatly strengthen Austria's strategic and commercial position as against both Servia and Montenegro. A slight manipulation of rates will follow—on the initiation of the large Austrian capital in the Turkish line—which will kill the Salonica traffic of the Servian section of the line; and passengers may find the Austrian route to Salonica the more beautiful and the less subject to unpleasant interruptions from the local 'brigands.'

The main water-parting of the peninsula is so high and so near the west coast—within five miles in Montenegro—that all the westward rivers are short and torrential, even those which trend northward or southward, as the Viosa and Aspropotamo, being of no use whatever for navigation, and having no very important roads along their banks. But there is a secondary water-parting between Shar Dagh and Muss-Alla,

throwing off rivers northward and southward from a minimum height of only 1,300 feet between the Morava and Vardar, and of not much more than 2,300 feet between the Isker and Maritsa.

The history of the romantic Kossovo-Polye (Plain of Blackbirds), even before it was known by its hated alternative Teutonic title of Amselfeld, suggests that the Upper Ibar valley—the precise route of the projected extension of the Bosnian railway—turns the valley of the main stream of the Morava; and the lowness of the water-parting implies easy and cheap working of the railway, though at Vranya, a mile or two west of the river, the line rises above the minimum of the water-parting.

The result is that the political and commercial relations of the three chief rivers, the Morava, Maritsa, and Vardar, which may roughly represent Serb, Bulgarian, and Turkish influences, give the balance of power to Servia. Sofia, like Üsküb, controls only one of the great through-routes. Niš, although it can be turned viâ the Ibar valley, controls both. Belgrade not only controls both, but also commands the Lower Ibar valley—by rail to the arsenal of Kraguyevac, and by road past the site of Pompey's old fort at Kralyevo—and has, like Niš, easy access to the only good supplies of coal in the whole peninsula.

The height and position of the main water-parting, besides being a great obstacle to east and west traffic, put the peninsula climatically and commercially into relations with the Black Sea rather than the Mediter-

ranean. This involves the certainty of very heavy snow, and the almost more trying uncertainty of the time and intensity of frost. For instance, in 1902 the frost came so early (December 6) and so suddenly that thirty-eight steamers were frozen up for the winter between Braila and the coast, and considerably over 120 loaded barges suffered a similar fate between Braila and Rushchuk. (*Cf.* p. 160.)

Another result of the 'continental' exposure is the prevalence of bleak, dry north-east winds, which raise storms of dust, especially off the loose, porous soil of the Bulgarian plateau. Winds of this kind blow across Roumania on five days out of twelve throughout the whole year, when the passage of a flock of sheep along a typical road may raise enough dust to screen the movements of quite a large body of men. These dust-storms are, naturally, worst on the plains, and much worse on the exposed loess plain of the Danube than on the sheltered alluvial plain of the Maritsa; but they are not confined to the plains, as was shown by the experiences of 1885 on the steep descent from the Dragoman Pass to Slivniča.

Again, the absence of protection on the north-east, coupled with the low atmospheric pressure over the Danube basin in early summer, favours the access inland of strong currents of humid air off the chilly surface of the Black Sea; and this causes constant rains—precisely at the season otherwise most suitable for operations—which convert the loose soil into a liquid the colour and consistency of porridge. Only

a gunner, perhaps, can fully appreciate the meaning of 'Coming up the hill, after leaving Voditzka, all the guns stuck in the mud, and we had to put fourteen horses to each gun and caisson, and so bring them up one by one.'

In the south and south-west, on the other hand, the climate is 'Mediterranean,' and movement of troops from the one belt to the other—*e.g.*, of Suleiman's force from the Montenegrin coast to the Shipka—must be accompanied by the strictest sanitary precautions, for the conditions are almost diametrically opposite. In the 'Mediterranean' area the rain can come only from south and south-west winds, and these winds are 'traded' into the north 'Etesian' winds when the source of the Trade-winds moves northward with the increasing heat, so that dry, healthy weather prevails there at the very time when the rains are commencing in the north-east. In autumn and winter, when the source of the Trade-winds moves south with the sun, the south-west winds blow undisturbed over a sea which is still evaporating against land which is already cooled.

The consequent rains bring a perfect scourge of malaria, not only to lowland areas such as the plains of Kampania and Kopais, but also to the sunken 'saucers' of the highlands—*e.g.*, the Monastir basin. In the latter the disease seems to be endemic; in the former it is due partly to bad tillage, especially in the regulation of surface water, and partly to the historic exodus of the lowlanders into the less accessible hills to escape from their Turkish oppressors.

Perhaps the greatest climatic danger, however—greatest because most underrated—lies in the great extremes and sudden changes of temperature from day to night in the 'continental' area, especially within reach of the Danube fogs; and the essential and sole precaution is good food combined with good woollen clothing. Baker's splendid, but little remembered, action at Tashkessen, if it proved nothing else, proved the value of such precautions.

The supply of good food is a matter of some difficulty, even if the natives are sympathetic; but the cause is not want of fertility. In Servia, for instance, there are two crops of hay, wheat, and barley every year, which sufficiently explains the otherwise puzzling superabundance of (very primitive) flour-mills in the country and the great stores of grain in the State granaries.

The truth is that the relation of climate to 'relief' in the various parts of the peninsula has led to a good deal of specialized agriculture on lines not calculated to guarantee large supplies of necessaries—at least, for troops whose standard of comfort is measured by wheaten bread; and the great extension, for political reasons, in Central Europe of east-and-west trunk railways, converging on a single huge port such as Hamburg, has checked the natural gravitation of products on the nearest 'line of least resistance.' That is to say, the route is decided by the destination; and the destination is in the big markets of North-western Europe. Thus, necessaries drain north-westward—*i.e.*, away from the peninsular mass—by rail; and luxuries, such

as currants and salad-oil, raw silk and attar-of-roses, are not regarded as equivalents by the authorities of the Army Service Corps.

The soil is very poor on the dry exposed uplands, but remarkably rich in the sheltered river-valleys; and in most parts of the peninsula animals are usually obtainable, though not always of the most desirable kind. For instance, in the regions of summer rains, where the hills are covered with dense forests of oak and beech, and the lowlands with miles of maize, there are enormous herds of swine, especially in Servia and Roumania. Indeed, it has been said that, since the days of Prince Milosh the Pig-driver, 'the foreign policy of Servia always brings us back to pigs.' On the dry, treeless slopes of the central and southern hills, on the other hand, sheep and goats—of poor quality—are equally numerous. Game, too, is plentiful almost everywhere; deer and wild-pigs haunt the wooded districts; fish—generally of a coarse kind—are so abundant, especially in the Danube, that they attract vast flocks of water-fowl; pheasants and geese are characteristic of the avifauna, and Servia is famous for its partridges; poultry and eggs are incredibly abundant in the grain districts, especially in Roumania; and the small and ugly native horses are wonderfully hardy and sure-footed.

The export of maize—the staple of home consumption also—from the Lower Danube basin is larger than from any other country in the world except the United States, and nearly all of it comes from the low Wal-

achian plain and the Morava valley—*i.e.*, the banks of the two most important waterways in the peninsula. The higher and drier Bulgarian plateau produces wheat rather than maize, but in sufficient quantities for export; and the sheep and cattle are of good quality, though small in size. Even in this area, however, there are difficulties of supply. All the surplus grain is generally exported as soon after harvest as possible, partly to insure its getting away before the Danube is frozen; and the numerous caves in the limestone and the abundance of scrub offer great facilities to the natives, if unsympathetic, for secreting both grain and cattle.

A greater difficulty—as already stated—is the use of the land for other purposes than the production of necessaries. For instance, a very large proportion of the best soil in Servia, as in Bosnia, is devoted to plum-orchards; in the Tunja basin the special product is roses, for scent; in the Maritsa basin it is the mulberry, for silk production; in the Vardar valley it is opium or tobacco; and round the Gulf of Patras it is the currant crop. Consequently, invaders would have to bring supplies with them —from the north by rail, and from the south by sea.

CHAPTER III

BULGARIA

WHAT is now called United Bulgaria—*i.e.*, Bulgaria proper and Eastern Roumelia—is a rectangular country rather larger than Ireland, less than 250 miles in extreme length from west to east, and less than 150 miles in extreme breadth from north to south.

Within this area there is a population of nearly 3,000,000 persons, as mixed in race and creed, and therefore as difficult to govern, as in other typical areas of Eastern Europe. The mass—some 2,900,000—are Bulgarians, descendants of a 'Yellow' race who centuries ago adopted the language, customs, and creed of the Slav 'White' races whom they conquered, and who may now be regarded as Slavs; but south of the Balkans a typical Bulgarian might still easily be mistaken for a Finn, and the temperament of the people still has an undercurrent of the 'Yellow' element—even in such an insignificant detail as a 'Chinese' aptitude for gardening. Their language is somewhat similar to the Russian, and the Russian characters are

used; but many of the better educated persons speak English fluently.

Next in number to the Bulgarians come the Turkish inhabitants, who are found mainly in three 'strategic' areas—between Silistria and Varna, Shumla and Yamboli (Jambol), Sofia and Plevna; they are the descendants of settlers encouraged — if not actually imported—by the rulers of Constantinople to act as pro-Turkish and pro-Muhammadan leaven.

There is also a fair sprinkling of gipsies, Roumanians, and Greeks, distributed more or less generally over the whole area, along with small groups of Jews, Tatars, and Armenians, and still smaller units of Germans and Austrians, Albanians, Russians, Czechs, Servians, and Italians.

Of this motley crowd the vast majority belong to the Orthodox Greek Church; but, in consequence of a political demand for religious autonomy (in 1870), the Bulgarian Greek Church was declared by the Patriarch of Constantinople to be outside the Orthodox Communion—a declaration as mischievous as it was misguided. The Turks and some of the Albanians are Muhammadans, the Albanian Moslems showing characteristic 'pervert' zeal; the Jews belong to the Mosaic Communion; and the Armenians—of whom it is said in the East that 'an Armenian is worse than nine Jews'—are Gregorians.

On all the adult and able-bodied males of this population, whatever their race or creed, military service is obligatory from the age of twenty (eighteen in

time of war) to that of forty-seven, the only exceptions being men found physically unfit and ministers of religion.

This gives the army a peace footing of about 2,000 officers and 44,000 men, and a war footing of about 5,000 officers and 290,000 men (including mounted gendarmerie and partly-trained men *). The cavalry form about one-ninth of the total, and the artillery consists of seventy-two field batteries and nine mountain batteries, with three fortress battalions. It is estimated that a field army of 150,000 could be mobilized within ten days, consisting entirely of well-trained and well-disciplined men, most of them really good marksmen.

To this must be added a small naval contingent; but the navy is limited to one gunboat of 700 tons (with six quick-firing guns), three armoured gunboats of 500 tons apiece, two torpedo-boats of 300 and 600 tons respectively, five transports, and a few small steamers. This seems to be sufficient for the 200 miles of coast on the Black Sea, where there are only two vital points—some fifty miles apart—Varna and Burgas, though troops have been landed on each side of Burgas, viz., at Sizebolu (Sozopolis) and at Misivri; and a few words may show how even these two points are matters of 'land power.'

Though chosen as the Franco-British depôt in the Crimean War, Varna is by no means an ideal harbour. It offers no shelter from north and north-east winds; the anchorage is only 3 to 5 fathoms, and loading or discharging must be done by lighters. The town is covered

* For number of actual soldiers, see Appendix II.

by Lake Devna, and commanded by heights—now included in the recently renovated fortifications—on both sides of the Pravadi Valley, in which it lies, and near the head of which stands Shumla. From Cape Emine to Varna, hills, averaging 2,000 feet in height, and broken only by the marshy outlet of the Kamčik, slope steeply to shallow shore-waters; and there is a similar coast from Varna to Balčik. North of the latter the hills are uniformly lower, and the sea increases in depth; but the only road inland is that from Balčik to (Haji Oghlu) Bazarjik*—*i.e.*, the neighbourhood of the Dobric cavalry barracks; and, though there is a good road from Dobric to Varna (thirty miles), the road to Murzah (for Silistria) is bad.

From Varna itself the road inland (to Shumla and Silistria), like the railway, at once breaks away from the coast, and leans to the Balkans, running almost parallel with the railway, but a few miles farther north, as far as Yeni-Pazar (Novi-Bazar), where it turns south-westwards to Shumla. There is also a poor road hugging the coast from Varna to Burgas; but the direct road—indifferent as far as Stara Orlehomo, but good beyond that—crosses the Emine Balkans at a height of under 1,500 feet about halfway between the two towns.

Burgas, though only a roadstead, is safe for shipping; and there is good anchorage also at Sizebolu (*cf.* p. 50), twelve miles away. South of Burgas the sea is deep, but the shore is skirted by hills attaining a height of 1,500 feet; between Burgas and Misivri there is a low,

* Hadzi Pazarchzik.

flat plain stretching inland, but the shore-water is shallower. On the other hand, the valleys of rivers which rise in all directions from the town except east—*e.g.*, the Aitos, Hajilar, and Mandra—converge on the Gulf of Burgas, so that there is natural access to the sea.

The main-road inland—again like the railway—leans at once to the Balkans, more or less parallel with the railway, which it crosses at Aitos; and from Aitos there is one of the numerous routes across the Balkans—the Nadir Derbend Pass—which, though not well-made roads, can be used as thoroughfares, and by which in favourable seasons it is possible to move artillery and light transport. The main-road west, after crossing the railway at Aitos, runs on—more or less parallel with it, but five miles farther south—to Karnabat (for Sliven or Yamboli); and from Karnabat there is another 'summer' route across the Balkans—the Dobral Pass. Before reaching Sliven this main-road crosses another main-road—from Eski-Stambul to Yamboli viâ the Koja Balkan Pass; and the latter, though rising to a height of 2,000 feet, is one of the easiest Transbalkan roads. It has the further advantage—to a force from the north—of having a 'support' in the Kazan Pass, through which runs the direct road from Osman-Bazar to Karnabat, crossing the Eski-Stambul—Yamboli road near Kaiabachi. That is to say, Burgas, like Varna, is a *military* outpost of the Balkans.

In time of peace the military forces of Bulgaria are distributed in nine divisional and thirty-six regimental districts, strategically arranged so as to allow and

insure rapid movement of men, and simultaneous concentration at any threatened points on the frontier. The headquarters of the divisions are: Sliven, Philippopolis, Stara Zagora, and Dubniča, in the south; Sofia, which commands both faces of the range; and Shumla, Rushchuk, Plevna, and Vrača, in the north. The frontier fortress of Silistria has a separate contingent of one garrison regiment, one company of fortress artillery, and one company of engineers; and a cavalry regiment is stationed at Dobric. In the event of war, reserve regiments are called up in all the divisions.

The chief feature of the country which this army has to guard, is the great range that gives its name to the peninsula. This range is usually described as consisting of three parts, viz., the Western Balkans (west of Sofia), the Greater or Central Balkans (between Sofia and Kazanlük), and the Eastern or Lesser Balkans (from Kazanlük to the Black Sea). Although appearing to be one continuous mountain chain, the Balkans in reality consist of numerous masses, or groups, of mountains sufficiently distinct to be known to the natives by distinct names. The central portion is the highest, its rounded tops being in places nearly 8,000 feet above the sea; the highest summits of the Western Balkans rise to 7,000 feet, but the chain is uniformly lower than the Central Balkans; the average height of the Lesser Balkans is some 2,000 feet lower, and, as they approach the Black Sea coast, they sink into insignificant hills.

Throughout the length of this great range spurs pro-

ject in all directions both north and south, forming an intricate network of under-features. As we have seen, the slopes of the spurs are more gentle northwards than southwards, in which direction they frequently end abruptly in limestone escarpments, sometimes 200 feet in height. In this manner numerous natural basins are formed, well enough sheltered to be very fertile. For the most part, too, the range is well wooded, principally with large oaks and beeches; and on the lower slopes, especially to the north, the undergrowth is in places almost impenetrable. The valleys are bold and rocky, and usually clothed with evergreens, wild-pears, and lime-trees, while countless streams flow down towards the Danube.

From a military point of view the Balkans form a valuable defensive line, inasmuch as they can only be crossed by certain passes; but, if these are undefended, the passage of the mountains is attended by few difficulties to an invading army from the north. The paths and minor trails across the mountains are numerous; but the roads by which an army and its transport would be able to move without difficulty, are few.

There are only some nine* passes by which fairly well-made roads cross the Balkans; but there are many passes which—as we have said—have at times been used as main thoroughfares, and by which, in favourable seasons, it would be quite possible to move artillery and light transport. Some of these are still much used

* Koja, Kazan, Col de Ferdjis, Hainkioi, Shipka, Baba Konak, Ginči, Dragoman, and St. Nicholas.

in the summer months, such as the Nadir Derbend between Pravadia and Aitos (*cf.* p. 39); the Dobral (*cf.* p. 39), between Shumla and Karnabat; the Demir Kapu, between Trnovo and Sliven; and the Tröian Pass, north of Tatar Bazarjik. Others, though only negotiable by men in single file, are capable of exercising considerable influence on military operations, as offering routes for turning, or even taking in reverse, the defences of the main passes.

South of the Balkans and the Tunja River, but north of Philippopolis and Tatar Bazarjik, there is a minor chain of mountains, sometimes spoken of as the Anti-Balkans, and bearing such local names as Srednagora—*i.e.*, Middle Mountains—and Karaja Dagh; the former are a strategical 'island,' being enclosed, except for about a mile on the north, by two tributaries of the Maritsa. South again, forming a natural boundary of Bulgaria almost as far east as Adrianople, lie the Rhodope Balkans, or Despoto Dagh.

This mountain system gives the country three principal watersheds—the Balkans, the Anti-Balkans, and the Rhodope Balkans. The bulk of the water drains north into the Danube, on its way to the Black Sea, and south into the Maritsa, on its way to the Gulf of Enos (Ægean Sea). In the east, where the mountains shelve towards the Euxine coast, short rivers and streams find their way direct to the Black Sea; but they are of little importance, except, perhaps, behind Burgas (*cf.* p. 52) and Varna.

The northward rivers generally flow through deep

ravines (*cf.* p. 34), and are not navigable except for very short distances from the Danube; they are all, therefore, great obstacles to troops moving eastward or westward across the country, though their relative value varies considerably. For instance, the Eastern Lom has commercial and military value to Rushchuk, and gives a 'supply' connection viâ the Ak (White—*i.e.*, 'clear') branch with Shumla, on the foreground of the Lesser Balkans, and viâ the Kara (Black—*i.e.*, 'muddy') branch with Osman Bazar, on the foreground of the Greater Balkans.

The Yantra, on the other hand, has no commercial value; but it has important bridges at Gabrovo and Biela, and winds through and round Trnovo—between high limestone rocks—in such a way as to make that a position of great natural strength, twin hills surrounded by natural fosses. So the Osma increases the natural strength of Lovča — a far stronger position than Plevna, being just in front of the Tröian Pass, and at easy distance from the Shipka; as the Popoliviča surrounds Vidin with a natural marsh. The Timok makes a useful international frontier, and the Western Lom makes Lom Palanka the busiest port in Western Bulgaria.

The southern rivers, while much less numerous than the northern, are—always excepting the Danube—of much greater importance both commercially and politically; and, though the Maritsa itself is by far the most important, the valley of the Upper Tunja, like those of the Arda and Ergene in Turkey, give peculiar facilities

for longitudinal movement—on Burgas from the west, and on Adrianople from east or west.

The chief Bulgarian main-roads are well-metalled highways, and in the summer months they are hard and good; but, when the autumn rains fall, they would soon be cut up by constant heavy traffic, and in the winter rain, snow, and frost often render them impassable. Country roads, of varying value for transport, run from village to village, and connect with the main-roads; in the dry months they are generally in very fair condition, but, if intended to be utilized at other seasons for the movement of large bodies of men, they would require considerable labour to keep in repair. As a rule, the bridges on the main-roads are well built (of stone), such as those over the Yantra at Gabrovo and Biela, and over the Maritsa at Philippopolis; but in the more out-of-the-way parts the bridges on the country roads are narrow, and are sometimes allowed to fall into a bad state of repair. Here and there troops might move alongside of the roads, but in most parts this is not feasible, for the roads often traverse deep rocky valleys or pass through dense scrub; and even in the more open, undulating country, wherever the soil is rich and loamy, all movement off the roads is impossible.

In dealing with the roads, it is necessary to consider them both defensively and offensively—*i.e.*, as available to the Bulgarians in order to resist invasion, and as available to an invading army. With regard to the former, it need only be said that from the centre of each

military district there are good main-roads to the frontiers and to the detached stations of the district, as well as to the headquarters of neighbouring districts.

The divisional headquarters (mentioned on p. 53) form a rough semicircle or 'horseshoe,' in intimate relation with the railway system of the country; the open 'heel' of the horseshoe is practically the right bank of the Danube between the two points—Somovit and Rushchuk—at which the railway touches the river. The weakness and the strength of the railway system (some 1,000 miles) lie in the fact that a considerable portion of the 'toe' of the horseshoe forms an integral part of the great Orient-Express route to and from Constantinople, which enters Bulgaria at Tsaribrod (Caribrod), and follows the route of the great trunk-road viâ the Dragoman Pass and Sofia.

Bulgaria is fortified specifically against Servia, as witness the fortresses of Belograjik, Slivniča, and Sofia; and it is significant that from Sofia there is a branch-line southward to Radomir—*i.e.*, the Struma Valley and the Köstendil roads to both ends (Vranja and Kumanovo) of the Morava-Vardar water-parting—and that eastward of Sofia the line avoids actually passing through or to the towns of Ichtiman, Tatar Bazarjik, and Philippopolis. So the Burgas connection, viâ Yamboli and Nova Zagora,* joins the Orient-Express route at the insignificant junction of Seimen (Trnovo Seimenli), while its important branch through Stara Zagora* to Čirpan does not join the main-line at

* Nova Zagora = Yeni Saghra, Stara = Eski.

all, though it comes to within a few miles of the halfway station (Papasli) between Seimen and Tatar Bazarjik.

Even in the north the same foolish policy is adopted. The main-line from Sofia to Varna certainly passes through Plevna, Trnovo, and Shumla; but the branch from Plevna to the Danube avoids Nikopoli, and the branch from Rushchuk to the Sofia-Varna line avoids both Razgrad (by five miles) and Shumla (by twelve miles). That is to say, some of the most important *direct* communications must be made by road.

Bulgaria being fortified specifically against Servia, it is natural that the military centres should be distributed mainly in the west—in the direction of Sofia and Vrača; but there is no neglect of vital interests elsewhere. In Eastern Roumelia the divisions of Sliven and Philippopolis represent respectively the relation of the Tunja Valley to the sea-approach viâ Burgas and the relation of the rail-approach to the Maritsa Valley, while Stara Zagora bars the one and flanks the other; and the quadrilateral of Rushchuk, Silistria, Dobric, and Shumla, represent the approach viâ Varna and the Danube, the stronger position in each case being in the rear. This general distribution of troops has been accompanied by concentration of engineering power in a few places. Thus, Svištov, where the Russians crossed the Danube in 1877 in the face of the Turks, the old stronghold of Nikopoli, Rahova, and Lom Palanka, are no longer very strong fortresses. But the north-west angle of the frontier has in Vidin a fortress strongly

garrisoned, with extensive works, and armed with modern siege and field guns; and the north-east angle of the frontier has in Silistria a natural fortress—standing on high ground, which falls in steep terraces to the river, and is difficult of access from the land side—surrounded by good modern fortifications. Dobric is also strongly fortified, and has outlying works on the east facing Balčik and the Black Sea.

Rushchuk (with a population of 30,000), as covering a main passage of the Danube from the Roumanian railhead of Giurgevo, is still of considerable strategic importance; but the old fortifications have not been modernized, and are practically 'dummies,' though a series of earthworks has been thrown up for some miles between the Danube and the railway to Trnovo.

There are small fortifications at the Shipka and Ginči Passes, Lovča is fortified on the north, and Sliven has three works on the west; but the great fortress of the Balkans is Shumla, a well-fortified entrenched camp in a valley of the steep-faced rocky plateau, and capable of accommodating a large field army. Its position, means of communication, and armament enable it to guard all the eastern passes.

The other fortifications are more or less in direct relation with Sofia. To the south-east, behind small works at Staminaka, stands Philippopolis, badly placed for the passes, but where the plain changes to highland in the form of the seven granite hills on which the town is built. The foreground is dotted with tumuli 25 to 50 feet high, each a suitable position for a gun,

with good command of view and fire; and the road from Philippopolis is marked, every 30 kilomètres, by ruined étapes (the old Turkish military stations).

To the south and west of Sofia there is a semicircle of small fortifications on or near the frontier—round Belograjik, west of Tsaribrod, near Grabechea, west of Köstendil, and south of the divisional headquarters of Dubniča. On the main-road west, immediately at the foot of the abrupt Dragoman descent, Slivniča has been strongly fortified, partly with fieldworks, and partly with eight semi-permanent works; and Sofia itself is surrounded by a ring of outlying works, seven in number, armed with modern quick-firing Nordenfeldt and other guns. The troops in the capital, besides the Royal Body Guard, include two and a half regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, one of field artillery, and one battalion of railway and telegraph engineers; there is one battalion of fortress artillery at Slivniča, and half a regiment of infantry at Tsaribrod.

The railway northwards from Sofia hugs the Isker, but the two possible military roads diverge, the one eastward to the Baba-Konak Pass (3,240 feet) for Orkhanie (and Plevna), the other westward to the Ginči Pass (4,730 feet) for Vrača (and Vidin), both of them crossing the upper waters of the Isker at five places.

Westward the old (Roman) trunk-road runs beside the Orient-Express line, crossing or being crossed by it several times. More or less parallel with this great thoroughfare, but diverging enough to increase the distance from forty to sixty-five miles, there is another

route from Sofia to the Servian frontier near Klisura, which climbs the Erma Valley to Trn, and then works south-eastwards along the mountains to Pernik, crossing the Struma-Isker water-parting at a considerable height under the shoulder of Vitoša.

The other important roads — from the south — approach Sofia by the same route. One is the main-road from Üsküb and Kumanovo, which crosses the frontier near Grabechea (seventy miles), and—after descending to Köstendil, where one infantry regiment is always stationed—has a stiff climb through very rough country up to Radomir, connecting at Pernik with the railway to Sofia. Halfway between Pernik and Sofia this road is joined by one from Barakli (fifty-five miles) viâ Dubniča. Both these roads are entirely in the Struma basin, and—like the Klisura road—must pass through Bali Efendi in approaching Sofia.

The roads eastward of Sofia are only two in number, one being a short road from Goubliane up the valley of the Golema-Isker tributary of the Isker to Kalikovo and Samakov; and from the latter place, which is garrisoned by three batteries of mountain artillery, there are very rough roads to Köstendil (forty-five miles) viâ Dubniča, and to the Servian frontier near Baria Mahala (seventy-five miles) viâ Radomir and Bresnik.

The other road is, of course, the great trunk connection with Trajan's Gate viâ Ichtiman. It runs beside the Orient-Express line, and has an excellent surface, the bridges being solidly built of stone.

Vrača occupies north of the Etropol Balkans a

position somewhat similar to that of Sofia to the south, though less important. The Stara Planina heights, pierced only by the St. Nicholas Pass (4,505 feet), form a real rampart against Servia; and the critical points are garrisoned—Vidin by two regiments of infantry and half a battalion of fortress artillery, Belograjik by another half-battalion of fortress artillery, Lom Palanka by a regiment of cavalry, and Berkoviča by three batteries of mountain artillery. Due west of Vidin there is a good road to Kula (Adlie) for the Servian frontier; and main-roads from Vidin (viâ Belograjik) and Lom Palanka converge at Choupren to ascend the left bank of the Lom to the St. Nicholas Pass, while another main-road runs from Lom Palanka viâ Berkoviča to the Ginči, where it joins the road from Rahova viâ Vrača.

Plevna, as we have already suggested, is naturally a less important site than Lovča; but, with the advent of the railway, it became a more accessible centre for a divisional headquarters, with a garrison of a regiment and a half of infantry. It forms the apex of a triangle, the base of which is the Central Balkans from Orkhanie (the Baba-Konak Pass) to Gabrovo (the Shipka), with advanced posts at Lovča and Selvi, the latter garrisoned by a regiment of field artillery.

The main-road (south-west) from Plevna to the Baba-Konak is by no means an easy one. North of Telich it threads a valley of the Vid basin (the Milin Kladenec), and has a similar course for some fifteen miles (almost to Yabloniča) in the Isker basin; from a high ridge

south of Osikoviča it plunges into the narrow gorge of the Praveč, winds through a small valley to Orkhanie, and then climbs a deep defile to the pass, with a gradient in some places of 1 in 10. On the other hand, the main-road (south) to the Tröian Pass (3,445 feet) is, except for the actual crossing of the pass, comparatively good and easy, ascending gradually the left bank of the Osma from Lovča to the first terrace of the Balkans near Troian, where the road surface deteriorates, and does not improve till it reaches Karlovo.

Lovča has also a good direct road eastward viâ Selvi to Trnovo, the great central road-junction of Northern Bulgaria, with a garrison of two regiments of infantry and commanding both the road viâ Drenova and Gabrovo* to the Shipka and that viâ Fedabei and Elena to the Ferdjis Pass (Col de Ferdjis). The latter road crosses two large streams, to the valley of one of which it is confined for some eight miles; but from Elena over the pass the travelling is quite good as far as Tvardiča. The road to Gabrovo passes through undulating country, crossing numerous (well-bridged) streams; but south of Gabrovo, where the Yantra is crossed, the climb to the Shipka is steep and rough. There is, however, no defile, the road merely winding over the mountains, with a slight dip in the middle of the pass. The descent from the summit to the village of Shipka is rapid.

Trnovo has also direct road-communication north (to Rushchuk viâ Biela) and east (to Shumla viâ Osman

* There is a by-road from Gabrovo to Elena viâ Trnovo.

Bazar). The road to Osman Bazar (forty-five miles) runs viâ Kesarova, a fine position on river-girt hills with commanding heights behind it—*i.e.*, southwards; but from about six miles east of Kesarova the surface is not well kept, and is therefore liable to get out of order. The north road, which crosses the Yantra—from the left bank—at Biela, is thoroughly good; there are strong stone bridges over all the rivers; and the country is fertile and well timbered.

East of the Rushchuk-Varna railway, owing to the character of the Dobruja plateau (*cf.* p. 72) and the nearness of the artificial land-frontier, so little attention has been paid to the roads that communication is very poor; even the one main-road, from Silistria to Shumla, is bad the whole way from Nasabchilar to Kanti-Dere, where it connects with the railway. West of the line the case is different, especially south of Razgrad, the natural junction of the trunk-road from Shumla to Rushchuk with the road* from the Koja Balkan Pass viâ Kazan (Kotel), Osman Bazar, and Eski Džumaja, where the Plevna-Shumla railway is crossed. North of Razgrad the trunk-road, running practically parallel with the railway, crosses the Ak Lom, once near Pisantsa and twice near Hinsenji, and north of Shumla it hugs the right bank of the same river for some twenty miles in climbing the water-parting between the Ak Lom and the Pravadi-Kamčik basins. In addition to its natural

* These two roads meet also south of the Balkans, near Kaiabachi, and are connected just north of the Dobral by an indifferent road viâ Eski Stambul.

strength, Shumla is garrisoned by two regiments of infantry, one regiment of field artillery, one battalion of fortress artillery, and one battalion of engineers.

South of the Balkans the road system is practically determined by the course of the Maritsa and Tunja, and the chief centre is Philippopolis, which is garrisoned by one regiment of infantry, one regiment of field artillery, half a regiment of cavalry, and one pontoon company.

The great trunk-road from Constantinople, after leaving Adrianople, follows the left bank of the Maritsa as far as Mustafa Pasha, where it changes to the right bank, crossing the Orient-Express line a few miles farther west on the Bulgarian frontier. From this point to Hermanli, where half a regiment of cavalry is stationed, the road and the railway run side by side up the Maritsa Valley, intercrossing several times; but from Hermanli, while the railway still keeps to the river, the road leans southward through Hasköi, which is in more direct line with Philippopolis, and at which a regiment of infantry is stationed.

Road and rail meet again at Papasli, but from there to the infantry depôt (of one regiment) of Tatar Bazarjik the road keeps to the river, while the railway bends southward, guarded by Stanimaka, where one regiment of infantry and three batteries of mountain artillery are stationed. At Papasli, too, the railway and the great trunk-road are joined by the main-road from Sliven to Philippopolis, which crosses the Maritsa about five miles north-east of Papasli, after winding

along the south-eastern spurs of the Anti-Balkans down to Ichtiman.

The Tunja-Burgas depression has two centres, Stara Zagora and Sliven, each garrisoned by a regiment of infantry, and Sliven having also a regiment of field artillery. The north road from Stara Zagora has a steep descent (1,000 feet in ten miles) from the Anti-Balkans (Karaja Dagh) to the Tunja, which is crossed some fifteen miles from Kazanlük. The latter guards the south end of the Shipka Pass, with a garrison of one regiment of infantry, and has a road-link with Philippopolis viâ Kalofer—*i.e.*, the Tulovsko Polye or upper Tunja Valley—and Karlovo, where there is a junction with the road from the Tröian Pass, the joint road then following the right bank of the Striema to the confluence with the Maritsa.

Between Stara Zagora and Sliven the Tunja is again crossed—at Baniata—by a road (of poor quality) from the Ferdjis Pass to Nova Zagora; and at Yamboli, which is garrisoned by a regiment of cavalry, roads from Sliven, the Koja Balkan Pass, Shumla, and Karnabat, converge on the confluence of the Tunja with its chief tributary.

Of course, the condition of all these roads varies with the weather, which, however, varies much less than in an insular country, such as the United Kingdom; and, as a rule, the variations are 'regular,' and can be foreseen. Indeed, the worst feature of the variability is its effect on the health of man and beast, for even at the most favourable time of year the climate is

treacherous. The low swampy ground in the vicinity of the Danube is unhealthy in the summer months; and here, as also in the Balkans, the great difference of temperature between day and night would be likely to cause much sickness among troops in the field. When the autumn rains fall (September), the parched-up country gives forth a steamy heat; and the decaying vegetation washed down by the streams pollutes the water and the air. Later in the year, when the rain gives place to snow, the climate, though more healthy, becomes, especially in the mountains, extremely severe. At all seasons the health of troops operating in the country must, therefore, be a source of great anxiety, for, unless well fed and well clothed, the men will rapidly succumb to sunstroke, diarrhœa, fevers, and other ailments. The records of the various campaigns in Bulgaria are filled with accounts of the decimation of armies by disease.

Excepting the higher parts of the mountain ranges, the country is remarkably fertile and productive. In early summer Northern Bulgaria is clothed with vegetation, and produces immense crops of maize and other cereals; pasturage also is extensive, and cattle and sheep are abundant. By August, however, the intense heat of the sun has burned up the grass, and forage becomes scanty. South of the Balkans the various valleys and basins are richly cultivated and well stocked with cattle and sheep; and the inhabitants themselves never want for food. The extent to which an invading army could obtain supplies in the country, however, depends not only on the time of year, but also on the attitude of the

inhabitants towards the invaders. The Bulgarians are adepts at concealing their grain stores ; and the thickly-wooded nature of many parts of the country, combined with the caves and other secluded spots in the mountains, enables them to hide their flocks and herds rapidly. Still, if the people are in sympathy with the invader, the supplies of an army may be augmented very considerably ; and in any case, if the operations take place in the early summer, the products of the country can be had for the gathering. There would at that season be no lack of forage for horses ; and a fair supply of fresh vegetables and fruit could be collected in most districts. Fuel (and timber for all purposes) is generally plentiful ; but water, though usually abundant, is very frequently chalky and bad for drinking.

Amongst other things the country is capable of supplying coarse woollen clothing, of which there is a considerable manufacture, and oxen for transport ; but no supply of horses can be relied on. If the Bulgarian army were mobilized, every available horse would be requisitioned ; in any case, the breed is small and unsuited for draught purposes, and the Bulgarians themselves import horses from Russia. Hungary, and elsewhere.

CHAPTER IV

ROUMANIA

It seems desirable to give a short account of Roumania on political rather than geographical grounds. Indeed, geographically it has very little in common with the Balkan Peninsula *quâ* peninsula, but it is very closely involved in typically 'Balkan' politics. The land is more or less a tongue of Russia, and the country has owed much to Russia; but the people are most akin to those of the south-west of the Austro-Hungarian Empire —where some 3,000,000 Roumanians are domiciled— and all the adjacent Powers resented the assertion of a united Roumanian kingdom on the base of the two old princedoms.

This unity, however, is not superficial. Out of a population of some 6,000,000—in an area about equal to that of England (without Wales)—more than 92 per cent. are Roumanians, and 90 per cent. belong to the Orthodox Greek Church; and, since they gained their independence, they have devoted their energies to the development of the natural resources of the country, one result of which may be seen in the denser population

and much greater volume of trade on the Roumanian than on the Bulgarian bank of the Danube.

Their language, unlike that of their southern neighbours, is essentially Romance, though much modified by Slav influences; and its importance lies in the fact that it is spoken by at least 4,000,000 persons in adjacent countries, mainly in Austria-Hungary, but also largely in Bessarabia, Servia, Bulgaria, the Pindus district, and Macedonia. The national desire for commercial development can only be gratified in the absence of war, but the very existence of the country depends on its ability to defend itself against the aggressions of its neighbours and to preserve the appropriate neutrality of a Buffer State. Consequently, every Roumanian is liable to military service from his twenty-first year for twenty-five years; and this gives the army a peace footing of about 130,000 of all ranks, and a war footing of about 190,000.

The various arms are, roughly, in the proportion of—infantry, two-thirds; artillery, one-twelfth; cavalry, one-fifteenth; engineers, one-thirtieth. The artillery consists of horse, field, mountain, and fortress batteries, with a total of 438 guns of all kinds; and the bulk of the whole army could be mobilized in about a fortnight. There is also a small but increasing naval contingent, including one cruiser of 1,320 tons (with eight guns, four machine-guns, and four torpedo-tubes), three coastguard vessels (armed with machine-guns), five small gunboats, three first-class and four second-class torpedo-boats, and four torpedo-sloops. The head-

quarters of the Sea Division are at Kustenji (Constanța), and those of the River Division at Galatz, where there is a marine arsenal.

The length of sea-coast to be defended is only some 140 miles, but it is of great importance from a commercial as well as from a strategic point of view, because it includes the mouths of the Danube and a harbour (Kustenji) in direct railway communication with Western Europe. Further, the hinterland is the bleak, barren, difficult plateau of the Dobruja, where the formation is a very porous limestone overlaid by fine gray sand, through which all moisture sinks instantly. Kustenji, an old Genoese seaport, has been so much improved of late years that it is now the principal seaport of the country. It is not fortified, but is well sheltered by a mole, which shuts in two large basins, with good wharfage and other conveniences; and it has the special advantage over the Danube ports of being seldom, if ever, closed by ice in winter. Since the construction of the railway-bridge across the Danube at Černavoda this freedom from ice has drawn a vast proportion of the winter traffic to the port.

The lagoons between Kustenji and the St. George's mouth of the Danube are too shallow to form a harbour of any value, but they are of great size, and do give access, though with great difficulty, for some considerable distance towards Babadagh and the heights in the neighbourhood commanding the road from Mejidia to Tulcea.

The importance of Tulcea lies in its command of the

apex of the Danube delta, and its favourable situation for the Sulina mouth. The latter carries only some 7 per cent. of the total volume of the river, but it is the shortest and the least silted, and therefore the most free from dangers and difficulties. The Kilia mouth has such a strong current, and is so much silted, that it is almost useless; and the St. George's mouth is not much better.

The river frontier—on the Danube and the Pruth—is much more important than the sea-coast, and has a curious uniformity throughout. In each case the right bank is steep, and the left is low and flat; that is to say, the natural elevation is in favour of Roumania in the east, but adverse in the south. In the latter case, however, there are compensations—in the shape of lateral swamps and islands. The great volume of water contributed to the Danube from the Carpathians, and the fierce current of the northern tributaries—to which is due the southward trend of the river between the Iron Gates and Galatz—cause very heavy and unequal distribution of alluvium, with the result that some of the 'tributaries' have been diverted eastward before joining the river, thus causing a series of swamps and lakes. At all times these are obstacles to the movement of man and goods eastward or westward near the river except by the highroad, and in flood-time they are exceedingly dangerous to life and health.

Further, the islands along the Roumanian bank are often of very considerable length, and thickly covered—as the bank itself is—with willows and poplars. These

alluvial islands are, of course, commanded by the high right bank of the river (averaging 300 feet, but reaching 1,000 in some places); but the width and depth of the river cause it to be a considerable obstacle to actual invasion from the south. The width varies from about 300 yards to nearly three miles, and the depth in mid-stream from 10 feet (an exceptional minimum) to 100 feet, the current having an average rate of about two miles an hour.

There is still another advantage to Roumania in the fact that there are very few places where the loess terrace—the edge of which is marked approximately by the route of the railway—of the interior impinges on the north bank of the river so as to afford a natural site for a bridge or other means of crossing; and wherever there is solid ground for such a purpose, it is already occupied by a town. Indeed, the places in question can be recognised on the map by the pairs of towns *vis-à-vis* by which they are marked. The Pruth is, naturally, not nearly so deep as the Danube; but it is navigable by small craft almost as far as the Austrian frontier, it has a very tortuous course, and the parallel line of the Sereth is fortified.

Galatz, near the confluence of the two frontier rivers, has peculiar importance, both strategic and commercial. Though, as the grain port for Walachia, it is being supplanted by Braila, which is twelve miles nearer Bucharest, it still monopolizes the Moldavian trade in grain, by boat viâ the Pruth, and in minerals and timber, by rail viâ the Sereth Valley. Strategically, it forms the

right of the important Sereth line of fortifications, and has a fortified front of some ten miles facing north, from Lake Bratisu to the bluffs above the Sereth-Danube confluence. There are three lines of defence and fifty-one batteries, armed with Krupp and other modern guns and howitzers as well as mortars; and the natural strength of the site—between the Pruth and the Sereth, Lake Bratisu and the Danube—is very great.

In the centre of the Sereth line of works is Nemolassa, an important bridge-head, with seven miles of 'horse-shoe' front, covering (from the left bank) the road and railway bridges across the Sereth. The bridge-head has two lines of defence and thirty batteries. The left flank of the Sereth line is also protected by a semicircular front of some thirteen miles from Focsani to Odobesti; the fortifications are on the right bank of the river, and —like those at Galatz and Nemolassa—are solidly constructed of concrete and iron. There are three lines of defence and seventy-one batteries, heavily armed with modern weapons.

The mountain frontier of the country is certainly of some value as a defence against the possible inroads of Austria-Hungary, but the available passes are so many and so easy that it is doubtful whether the Roumanian army unaided could defend them. The range does, however, form a natural barrier and national frontier from Bukovina to the Iron Gates; it rises in some places to a height of 8,000 feet, and the only real break is the gorge by which the Aluta River finds its way from Transylvania to the Danube.

There are at least ten passes by which good roads cross the mountains; and of these *four* diverge from the Austrian town of Kronstadt—the Torsburg south-westwards to Campulung, the Tömös southward to Predeal, the Buzĕu south-westward to Buzĕu, and the Oitoz north-eastward to Ocna. Similarly to the south, three converge on Craiova—the Verciorova (*i.e.*, the Iron Gates), the Vulkan, and the Roteturm, both the Verciorova and the Roteturm (like the Tömös) carrying also railways. The passes north of the Oitoz are not very important, but the Gyimes carries a railway (to Ocna), and the Tölgyes (or Prisacani) and the Bekas converge on Piatra.

The general slope of the country from these highlands is towards the south-east—*i.e.*, towards the Danube; but the descent is by no means uniform, the mass of Walachia being lowland, while at least half of Moldavia is plateau.

The foot-hills consist principally of tertiary sandstone and clay, and give on to an extremely fertile loess terrace, which in turn is succeeded by alluvial plains so rich in humus (20 to 40 inches deep) that they are of almost unique fertility; but the loose and uncertain character of the soil, especially near the mouths of the Alpine valleys, and the innumerable windings of the rivers, interfere considerably with the construction and the working of railways.*

The river system is correspondingly simple, and the

* The pace, *e.g.*, in the Prahova Valley up to the Tömös Pass is a mere crawl.

rivers have many characteristics in common; but the more rapid descent of the western rivers has caused them to cut deep steep-banked channels, and the greater breadth of plain has caused them to become shallow, sluggish, and liable to form wide flood-marshes along both banks. Most of them have broad pebbly beds, and are skirted by a good deal of timber 'cover.'

As in Bulgaria, we find a large proportion of the rivers working their way independently to separate confluences with the Danube, and thus offering constant obstacles to the passage of troops parallel with that river; and it is characteristic of the area for the towns to be on the 'home' bank, *i.e.*, the east bank of the western rivers—*e.g.*, Craiova, east of the Yiu (Schyl), and Slatina, east of the Aluta (Olt), but the west bank of the eastern —*e.g.*, Bacău, west of the Sereth, and Bârlad, west of the Bârlad. The absence of towns at the mouths of the rivers is equally characteristic.

For military purposes, Roumania north of the Danube is divided into four districts, in each of which in time of peace an Army Corps is stationed, while the Dobruja is garrisoned by a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry. Each Army Corps is composed of two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry; each infantry division contains two infantry brigades; each brigade two regiments; and each regiment two battalions. All are numbered in the most systematic manner; thus, the 1st Army Corps is composed of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the 1st Division of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, the 1st Brigade of the 1st and 2nd Regiments, and so on; while

to each division also there belong a rifle battalion, a regiment of field artillery, and a company of engineers.

The distribution of this force is decided mainly by the shape of the country, while the character of the surface has greatly facilitated or imperatively demanded the construction of good lines of communication. Excellent well-metalled roads connect all the larger towns; and, in order to develop the resources of the country, much attention has been paid also to the improvement of the cross-roads. Bridges are well built and kept in good repair; and, where they are liable to be periodically washed away by sudden floods—*i.e.*, on the higher land at the foot of the Carpathians—there is an ample supply of growing timber for hasty repairs.

The railways, like the roads, have been constructed more for commercial than for military purposes, and the rolling-stock is somewhat deficient for the movement of large bodies of men; but the system is sufficiently complete to enable a rapid concentration of troops to be effected at all points where they are most likely to be required.

The Dobruja plateau being Roumanian, there remain four natural centres of strategic importance—two, east and west, facing Bulgaria, and two, north and south, facing Russia, Bucharest and Craiova, Yassy and Galatz; and, from the character of the river-bank in each case, we should have expected that the two southern towns would stand—as they do—much farther from the Danube and its lateral marshes than the two eastern towns would stand from the right bank of the Pruth.

Bucharest—Bucuresci, 'the city of pleasure'—is a modern city in a peculiar position. Though a vast expanse of lowland spreads for miles in every direction except to the north-west, the city itself is surrounded by low hills, which have enabled it to be made into perhaps the largest fortified camp in the world except Paris, capable of accommodating 200,000 men. The fortifications, which were completed in 1885, consist of eighteen detached forts, encircling the city at an average distance of eight miles from its centre, with a redan between each pair of forts. The total perimeter of the fortifications is between forty-five and fifty miles, and the forts are of six different types, heavily armoured and with all modern improvements, including a special military railway and telegraph or telephone connecting the whole system. Each fort is well armed with some fifteen modern weapons, viz., 6-inch guns, 8·26-inch howitzers, and 2-inch quick-firing guns, the largest fort being that at Chitila, where the railways from Ploescĭ and Pitescĭ unite to be subsequently joined by those from the Černavoda Bridge and Giurgevo—all four railways thus approaching the city from the *west*.*

The out-stations of the Bucharest Army Corps are in intimate relation with these lines of rail, the only station eastward of the city being at Černavoda itself, where a rifle battalion is stationed; and, though one regiment of cavalry and two of infantry are stationed

* One good main-road leads south-east from Bucharest to the Danube at Oltenița—the *vis-à-vis* of Turtukai—hugging the left bank of the Arges as it approaches the Danube.

due north of the city—at Ploescĭ—they are in connection with Galatz, not Bucharest.

At Bucharest itself there are stationed three regiments of cavalry, two of infantry, two of artillery, one of fortress artillery, one of engineers, and a rifle battalion. A regiment of cavalry and one of infantry are stationed at the railway-terminus and river-port of Giurgevo,* and a similar force at the railway-terminus of Turnu-Magurele, on the elevated ground behind the confluence of the Aluta with the Danube—*i.e.*, some four miles north of the Bulgarian river-port of Nicopoli. The rest of the Bucharest command is concentrated to the north-west, one regiment of infantry watching the Torsburg Pass from the railway-terminus of Campulung, supported by two regiments of infantry and one of artillery at the important road and rail junction of Pitescĭ, and by one regiment of infantry at the depôt and repairing arsenal of Tîrgoviste, also a railway-terminus. The latter is connected directly by road with Campulung and with the powder-works of Ploescĭ.

A position similar to that of Tîrgoviste (as a road junction) in the north is held in the south by Alexandria, which is connected by good main-roads with Giurgevo and Turnu-Magurele, and with the river-port of Zimnița, and commands, along with Rosiĭ de Vede, all the lower course of the Vede River and the centre of the branch line of rail from Rosiĭ de Vede (Roșiori) to Zimnița.

None of these towns on the north bank of the river, however, are really as important as Černavoda, where

* Connected by ferry with the Rushchuk-Varna line.

[illegible]

To accompany BLACK'S MILITARY GEOGRAPHY of the BALKAN PENINSULA

BULGARIA


24
26
Bucharest
(Bucuresci)
Chitila
Slatina
Piatra
Vede
Rosii de Vede
(Rosiori)
Caracali
R. Aluta (Olt)
R. Arges
Oltenita
Silistri
Turtukai
(Tutrakan)
Alexandria
Giurgevo
Rushchuk
Turnu-Magurele
Zimnitsa
R. Vede
Corabia
Rahova
Somovit
Nicopoli
R. Osma
Svištov
R. Isker
R. Vid
Plevna
Telich
Biela
R. Jantra
Nasabchilar
Razgrad
Jenikoi
Kanti-Dere
Šumen (Shumla)
Eski-Džumaja
Eski-Stambul
R. Osma
Lovča
Trnovo
Kesarova
Osman-Bazar
Selvi
Jantra
Pedabei
Drenova
Travna
Elena
Trojan
Etropol
Gabrovo
Trojan Pass
Shipka P.
Hainkioi P.
Koja Balkan P.
Dobral Pass
Kamčik
Dobra
Kaiabachi
Shipka
Tvardiča
Sliven
Karlovo
Kazanlik
Srednagora
Kalofer
R. Tunja
Karaja Dagh
Stara-Zagora
Nova-Zagora
Yamboli
(Jambol)
Karnab
EASTERN ROUMELIA
Tatar Bazarjik
R. Maritza
Cirpan
Philippopolis
Siemen
Tunja
Rhodope
Staminaka
Hasköi
Hermanli
Mustafa Pasha
Balkans
Adriano
R. Arda
Simenli
Karajali
Arda
T H R A C
(Despoto Dagh)
R. Chai
Dimotika
Kuleli Burgas
L A C H I
B U L G A R I A
Balkan S

the Danube is crossed by the only railway-bridge in the last 600 miles of its course. This remarkable structure, being nearly 100 feet above high-water, allows of the passage of ships beneath it at all times. The length of actual iron bridge across the Danube main stream is about half a mile, and it is supported by massive stone abutments on either bank, with four stone piers built in the stream. The approach to the iron bridge consists of a three-arched bridge (500 yards long) across the Barcea branch of the Danube, a viaduct of thirty spans (700 yards), a long stone causeway, and another viaduct of fifteen spans (1,000 yards).

The district of which Craiova is the centre is specially concerned with the Valley of the Danube and its two tributaries, the Yiu and Aluta; and the distribution of out-stations is a significant comment on this.

Craiova itself (with two regiments of infantry, two of artillery, one of cavalry, and one rifle battalion) commands the centre of the Yiu Valley—*i.e.*, the centre of Western Roumania; and the upper part of the valley—*i.e.*, the approach to the Vulkan Pass—is guarded by the railway-terminus of Tirgu-Yiului (with one regiment of infantry and one of artillery). Similarly, the road and rail junction of Rimnicŭ Valcii (with one regiment of artillery) commands the upper valley of the Aluta—*i.e.*, the approach to the Roteturm Pass; Slatina (with a regiment of infantry) commands the centre of the valley and the important railway-junction of Piatra; and Caracalu, the chief road-junction in the south, and a station on the line from Piatra to the river-port of

Corabia, is garrisoned with yet another regiment of infantry.

In the extreme west, of course, Servia, as well as Bulgaria, impinges on the south bank of the Danube; and Austria threatens the Iron Gates Pass from the north. To guard the latter, two regiments (one cavalry and one infantry) are stationed behind the frontier (Verciorova) at Turnu-Severin, where the main-line west from Craiova touches the Danube at the site of 'Trajan's' Bridge; and a regiment of infantry is stationed at the railway-terminus of Kalafat, opposite the Bulgarian fortified port of Vidin.

In this Craiova district all the good roads, except that parallel with the Yiu to Segartzea, are north of the Craiova—Turnu-Severin line.

The natural centre in the east of Roumania is Yassy, the capital of Moldavia and the point of gravitation for the agricultural products of the whole district; and its strategic importance may be gauged by the part it played in the various Russo-Turkish wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Standing some ten miles back from the Pruth, opposite the narrowest part of the Bessarabian plateau—*i.e.*, the natural line of traffic to Odessa viâ Kishinev—on the eastern edge of the Moldavia plateau, it commands all traffic up and down the valley of the Pruth and the easiest approach to Moldavia from Russia. The garrison consists of two rifle battalions, one regiment of cavalry, and one of infantry; and a great trunk-line of rail runs up the parallel Sereth Valley, some thirty miles west of Yassy

itself, while branch lines run up and down the Pruth Valley.

Along this trunk-line of rail there are a series of out-stations of the Yassy command, so placed as to control vital points. One regiment of infantry is stationed on each side of the Austro-Moldavian rail-head—at Folteceni and Dorohoi—and a regiment of cavalry is stationed between the two—at Botosanĭ, the north end of the 'Yassy' plain. One regiment of infantry and one of artillery are stationed at Bacăŭ, a road and rail junction at the confluence of the Bistriţa with the Sereth, both of which are more or less navigable* by grain-rafts; and another regiment of infantry holds the rail-terminus of Piatra off the mouth of the Bekas Pass, while a fifth garrisons Roman, a road and rail junction at the confluence of the Moldava with the Sereth.

The direct line west (from the Roumano-Russian frontier at Ungheni) viâ Yassy connects with the Sereth trunk-line at Pascani; and the branch lines north and south run respectively up the Yiyia and down the Bârlad Valley—*i.e.*, to Botosanĭ and Dorohoi northwards and Vasluiŭ and Bârlad southwards. Bârlad, behind the important frontier road-junction of Fălciu, is garrisoned by one regiment of cavalry and one of infantry. At Vasluiŭ, behind the historic Huşĭ, where the Treaty of the Pruth was signed in 1711, there is one regiment of infantry.

* The Bistriţa is *usually*, however, neither navigable nor fordable.

The Bârlad Valley line connects with the Sereth line by a branch from Tecucĭu, the most northerly outstation of the Galatz command, where one regiment of cavalry and two regiments of infantry are stationed; and the rest of the Galatz corps is distributed along the riverside and mountainside railways which meet at Tecucĭu.

The chief riverside centres are Galatz itself, where the railway touches the Danube from the north, and Braila, where lines converge on the Danube from the south and west; but one regiment of cavalry and one of infantry are stationed at the river-port and railway-terminus of Kalarasi, opposite the Bulgarian fortified port of Silistria. Galatz is garrisoned by one regiment of infantry and two rifle battalions, and Braila by one regiment of cavalry and one of artillery; but, of course, both towns have access to the river flotilla (*cf.* p. 71), and both are more or less protected by the wide stretches of steppe, east and west, on both sides of the Danube.

The bulk of the force is, however, distributed along the submontane line—one regiment of infantry, one of artillery, one of fortress artillery, and one of engineers, at Focsanĭ, where the trunk-line diverges from the Sereth; one regiment of cavalry and two regiments of infantry at Ploescĭ (*cf.* p. 80), where the 'petroleum' line to Predeal (*i.e.*, the Tömös Pass) joins the trunk; one regiment of infantry and one of artillery at Buzĕu, which commands the Buzĕu Valley to the Buzĕu Pass, and at which the Braila-Galatz branch line joins the

trunk; and one regiment of infantry at Rimnicŭ Sarat —*i.e.*, halfway between Focsanĭ and Buzĕu.

The Dobruja is garrisoned by an independent division, with headquarters at Kustenji, where one regiment of cavalry, one of infantry, and one rifle battalion are stationed; and there is an out-station of one regiment of infantry at Tulcea (*cf.* p. 72). But the most important place is the bridge-head of Černavoda, at the end of Trajan's Wall, behind the great road-junction of Mejidia, itself a station on the Kustenji-Černavoda railway.

The climate of the greater part of Roumania is most treacherous, owing to the sudden change of seasons. There is hardly any spring, summer heat often following the intense cold of winter with only a few days' interval. The temperature in summer rises to 120° F., being very oppressive in July, and in winter it falls below zero. The autumn is long and pleasant, usually terminating in the middle of November in cold north-east winds with snow. Rain usually falls between May and September, but only scantily; indeed, the average annual rainfall is only about 20 inches. The snowfali, however, is heavy, the whole country being buried deep in snow for many months, and the Danube is generally icebound for three months of the winter (*Cf.* p. 43).

The climate of the Dobruja and of the Danube delta is unhealthy and trying; and the hills round Bucharest (*cf.* p. 79), although some protection against the icy north-east winds in winter, make the capital a perfect oven in July and August.

As much as one-sixth of Roumania consists of woodland, the actual forest being confined almost entirely to the Carpathians, the slopes of which are clothed with coniferous and deciduous trees. On the extensive plains of Moldavia and Walachia few actual forests are to be found, but the country is fairly well wooded with oak, beech, and other trees, while various fruits are frequently seen growing wild.

The fertility of the soil of Roumania is remarkable, and the crops yielded are enormous—said to be the heaviest in Europe.* The chief products are wheat and maize (the staple food of the people), while barley, oats, rye, and tobacco are also grown. Vines are cultivated, and the grapes made into a good wine. From the principal fruit of the country — the damson — a sound brandy is produced; and such fruits as peaches, apricots, plums, apples, pears, cherries, and nuts, are abundant.

The production of honey is an important industry; coarse fish are to be found in all the rivers, especially in the Danubian lagoons, where they attract huge flocks of water-fowl; but stock-breeding has declined of late years, horses being comparatively few and poor, and sheep by no means plentiful. Swine and goats are, however, very numerous in the forests; and nearly all the land between the Pruth and the Sereth is good

* As an instance of the resources of the country, it may be mentioned that even in 1828 the Russians requisitioned and obtained in Roumania at once, without difficulty, 250,000 loads of corn, 400,000 tons of hay, 50,000 barrels of brandy, 23,000 oxen, and other supplies.


22
24
48
46
Grosswardein
TRANS
Hermannstadt
R. Vilt
Vulkan P.
Transyl
Rimnicu Valcea
Targu Jiului

cattle-pasture, and the same district produces the best horses.

As far as the Dobruja is concerned, no local supplies, except in the form of sheep and buffaloes, can be reckoned on. The soil, as already described, is a fine gray sand overlying limestone rock, and all moisture soaks through at once. The valleys contain no streams, and the wells (often 100 feet deep) in the scattered villages produce little water. Cultivation is therefore very scanty; there are no trees, or even shrubs; and the grass is withered by midsummer, when such cattle and sheep as the inhabitants possess are driven down to the Danubian marshes.

CHAPTER V

SERVIA

SERVIA is not much more than half the size of Bulgaria, and suffers from the absence of direct access to the sea; but its triangular shape has a certain formal relation to the general coast-line of the whole peninsula, and a large proportion of its actual frontier is water—200 miles on the Danube, 100 on the Drina, 90 on the Save, and 25 on the Timok.

Although the actual frontier elsewhere is more or less artificial, it is not one to tempt invasion. Almost everywhere it is rough and mountainous, and in the most important directions it has really formidable backgrounds. For instance, on the Bulgarian frontier the Western Balkans run north and south, and attain in Mižur a height of over 7,000 feet, while farther south the spurs of the Rhodope Mountains rise to over 6,000 feet in Strešar. Towards Old Servia (the Turkish vilayet of Kossovo) the Golija and Kopaonik peaks are between 6,000 and 7,000 feet, and the Austrian trunk-road eastward from Sarajevo is blocked by the Alpine region of Zlatibor (3,000 feet).

On the other hand, the water-parting between the Morava and the Vardar is so low and insignificant that the head-streams of the two overlap, and the Morava basin goes beyond the Servian frontier in both the Ibar and the Nišava valleys. The direct route across the water-parting viâ Vranya, though so low, is really less important than the two 'side-entrances,' because for the first fifty miles the Morava flows through a very deep and narrow gorge—so deep that in places the sides are 3,000 feet high, and so narrow that both the road and the railway track are eventually hewn out of the solid rock. And the country on each side is so rough, rising to nearly 4,000 feet in the Golyak Planina, that movement east and west is practically impossible. Indeed, this is more or less true of the whole country, and practically forbids any formal military movements. The ends of the Dinaric Alps, of the Carpathians, of the Balkans, of the Despoto Dagh, and of the Albanian Mountains, all encroach on Servia, converging on a 'chaos' of mountain knots, generally thickly wooded, and all overhanging long, deep, torrent-cut gorges, along which there is rich pasture.

These conditions are profoundly favourable to guerilla warfare, but put almost insuperable difficulties in the way of wide commercial or military developments; and they minimize the danger to Servia of the easy access from the south into the Morava basin, without affecting the commercial value of the easy through-routes—at all events, in time of peace.

In the extreme north-west there is a fairly large area

of plain, but the rough ravines of the Drina and the liability of the Save to flood are a sufficient defence; and along the whole of the north frontier of the country the only bridge is at Belgrade. At that point the Danube is almost a mile and a half wide, and its depth reaches 130 feet;* and where the width decreases, as at the Iron Gates, the approach to the bank from the north or the south is extremely difficult. Even at Belgrade the bridge is across the Save, not the Danube; and the windings of the Save—an important factor in regard to the floods—give the command of its banks generally to Servia. The same is the case with the Danube; indeed, the Servian bank of the river, while enjoying the same physical and military advantages as the Bulgarian, exhibits the social and commercial phenomena of the Roumanian bank. One steamer and six tugs are kept specially for transport of troops.

Although the area is so much less than that of Bulgaria, the population numbers over 2,500,000, and it is peculiarly homogeneous. Fully 90 per cent. are Servians, three-quarters of the remainder being Roumanians; and the country is 'supported' in practically every direction by a very large Servian population, forming a Slav wedge from the Iron Gates to the Adriatic, and from the Drave to the Macedonian coast. The mass belong to the Servian branch of the Orthodox Greek Church, and use the Russian characters in writing; but there is strong political jealousy of Austria and

* Off the mouth of the Timok the depth is 160 feet, though the width does not exceed about 1,000 yards.

even of Russia, and the hatred of the Tataric-Slavs of Bulgaria is chronic. The few who do not belong to the Greek Church use Roman characters. The commercial language of the country is German.

Rather more than half the population is composed of males, on whom military service is compulsory from the age of twenty-one to that of forty-five, giving the army a peace footing of 18,000* and a war footing of 200,000 men; and for military purposes the country is mapped into five divisional districts, each subdivided into three regimental districts. With the exception of the Shumadia, or Central, the divisional districts correspond practically to the frontier rivers—the Danube, Drina, Timok, and Upper Morava (Nišava); and the difficult nature of the land is partly responsible for the probability that it would take a month to mobilize 150,000 men, and two months to mobilize the second line.

The Danube centre is, naturally, Belgrade, a hill-fortress at the confluence of the Danube and the Save, on a spur of the Avala plateau between the two rivers. Its situation, on the frontier of the kingdom, is strategically weak and politically unfortunate, though excellent commercially. It is not even a great fortress now, though it covers the main railway-route to the East; it has no modern fortifications; and its utility as a depôt for war material is mainly due to the ease of navigation between the two other regimental headquarters of the division, Semendria and Požarevac (viâ Dubraniča).

* The proportion of cavalry to infantry is 1 to 12 in peace, 1 to 60 in war; but the 'peace' strength is only nominal.

Belgrade itself is garrisoned by four regiments of infantry (each of three battalions), one regiment of cavalry, and six batteries of artillery. There is direct connection by river and by trunk-road westward to Šabac, and eastward to Semendria, and by rail and trunk-road southward to the Morava Valley, the railway being joined at Velika Plana by a branch line and a trunk-road from Semendria (Smederevo), where three batteries of artillery are stationed.

Požarevac, as the centre of the 'peninsula' between the Lower Morava and the Danube, is a very important road-junction (garrisoned by a regiment of infantry), but not accessible by rail or river. The river is reached by trunk-roads to Dubraniča and Veliko Gradiste. The road and rail route from Semendria to Velika Plana is tapped by another trunk-road at Ostpaoniča. A fourth route runs due south to the road, rail, and river junction of Čupriya (near the Seng coal-mines), connecting with the Belgrade-Čupriya—*i.e.*, the Orient-Express—rail and road at Lapovo viâ Svilainac, and at Yagodina viâ Glogovac; and a fifth runs eastward to Salakovac, where it bifurcates, one branch (still a trunk-road) running up the Mlava Valley to Petrovac, and the other to the Pek Valley at Babrovo. A trunk-road also runs up the Pek Valley from Veliko Gradiste, viâ Babrovo, to Neresniča and Maidan Kučaina.

The Timok Division has its headquarters at Zaiečar, which is garrisoned by three batteries of artillery and two regiments of infantry (six battalions); and its other regimental headquarters are at Negotin and

Kniayevac, each garrisoned by a regiment of infantry (four battalions). A trunk-road runs parallel to the eastern frontier from the Danube port of Kladova viâ Negotin, Zaiečar, and Kniayevac to the St. Nicholas Pass and the Nišava Valley; and a branch line of rail is to follow the same route as far as Kniayevac. Another trunk-road from Zaiečar viâ Vrazogrnac taps the Danube at Dolni Milanovac, the most important cross-connections being from Dolni Milanovac viâ Miročevo to the river-port of Brza Palanka, and from Tzrnaika viâ Štulik and Negotin to the river-port of Radonyevac. Zaiečar itself is furnished with five modern forts, three of them facing eastward—*i.e.*, towards Bulgaria—and heavily armed with the latest ordnance.

The headquarters of the Upper Morava Division is Niš, which is garrisoned by seven companies of engineers (four field, one mining, one railway, and one telegraph), a regiment of artillery (nine batteries), and a brigade of cavalry. The importance of the town has been greatly increased since the construction of the railway; but, even before that, its site commanded the junction of the great road through Pirot from the Bulgarian frontier with that through Leskovac from the Macedonian frontier. These two roads are the invasion routes which have always been, and must always be, followed by armies advancing on Servia from the east and the south; each is protected by a natural rampart, the rugged gorge at Leskovac (Grdeliča-Djep) being practically impregnable.

Niš is also the natural point of convergence for all the

principal roads to the East. Lines drawn so as to connect the three towns of Niš, Aleksinac, and Kruševac, form a triangle which may be considered the natural rendezvous for an army destined for the invasion from the west of either Bulgaria or Turkey. The chief converging routes are those from Durazzo, Belgrade, and the Middle Danube, viâ the Timok Valley; and the old Turkish citadel stands, therefore, to the north of the town. As the junction for the Salonica and Constantinople railway-lines, Niš has also great commercial advantages; and the surrounding country is now well cultivated, principally, however, with vineyards. It is fortified with a system of eight or nine permanent and semi-permanent works, but most of them quite oldfashioned, and few armed with modern weapons.

The centres of the regimental districts are Vranya, Pirot, and Prokuplye, each garrisoned with a regiment (three battalions) of infantry. Vranya commands the head of the Morava Valley, and Prokuplye commands a rough road up the Topliča Valley, giving a difficult approach on Niš from the Kossovo Polye between the Kopaonik and Golyak systems. Pirot is still more important. Besides commanding the main-line of the Orient-Express and the direct trunk-road from Niš to Sofia, it has direct communication by trunk-roads with both the Ginči (east) and the St. Nicholas (north) Passes, and viâ Vlasotince with Leskovac, the most important station in Servia on the Niš-Salonica line south of Niš, commanding all the river-valleys between the Kukaniča and the Golyak.

The headquarters of the Drina, or Western, Division is Valyevo, garrisoned by two regiments (each of two battalions) of infantry; and the centres of the other regimental districts are Šabac and Požega, the latter garrisoned by a regiment (two battalions) of infantry, and the former by a regiment (nine batteries) of artillery. Šabac, besides its importance as a busy river-port, is a great road-junction. Trunk-roads run viâ Obrenovac to Belgrade, viâ Murgach to Kraguyevac and to Valyevo, to the confluence of the Drina with the Save opposite Tznabara, and viâ Lechniča and Ložniča* to the Upper Drina opposite the Bosnian fortress of Zvornik. There are also two good roads up into the plum district of the Upper Tammava Valley. Požega, behind the Zlatibor, commands the upper basin of the Servian Morava, and is a great road-junction between Užiče (for the frontier post of Makragora), Gornyi Kravariča, and Čačak; but the trunk-road to Čačak is very difficult, though there is a good branch road from there to the Albanian frontier.

Valyevo is the natural centre of this division, being on the most direct route between Belgrade, viâ Obrenovac and Ub, and all the frontier (Drina-bank) posts between Baima Bachta and Liaboviya; but, though there are trunk-roads up the Kolubara Valley, along the Drina bank, and in the Yadar basin, the routes across the Yadar-Kolubara water-parting are very rough. This throws considerable importance on the two chief

* The road from Obrenovac is a good one as far as Ložniča, but beyond that (*i.e.*, along the Drina) bad.

road-junctions in the upper part of the Yadar basin, Ravnaia and Krapani. A trunk-road joins the two places, and each communicates with the Drina by a trunk-road, that from Ravnaia running direct to Ložniča, and that from Krapani running round the Yagodina heights to Ozovniča. There is also another trunk-road parallel to the frontier from Krapani to the Ravnaia-Ložniča road.

The Shumadia ('Forest-land') Division has its headquarters at Kraguyevac, an old capital of the Serbs, and still the natural centre of the land and the best provided with good roads. Besides being the terminus of a branch line from Lapovo (on the Orient-Express main-line), it has good trunk-roads in every direction —north to Racha, north-east to Korman, south-east to Belučic, south-west to Čačak, west to Gornyi Milanovac, north-west to Belgrade and to Šabac. It lies, surrounded by mountainous country, on the most southerly bend of the Lepeniča Valley, and is garrisoned by a regiment of artillery (nine batteries) and two regiments of infantry (six battalions).

The headquarters of the regimental districts are Kruševac, the home of the last of the medieval tsars of Servia (Lazar), Čupriya, and Gornyi Milanovac. At the latter, which is garrisoned by a regiment of infantry (two battalions), the trunk-road from Kraguyevac to Čačak is joined by a trunk road to Valyevo. Čupriya is on the main line of rail and the trunk-road from Belgrade and Semendria to Kruševac, and the trunk-road from Požarevac to Čupriya runs viâ Svilainac,

parallel to the Semendria-Čupriya route, while the trunk road from Yagodina to Kruševac viâ Štolac runs parallel to the Čupriya-Kruševac route. Both these southward roads are joined viâ the railway-station of Paračin with the eastern fortress of Zaiečar. When not obstructed by alluvium, the Morava was, and would still be, navigable to Čupriya, the garrison of which consists of half a pontoon battalion of engineers.

Kruševac, which is garrisoned by a regiment (two battalions) of infantry, besides being the junction of the two great North roads, commands the confluence of the two Moravas (Serb and Bulgarian) near Štolac, and has direct connection by trunk-road with Čačak westward viâ Kralyevo—the site of Pompey's Roman fort, which commands the confluence of the Ibar with the Servian Morava, and with the eastern centres of Aleksinac and Kniayevac.

Even in this, though to a less extent than in the other divisions, the roads are not really good, for two reasons. In the first place, though wide enough, they are constructed of beaten clay instead of being properly metalled with stone, of which there is abundance. In the second place, little attention is paid even to the main trunks, and the surface of the roads generally is best during hard frost. In the dry season the dust is excessive, and the roads soon wear away under moderately heavy traffic, while in wet weather or during thaws they are deep in mud.

The whole question of climate is important. An army operating in or through Servia would have to

be prepared for every variety of weather, with extremes of temperature. In this matter, what has been said in the chapter on Bulgaria applies equally to Servia.

The soil is fertile, however, and, where cultivated, it produces abundant crops of wheat, maize, and tobacco; but the people are misgoverned and indolent, and more than three-fourths of the surface is uncultivated. The latter part of the country is generally well timbered, and extensive forests of oak clothe the slopes of most of the mountains, while fruit-trees and vines grow with very little care. Dried plums (prunes) are exported in great quantities, and from this fruit also a spirit is distilled. But the principal industry (after agriculture) is stock-rearing, an immense number of pigs being kept in the oak-forests, cattle and sheep on the pasture-lands, and fowls everywhere. The horses are poor and insufficient in number even for the military requirements of the country, though some attention is now being paid to improving the breed by importing from Hungary and Russia and by the establishment of stud-farms. Oxen are fairly plentiful, and partly supply the deficiency in horses for transport purposes; but the country carts * are usually not built for heavy loads, and the draught cattle are small and ill-fed.

An invading army, therefore, could not count on obtaining locally any great amount of transport; and the country would soon be exhausted of supplies, although there are considerable stores of grain in each district.

* Each commune is required to keep a certain number of waggons for the use of the Government.

CHAPTER V

MONTENEGRO

THE little principality of Crnagora, called by the Turks Kara Dagh, owes its name to the dark forests covering the mountains in which the Servians who refused to submit to the Turks after the Battle of Kossovo (A.D. 1389) found refuge.

It has some twenty miles of coast-line on the Adriatic, with two indifferent roadsteads—Antivari and Dulcigno, the latter commanded by the heights of Masiuri and Colonza behind it; but the natural harbour of the country, Cattaro, where the sea cuts deeply into the land towards the capital, Cetinje, belongs to Austria. The Boyana, which gives a natural frontier in the extreme south, is also navigable for about a dozen miles, and could easily be much improved.

As the name* implies, this is essentially a land of mountains, bleak and barren and black, though no longer densely forested, rising in parts towards the eastern frontier to a height of 8,000 feet. There are, however, three distinct areas—the Karst, the Brda, and the Lowlands.

* The largest town in the country is Podgorička ('Mountain-foot').

The Karst is the largest, covering the west, the north, and much of the centre. It has all the typical 'Karst' features, with an average height of 2,500 to 5,000 feet, though reaching more than 8,000 feet in Mount Dormitor. The rapid dissolution of the limestone, which produces the deep chasms and underground rivers characteristic of the area, causes surface water to be very quickly absorbed, leaving the land a dry and stony wilderness.

The highland region (4,000 to 4,500 feet) of the Brda —added, like the strip of coast, by the Treaty of Berlin —is mainly of schist formation; and, therefore, its deep narrow valleys, besides being well sheltered, are also well watered—chiefly by the Tara and the Lim—and comparatively fertile.

The Lowlands of the coast belt and the southern rivers, especially in the Morača basin, are still warmer and more fertile; but, as in the Brda, there is considerable specialization in fruit-growing, so that the food value of the area is not great. Indeed, the people are largely dependent on imported food-supplies, though there are numerous flocks of sheep and goats, and the southern rivers and the Montenegrin part (two-thirds) of Lake Scutari (Skodra) are rich in fish.

Speaking generally, the rivers may be said to drain from the centre of the country towards the north or the south, or from the east towards the extreme north and extreme south—*i.e.*, slightly north-west and south-west; but the system is exceedingly intricate, and characterized almost everywhere by profound ravines, caverns, and subterranean channels. The valleys are,

therefore, practically useless even as trade-routes, and navigation is impossible. The Tara in the north-east, like the Boyana in the south-west, forms a natural frontier.

These peculiarities of the surface features are reflected in the military dispositions. The country is divided into eight military districts, each containing the headquarters of a brigade cadre. The brigade district is again divided into battalion districts, and the latter into company districts. In this manner the whole country is partitioned into 326 company commands, in each of which are small territorial units, composed of the members of the local tribe or family. The strength of the unit varies with the number of fighting men in the 'tribe,' though the war strength of the company is fixed at 100 men, with a proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers. The number of companies in a battalion, and of battalions in a brigade, depends, therefore, on the population of each district, which varies with the fertility.

These troops may be termed militia, for there is no regular standing army, with the exception of a recently-formed 'Guard Battalion,' a Palace Guard of some fifty men, and an Instructional Battalion for training the recruits (about 1,500 per annum).*

The whole population does not exceed 250,000 people, and the war-footing of the armed strength is about

* The recruit undergoes a four months' course, after which he passes to the militia, and is liable to service up to the age of sixty.

50,000 of all ranks. Obviously, there is no place for cavalry; the unhorsed artillery is suitable to the nature of the country — about twenty Krupp guns, twenty mountain-guns, and six Gatlings; and the infantry are armed with a magazine rifle supplied by Russia in 1898. Every able-bodied Montenegrin is a soldier, and all carry revolvers habitually. They are adepts at guerilla warfare; and, as they keep their arms and equipment at their homes or on their persons, the army can be mobilized in a few hours, thanks to a good telegraph system and visual signalling amongst the mountains.

The territorial distribution of the units corresponds mainly with the fertility of the land, but betrays a certain political leaning. Montenegro is essentially 'Russian' in sympathy. It owes to Russian influence not only its most fertile valleys and lowlands, but also its access to the sea, though ships of war are not allowed to put in at Antivari (Prstan) and Dulcigno; and it exercises a very real and anti-Austrian influence over Herzegovina. The difficult communication inland from Antivari and Dulcigno makes Cattaro still the most important outlet of Montenegro, and Austria guards Antivari from Spizza, and actually polices the Montenegrin coast.

No less than three of the territorial centres—Niegurch, Virpazar, and Grajani—are on the 'Adriatic' sea and land frontier, Niegurch and Virpazar having each seven battalions (fifty-two companies and fifty-one respectively) of infantry and a battery of artillery, and Grajani having four battalions (twenty-nine companies) of infantry and a battery of artillery. Cetinje, some ten

miles inland from Cattaro, is a great military depôt and the headquarters of the Instructional Battalion except in winter, when it moves to Podgoriča in order to avoid the rigorous climate of the Cetinje plateau (2,000 feet).

In the Valley of the Morača, Podgoriča, which commands the confluence of the Zeta with the Morača and the convergence of the roads from Cetinje viâ Rieka and from the lake port of Plavniča (Berislavtzi), is the centre for seven battalions (forty-six companies) of infantry and a battery of artillery; Piperi is the centre for seven battalions (thirty-eight companies) and a battery; the fortified place of Spizh, near the mouth of the Zeta Valley, is the chief military depôt in the country; and Nikšic, near the head of the Zeta Valley, the terminus of the great north road, is another depôt.

The Brda contains Kolāsin, a centre for six battalions (thirty-one companies), and Andrieviča, a centre for five (twenty-five companies); and Zhabliah is a fortified depôt. Goransko, a centre for nine battalions (fifty-four companies) and a battery, though in the Tara basin, is in the Karst district, overlooking the Piva Valley into Bosnia, and within twenty miles of the Austrian road-head at Antevac in the Herzegovina.

Except along the trunk-road viâ Podgoriča to Nikšic from Cattaro and Lake Scutari, communication between the various centres is very difficult at all times, and the difficulty is increased in winter by the snowfall. It is significant, however, that Austria contributes funds for the upkeep of the roads. The country is obviously unsuited to railways.

CHAPTER VII

TURKEY

TURKEY possesses a great advantage over the other Balkan Powers in the position and character of its sea-coast, facing east, south, and west, extending for over 1,400 miles, and including one of the finest harbours in the world; but the antiquated type of most of the men-of-war, and the fact that, owing to the Turks' dislike of the sea, the navy is manned chiefly by Greeks, discount some of the advantages.

The 150 miles of coast on the Black Sea are not of much importance commercially or strategically; the Istranja Dagh range, which rises to 3,400 feet in the north, makes a formidable hinterland; and there are practically no useful harbours. The only probable point of danger is Midia, which has deeper off-shore water than any other Balkan port on the Black Sea, and is opposite one of the easiest crossings of the Istranja Dagh.

The 200 miles of the 'Straits' coast is, on the other hand, of the greatest importance. The north shore of the Sea of Marmora is steep and devoid of harbours; but

even in this part there are some roadsteads with fairly good access inland, Rodosto (Tekirdagh) being the best. Here, too, however, the population is largely Greek and Armenian, with a natural anti-Turkish bias.

The Bosporus resembles a winding river-valley; both sides of it are thickly dotted with habitations, well wooded, and cultivated; the water is deep enough for ships of any size; and the only disadvantage is the rate of the current (westward), to which is due the enlargement to its present width of the narrow chasm originally made by a primary convulsion of the earth's crust.

The physical history of the Dardanelles is similar, but the shores are flatter than those of the Bosporus; and, where the Gallipoli Peninsula sinks to under 500 feet and narrows to less than four miles, the Bulair fortifications, joined by a continuous parapet and ditch, stretch completely across the isthmus from the Gulf of Saros to the Hellespont; the heights in front are crowned with redoubts, and Bulair itself is protected by smaller works. The Straits are also fortified at each end and in the centre. The south entrance, like the north entrance to the Bosporus, is heavily fortified on both sides; the four or five miles of narrows in the centre, from Kilid Bahr to Maidos and from Kale-i-Sultaniye to Nagara, are lined by some ten works on each shore, and the great naval station of Gallipoli is also fortified.

The isolation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and the character of the mainland north of the Gulf of Saros, however, make the Dardanelles less important than the Bosporus, which is the real meeting-place of the two

continents and of the two seas; and, therefore, every other place is dwarfed in importance compared with Constantinople.

In the name 'Constantinople' is included, not only the city itself, but also the neighbouring suburbs on both banks of the Golden Horn and on both shores of the Bosporus—*i.e.*, including Scutari. Its population is estimated at a million; and its unique position, covering the great land route between Europe and Asia, as well as the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, has made it of supreme importance. Perhaps no other city in the world enjoys such strategic and commercial advantages, for Constantinople possesses a supremely magnificent harbour, with anchorage for the largest fleet; the climate is good; the water-supply is abundant; the surrounding country is both fertile and picturesque. Moreover, if it were cut off from Europe by an investing army, the food-supply obtainable from Asia would be inexhaustible; and the importance of the site is so well understood by the Turks that they have strengthened the neighbourhood in every possible way. Both banks of the Bosporus have a series of redoubts on the water's edge, strongly posted at the Black Sea entrance, and échelonned elsewhere so as to cover straight reaches of the waterway, while a system of a dozen or more works surrounds Constantinople within a few miles on the land side.

About twenty-five miles to the west are the famous lines, extending across the peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea, intended as the first line of

defence for the protection of the capital from attack by land. These are known as the Lines of Chatalja (or Lines of Böyük-Chekmeje), and were commenced in 1877, when the Russian army was advancing on Constantinople. The position is one of great natural strength, consisting of a ridge (some 500 feet high) flanked by broad lakes, with numerous marshes and swamps in front. Along a front of about fifteen miles there have been erected some thirty redoubts and several earthen batteries, in two (and in some parts in three) lines, adapted to the ground. The flanks cannot be turned, and the position, if properly defended (which would require 70,000 men), would be impregnable. *Cf.* p. 112.

The Ægean coast, though much more diversified than that of the Black Sea and five times as long, is still curiously deficient in good harbours. Throughout the whole length of it there are few points at which an invading force could—still less would—endeavour to land, partly on account of the sea-approach, and partly because the access inland is almost everywhere so bad that it is quite unsuited to the movement of large bodies of troops. Its position between the Mesta and the Struma valleys, and the shelter of the island of Thasos, make Kavala a possible roadstead; but the physical difficulties and the unhealthiness of the hinterland are clearly marked by the way in which the railway avoids the area, the nearest station being at Drama, some twenty miles away, over a very poor road.

The natural 'Lines of Least Resistance' inland are the valleys of the two great rivers, the Maritsa and the

Vardar; and in each case there is a gulf facilitating access from the sea, though in each case the malarial estuary of the river is not an ideal site for a town. On the Gulf of Enos, however, well to windward of the estuary of the Maritsa and the lateral marshes, the roadstead of Dede-Agach gives easy access to the Maritsa Valley and to the Salonica-Constantinople railway. This roadstead, in spite of its bad anchorage, would naturally be made an invader's sea-base in preference to Enos. Similarly, Salonica, a much better harbour, which stands well away from the fever-haunted estuarial marshes of the Vardar, under the shelter of Chalkis, would be made a sea-base.

The Albanian shore of the Adriatic has very difficult access inland, even if there were any good natural harbours; but there are three possible routes inland—the Shkumbi, the Viosa, and the Vyros valleys, and each has some facilities of approach from the sea. The rocky peninsula of Peli affords some shelter to the roadstead of Durazzo (Drach), as that of Cape Glossa does to the roadstead of Avlona; but the latter is very unhealthy, and the immense amount of detritus deposited by the coastal torrents has helped to accentuate the difficulties of navigation on a sea already too shallow. As far as Turkey is concerned, the Gulf of Arta is useless commercially, and ought to be no danger strategically, for the estuarial lagoons of the Arta and other rivers make the north shore scarcely habitable; but there is a good trunk-road inland from Prevesa and Nikopolis (viâ Luros) to Yanina, which can easily be cut from Arta either at Philippiada (viâ Strevina) or viâ the

Pentepigadia Pass, and large vessels can lie safely under the lee of Corfu, with a possible landing-place at the road terminus of Hagioi Saranta (Santi Quaranta).

The real nucleus of the area is the old crystalline mass of the Thraco-Macedonian highlands, which are flanked along the east coast by the Istranja Dagh, and along the west by the wild 'Albanian' mountains. The general north-and-south direction of the systems, the great height of the rounded mountain masses, and the great depth of the adjacent river-valleys, account alike for the fine scenery, the easy communication north and south, the difficult communication east and west, and the division into four political areas—Thrace, Macedonia, Albania, and Old Servia.

The most complete physical barrier is the Rhodope range, but the most intricate is in Albania, which is threaded from north to south by three parallel systems, penetrated generally only by the roughest tracks, with fastnesses (and monasteries) perched on almost inaccessible heights, and quite unsuited for any military operations other than those of an essentially guerilla character. Old Servia, girdled by Montenegro, Bosnia, Servia, and Bulgaria, and draining to the Danube, the Adriatic, and the Ægean, is a centre of great political importance, in which Albanians, Servians, and Bulgarians intrigue for supremacy, resenting alike its ownership by the Turks and the military occupation of 'Novi-Bazar' by Austria. And Thrace, where the Maritsa enters the hill-girdled lowlands south of Adrianople and becomes navigable for small boats, is the most important commercial area.

Under such conditions of surface relief, the relation of the river-valleys to the mountain barriers becomes exceedingly important, especially in the case of the Maritsa and the Vardar. The Maritsa Valley is the only route for an army between the Thraco-Macedonian highlands and the Istranja Dagh; the former system is practically uncrossable, there not being a continuous track even up the Arda Valley; and the rectangular area between Adrianople and the Black Sea, the Ergene Valley and the frontier east of the Tunja, is so difficult that there is not a single trunk-road through it in any direction, though at least half a dozen branch roads meet at the important town of Kirk Kilise (Forty Churches).

The Vardar plays a somewhat similar part between the Thraco-Macedonian highlands and the Albanian system, though it has not a monopoly of the area. The Mesta (or Kara-Su) Valley accommodates the South Coast Railway for some distance, and gives access to the strongly Muhammedan town of Nevrokop; but there is no track at all over Muss-Alla. The parallel Struma Valley works round the obstacle through a pass near Juma which is not more than 1,000 feet above the sea, and a trunk-road runs along the eastern bank of the river for some distance south of the frontier, leading on north of it, also by trunk-road, to Dubniča (*cf.* p. 61); but the torrential character of the river is so marked, in spite of its great length (225 miles), that throughout part of its central course there is not even a continuous track.

The importance of the Vardar Valley is, therefore,

very great, and it should be noted that, before the advent of the railway, boatmen used to brave the dangers of its narrow tortuous waters, even through the Demir-Kapu (Iron Gate) gorge. In summer it contains very little water, because many of its small tributaries run dry, but at other times it is quite possible for daring boatmen to navigate it downstream.

The most important connections viâ the Vardar Valley are, of course, northward, for it contains Üsküb, one of the keys of Macedonia, and it commands the Kachanik Pass between the Shar Dagh and the Kara Dagh into Kossovo ; but it also controls the old Roman military road (the Via Egnatia) round the north ends of the Ostrovo, Prespa, and Okhrida lakes to Durazzo (Dyrrachium) by Elbasan and the Shkumbi Valley.*

There is a further importance attached to the Vardar Valley (and to the Morava Valley in a less degree) in the fact that it carries a railway which crosses the river several times by iron bridges—a great aid to the movement of troops and guns. It is scarcely possible to take a day's journey in any direction in Macedonia or Albania without having to ford quite a number of rivers, which in winter are deep and rapid, while in summer they generally trickle at the bottom of steep-sided limestone troughs.

A still greater obstacle, however, to movement of troops is found in Central Albania and Southern Macedonia in the presence of the numerous long lakes ; and

* This route and the Drin Valley are the keys to Northern Albania, as the Viosa Valley and the Metsovo Pass are to Southern Albania. *Cf.* the importance of Skodra and Yanina.

even in Thrace there is something of the same kind, for it is the presence of lakes on each side of the peninsula west (by about twenty-five miles) of Constantinople that narrows the land-gap to about fifteen miles, thus greatly facilitating the erection of the line of fortifications by which the Turks have completely covered the capital.

The strategic position of Salonica, even without covering fortifications, is immensely strengthened by the presence of lakes. The natural depression between the Chalkis heights and the Bechik Dagh, through which the town might be approached, is occupied almost throughout (for some thirty miles) by the lakes of Bechik and Langaza; and, though there is one trunk-road direct from Seres to Salonica, Lake Takhyno (an expansion of the Struma, twenty miles long by five wide) completely blocks east-and-west traffic except on the coastal strip of land between Orfano and Rendina. There is another smaller expansion of the Struma north-west of Seres, where Lake Butkovo is six miles long; and, to avoid these lakes, the railway from Salonica to Constantinople takes an enormous détour viâ the Galiko Valley and Lake Döiran. The towns of Okhrida and Monastir are similarly protected from the west by Lake Okhrida and Lake Prespa.

Beyond the two great main lines of rail, with their important southern link (from Salonica viâ Seres and Ferejik to Kuleli Burgas) and the two isolated branches (from Salonica to Monastir, and Üsküb to Mitrovitsa), the only means of communication is by road; and such roads as exist are for the most part so bad that, to be of

any use for the heavy transport accompanying an army, many of them would have to be remade, and all would need constant repairs. Though the Turkish forces are constantly moving about the country, they are accompanied by less transport than other European armies, and they employ pack-animals to a greater extent. There is, in fact, scarcely a single well-metalled highway in the whole country; even the old thoroughfare between Adrianople and the capital is little more than a rough track. Cross-roads do exist, but very little attempt is made anywhere to overcome engineering difficulties; and even on the so-called trunk-roads the mountain gradients are very steep, streams are not bridged, and often several miles of the roadway may be found to have bodily disappeared.

Communications are further impeded by the climate, especially in the west. The rainfall of Albania is considerable, and the snowfall on the mountains is so deep that it hardly disappears altogether before July; Thrace is very dusty and subject to violent storms in summer; and the lower courses of nearly all the Macedonian rivers are hotbeds of malaria. These conditions, of course, affect the question of the supplies available for an invading army; and, in any case, most of the country is very badly cultivated—the inhabitants being too restless to pay much attention to agriculture, the best-cultivated parts are largely devoted to luxuries (*e.g.*, the silk-mulberry, tobacco, and fruits), and the population —in an area rather larger than England and Wales— does not much exceed 6,000,000.

There are no accurate ethnological statistics, but it is certain that the Turks form less than 25 per cent. of the whole, and that Greeks and Albanians constitute nearly half. All male Mussulmans* over twenty years of age—*i.e.*, perhaps 13 per cent. of the total population—are liable for twenty years to military service; and it must be remembered that within easy reach of Constantinople there are many 'Asiatic' garrisons which would be available in case of emergency.

The 'European' army is distributed in three great territorial divisions, called 'Ordus,' the headquarters of which are Constantinople, Adrianople, and Salonica; these three towns—along with Mustafa Pasha, Üsküb, Mitrovitsa, Seres, and Nassilitz—are headquarters of infantry divisions; and Adrianople, Gallipoli, Monastir, Yanina, Üsküb, Prishtina, and Salonica, are assembly-places of brigades. Further, as the troops are employed at least as much in suppressing the inhabitants as in operation against foreign nations, there are a score of 'fortified' towns scattered over the country, and there are numerous blockhouses and temporary fortified posts among the mountains of Albania and Macedonia.

The precise difficulty in Macedonia—a term practically unknown on the spot, *i.e.*, in the vilayet of Salonica—is that the Bulgarians, though not in the majority amongst a polyglot, heterogeneous population of Greeks, Turks, Serbs, Albanians, Roumanians, etc., are making great efforts for supremacy. Externally, too, the country is fortified specially against Bulgaria, small

* Non-Mussulmans of all ages pay an exemption-tax.

works having been erected at intervals all along the Bulgarian frontier west of Adrianople, with groups of larger works a little distance from the frontier, so as to guard all possible avenues of approach, specially those into Macedonia. Thus, even in the Mesta Valley there are three strong earthworks facing north at Nevrokop; and the possible track from the head of the valley across into the Struma Valley (at Juma) is protected by a group of four works round Mehomia, Banja, and Banjska. Juma itself has three works facing north and west, commanding one of the two trunk-roads across the frontier, and at Egri Palanka there are, again, three astride of the other trunk-road from Köstendil to Kumanovo. Both at Juma and at Palanka a brigade of infantry is also stationed, and similar brigades are stationed in the south-east of the province at Seres and Doiran, in the south-west at Perlepe, Nassilitz, and Monastir, and at Üsküb.

The natural importance of Üsküb (Skoplje) may be gathered from the choice of the site by the Romans for the capital of Dardania; and, though the communications round Shar Dagh, either by Kachanik into Kossovo or by Kalkandele into Albania, are scarcely better than in Roman times, the command of the three most important sections of railway in Turkey and of the two great trunk-roads—north-east viâ Kumanovo to the Servian and Bulgarian frontiers, and south-east viâ Köprülu (The Bridge*)—has made the place the most important inland town in Macedonia.

* This bridge is a dilapidated wooden structure.

Perlepe commands all the roads converging on the Shkumbi Valley from the north-east, especially off the trunk-road from Köprülu ; and Monastir commands all those converging on the same point from the south-east, especially the trunk-road from Elassona (six miles from the Meluna Pass on the Greek frontier) viâ Kozhani and Kesrie (Kastoria) or Kailar, while Nassilitz commands the direct route from the Metsovo Pass viâ the Vistritsa to Serfija. Monastir is in such a fertile region, and occupies such a strong strategic position, that it has been made the terminus of a branch line from Salonica viâ Kara-Feria (Verria) and the important road-junctions of Vodena and Ostrovo.

In Albania there are nominally two brigades of infantry—one in the extreme north, at Scutari, with very difficult communication inland viâ the Boyana basin to Diakova and viâ the White Drin to Prizren ; and the other in the extreme south, at Yanina, commanding the west of the Metsovo Pass, from the trunk-road from Arta viâ Kalivia to the port of Santi Quaranta (and Avlona), and to the lakes viâ Ostanitse (on the Viosa) and Koritsa. The latter road joins, at the head of Lake Prispa, the trunk-road between Monastir and Okhrida ; and this makes the little village of Kasiak the real key to the lake plateau. A somewhat similar position is held farther west by Berat, which commands all roads converging on the Shkumbi Valley from the south of the lakes, and stands on a trunk-road from Levani (between the estuaries of the Semeni and the Viosa) to a point commanding the chief confluence of the Middle Viosa at

Tepeleni. There is also a direct, but very rough, track from Berat to Avlona.

Old Servia, the Turkish vilayet of Kossovo, is nominally garrisoned by two brigades of infantry—one in the north-west at Plevlye, and the other in the south-west at Ipek—and a brigade of cavalry, at the old Servian capital of Prizren, the 'Plain of the Blackbirds' being suitable for cavalry operations. But Priboy—like Plevlye, the terminus of a trunk-road from Austria—in the north-east, and Prishtina in the south-east, are at least as important as Plevlye and Ipek; both Priboy and Plevlye are commanded by Pryepolye (garrisoned by Austrian troops); and the only favourable route northwards—*i.e.*, from the rail-head of Mitrovitsa, on the Ibar—is commanded by the fortified town of Novi-Bazar, also garrisoned by Austrian troops.

In Thrace, with the exception of the garrison* of Constantinople itself, the troops are all massed inland—at Mustafa Pasha, Adrianople, and Kirk Kilise (each with a brigade of infantry and a division of cavalry), and Dimotika (with a division of cavalry). Mustafa Pasha, of course, commands the actual frontier, where the one feasible line of advance for an invader leaves the railway and crosses to the eastern bank of the Maritsa; Dimotika commands the junction of the branch line from Salonica and Dede-Agach with the main line to Constantinople, and has a roundabout but absolutely safe connection with Adrianople by fairly good roads up the Valley of the Chat and down that of the Arda (*i.e.*, viâ Karajali and

* Two brigades of infantry and three cavalry divisions.

Simenli). The importance of Kirk Kilise is due partly to the great meeting of—fairly poor—branch roads under the shelter of the Istranja Dagh, but mainly to its position on the flank of the direct trunk-road from Adrianople to Constantinople viâ Baba Eski and Lüle Burgas ('Pipe-bowl' Burgas). A very large number of tributaries join the Ergene from the north, making an extraordinary succession of parallel valleys which cut the trunk-road (and the railway farther south) at right angles; and the direct tracks from Kirk Kilise to Adrianople and to the railway-station of Cherkerskeni viâ Viza and Sarai cut across the heads of all these valleys.

Adrianople is, however, much the most important centre, standing where the confluences of the Tunja and the Arda make the Maritsa navigable, at the junction of short trunk-roads from the valleys of both these tributaries and of a number of branch roads with the great eastern road to Constantinople. This position, emphasized by the nearness* to the Bulgarian frontier, has necessitated an extended system of fortifications. From twenty-five to thirty works are grouped round the town itself; some half-dozen more have been erected along the right bank of the Maritsa, eight or nine between the left bank of the Maritsa and the right bank of the Tunja, and a dozen to the east and north-east.

* Mustafa Pasha is seventeen miles north-north-west of Adrianople.


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

CHAPTER VIII

GREECE

THE conditions of modern warfare have deprived Greece of almost all her old importance as a battlefield. Except along some parts of the coast and on the plains of Thessaly and Bœotia, practically no part of the country is suited to the operations of a modern army. In any case, too, in spite of the neglect of the navy, the country is essentially maritime, not military; the coast is at least twice as long for the area as that even of Great Britain, while the surface is covered with masses of mountains, most of which run out into the sea as bold peninsulas, so that it has hitherto been* easiest to conduct even the domestic trade by sea.

It must be remembered, however, that the coast, though deeply indented, is generally iron-bound; and, though the winding bays and wooded islands, with their innumerable caves and coves, are eminently favourable to piracy and smuggling, the supply of good commercial harbours is very limited, and the places where it would be

* The Morea railway has changed this, but its route only confirms the general truth.

possible to land a military force of any size are still fewer.

The one supremely fine harbour is the anchorage which stretches westwards from the Piræus peninsula to the island of Salamis. It is large enough and deep enough to accommodate several fleets of modern battleships, and gives access to the centre of the Attican plain at the road-and-rail junction of Athens. Its nearness to the isthmus, and the growth of the canal ports of Poseidonia and Isthmia, have deprived Corinth of almost all commercial importance, though the heights behind the town still command the isthmus itself and the canal.

Continental Greece contains also, in Volos and Mesolonggi, the harbours of second and third importance. The land-locked Gulf of Volos gives safe anchorage for men-of-war, though the entrance is narrow ; troops could be landed on each side of the latter at Nea Mintsela and Trikeri ; and the town has easy access inland both by road and by rail to the plains of Thessaly. The port of Mesolonggi is within easy reach by road of the still better port of Lepanto, and is the real terminus of the great trunk-road to the Turkish frontier near Arta, viâ Agrinion and Karvasaras, alongside which there is a line of rail as far as Œtolikon.

The Morea contains several possible landing-places, most of which, like their hinterland, are in themselves of no importance ; but some of them tap the coastal railway from Olympia viâ Patras and Corinth to Tripolitsa. For instance, there are short lines of rail from Katakolo to Pyrgos, from Kyllene (Glarentsa) to Kavassila, and

from Kalamata—a somewhat better harbour than the others—to Tripolitsa. The railway can also be tapped, *e.g.*, at Nauplia and Myli; and the coast road can be tapped between Kalamata and Katakolo at Korone, Navarino (with a port sheltered by the island of Sphagia), and Kyparissa (Arkadia). Marathonisi, which gives access to the valley of the Eurotas (Iris), is the terminus of this coast road viâ Sparta.

None of these ports can compete, however, with Patras, the most important commercial and strategic centre in the Morea, controlling practically the whole export of currants,* and commanding the Gulf of Lepanto and the Corinthian Canal.

The slight importance of the Morean ports is, of course, largely due to the character of the hinterland. The mass of the area is at least 1,600 feet above the sea, and the only real lowlands are in the lower valley of the Iris and in the north-west corner of the peninsula. It happens, however, that these two areas are connected by the natural depression of the Ruphia (Alpheios) and the Iris valleys; and the channel between Zante and the Morea is a safe place for even a foreign fleet to assemble —under the lee of Zante itself.

Continental Greece is divided into two very distinct areas by the Pindus system, eastward of which lie the important plains of Thessaly and Bœotia. The Plain of Thessaly is so much cut off by the Othrys Mountains in the south and by the Pelion-Kissavos (Ossa) Moun-

* In some years currants form 80 per cent. (in value) of the total exports of Greece.

tains in the east that it is practically unapproachable except by the upper valley (the Metsovo Pass) or the estuary (the Vale of Tempe) of the Peneios (Salamvria)—both very difficult routes, by the Meluna Pass (*cf.* p. 162), or by the port of Volos.

The Kopais Plain is connected, both by the valley of the Mavropotamus and by the 'Thermopylæ'* coast-road, with the narrow plain of the Sperkheios (Hellada), which skirts the Othrys from Lamia to Karpenision; and there is a fair road on across the Phurka Pass from Lamia to Domokos. To the south of the Kopais Plain Thivai (Thebes) commands the junction of four trunk-roads, the eastward and the westward roads spanning the peninsula from sea to sea, and is the first important station on the line now being constructed from Athens to Larissa.

The greater part of the country is composed of marls and limestones, and this has a marked effect on the river system. Wherever limestone prevails, the surface water is apt to disappear into fissures; and it does not reappear until it meets the marl or some other impermeable rock. Further, the height of the mountains and the small area of the land (less than Scotland) cause the pace of most of the rivers to be very great; those in the west flood to dangerous and destructive dimensions in winter, and then, like most of the eastern rivers too, dry up as soon as all the snow has melted.

The disappearance of the surface water inland is as

* The famous strip between Mount Œta and the sea has been much widened by alluvial deposits since the days of Leonidas.

disastrous to agriculture as the blocking of the estuaries by alluvium is to health. Of course, the dry heat of summer ought to be healthy, but not even the highlands are free from malaria,* though the disease is more virulent in the lowlands. Dysentery and cholera are also to be feared; and the heat, which is stifling down in the valleys in summer, necessitates the use of tropical head-dress as a precaution against sunstroke. Further, the drinking-water is frequently bad, and the wine (which is abundant) is sour, though usually pure. Even in April and May, therefore, when the weather is bright and clear without being too hot, foreign troops operating in the country would suffer severely unless the greatest care was taken.

The question of supplies would be another difficulty. Barely one-sixth of the area is cultivated at all, and of this a large proportion is devoted to currants and olives. In the south the people do not grow enough food even for themselves. On the other hand, the areas most suited to military operations are beginning to produce considerable quantities of grain (wheat and maize), under a system of culture which is greatly decreasing the tendency to malaria; and Thessaly is also famous for tobacco and horses. Timber (for fuel) is plentiful, and in the more densely forested parts of the north-west large herds of swine are kept. Otherwise animals are scarce. Fish are plentiful round the coast, and boats

* The disease is much worse than in ancient times, owing to bad tillage and the retreat (for political reasons) of the inhabitants into mountain fastnesses.

are found everywhere; but the people are indifferent fishermen, though great eaters of fish.

The distribution of the army in time of peace is a significant comment on the relative value, strategic and commercial, of the various areas. It is distributed in three divisions, each consisting of two brigades of infantry (twelve battalions) and two Evzonoi (highland) battalions, a regiment of cavalry (four squadrons), and a regiment of artillery, besides technical troops; and the divisional headquarters are all outside the Morea — Athens, Larissa, and Mesolonggi (*cf.* p. 120).

Athens is the most important road-and-rail junction in the country, and its magnificent harbour is within eighty miles of the great free-port of Hermoupolis (Syra); and the new railway will put it into very favourable relations with the other important road-junctions south of Mount Othrys, Thivai, Levadeia (also a busy grain-market), and Lamia (with its roadstead of Stylida).

The still busier grain-market of Larissa is the natural centre of the Plain of Thessaly, which is practically the basin of the Peneios; and it is connected by rail and trunk-road viâ Gherli, through the fertile depression between Lake Karla and the Kara Dagh, with the harbour of Volos (thirty-eight miles). From the station of Velestinos (eleven miles W.S.W. of Volos) another line runs between 'Pelion' and 'Cynoscephalæ' to Kalabaka (for the Metsovo Pass), viâ the grain-markets and important road-junctions of Karditsa and


ECE
Lemnos
Kastro
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Velestinos
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Halmyros
G. of Volos
Nea Mintsela
Trikeri
Lamia
Skopelos
North Sporades
Skyros
Euboea
Kumi
Talanta Chan
Atalanti
E
C
E
Kopais Plain
Chalkis
Levadela
Egripos Ch.
(Egripos, Negropont)
Thivai (Thebes)
ATTICA AND BOEOTIA
of Lepanto
Athens
Piraeus
Salamis
G. of Petali
Andros
Corinth
ARGOLIS AND CORINTH
Argos
Nauplia
Mylie
Aegina
Therikon
C.Colonna
Tzia
Syra
Hermoupolis
G. of Aegina
Poros
G. of Nauplia
Spezzia
West. Sporades
EA
Paros
Sparta
Marathonisi
Monemvasia
Melos
G. of Marathonisi
Elaphonisi
C.Malia
Cerigo
English Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50
24
38

Trikkala, the latter being the terminus of a trunk-road* from Larissa viâ Zarkos.

From Larissa, which is protected on the north and the west by the deep and rapid waters of the Peneios, there are also direct branch roads—rather less poor than most of the Greek branch roads—to Karditsa and Pharsalos and to Baba (for Ampelakia), at the beginning of the gorge between Olympus and Ossa; and a rough twenty-five-mile track goes viâ Tyrnavos to the Meluna Pass (for Elassona).

Through Tyrnavos there is also a road which runs along the left bank of the Xerias-Peneios from beyond Damasi to near the Baba bridge, and by this road Macedonia can be entered either from the south-west † (with a possible support through the Skumpa defile, guarded by the almost impregnable rock of Kritizi) or viâ the Rapsani Pass (with a possible support along the coast-road through Platamona and Katarina), as well as by the Meluna Pass.

There is a similar road—supported by a short trunk-road as far as Surpi—from Nea Mintsela (*cf.* p. 120) viâ Halmyros to Pharsalos, which runs on through Karditsa and Trikkala to Kalabaka, with a branch to the natural fortress of Domokos and Lama viâ the Phurka Pass.

* This road—after crossing at Kouzochero to the north bank of the Peneios—is threatened by the Reveni Pass.

† The reverse movement, of course, would start naturally from Elassona and proceed viâ Domenik.

CHAPTER IX

EARLIER MODERN CAMPAIGNS

In a land such as that now under discussion, portions of which contain numerous sites of battles in both ancient and comparatively modern history, it is obvious that, so far as the strategy or general plan of campaign is concerned, there is little left to be worked out. Certain things always have been done, and, given the same conditions, always will be done. The purport of this chapter is to show what has taken place, and thus what possibly may take place again. But it is unnecessary to go far back into history for our examples, and the few typical campaigns that have been selected for detailed description are those which best bring to light the geographical conditions of war.

There is little to be learned from the numerous expeditions despatched by Turkey for the suppression of her provinces in revolt. In Servia and Montenegro there has been, at one time and another, endless fighting—mostly guerilla warfare among the mountains—accompanied by barbarous cruelties on both sides; Greece, also, until she gained her independence, was

the scene of constant trouble; while Bulgaria and other provinces frequently rose against Muhammedan rule. Such punitive expeditions, however, as Turkey undertook, though often resisted bravely by the Christian inhabitants, can hardly be regarded as operations of war.

The several conflicts between Russia and Turkey, on the other hand, are of considerable geographical interest; and during the last two centuries these inveterate foes have crossed swords on nine occasions. That they will sooner or later do so again is inevitable.

Russo-Turkish Wars, 1709-1811.

Although the methods of warfare have undergone radical changes, and the actual tactics of a campaign have been entirely revolutionized by the employment of modern weapons, some slight knowledge of the campaigns of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century is by no means unimportant. The natural features of the theatre of war are the same to-day as they were 200 years ago; and in warfare, as in other matters, history is ever repeating itself.

The treaty of peace concluded at Karlovicz between Peter the Great and the Sultan of Turkey in 1699 handed over a certain amount of Turkish territory to Russia, but at the same time secured for the Ottoman Empire practical immunity from attack for thirty years, though there was a Russo-Turkish war from 1709 to 1711, resulting in the defeat of the Russians. From 1735 to 1739 Russia (aided by Austria) was at war

with Turkey; but, with the exception of the Austrian operations in the neighbourhood of the Servian frontier, the war was conducted in what is now Russian territory. The next war was that of 1768-1774, declared by the Sultan on the Tsar, and fought out not only in the Crimea (which in 1768 belonged to Turkey), but also in Moldavia, Walachia, and Eastern Bulgaria. Little would be gained by following the various operations of this protracted war, but the strategy adopted by Russia in her invasion of North-East Turkey on this occasion formed a precedent for operations in subsequent campaigns, and is therefore worthy of attention.

In a Russian invasion of Turkey, and when both combatants fight without allies, there are two feasible plans, the choice between them depending on naval supremacy in the Black Sea. Thus, if Russia is mistress of the Black Sea, she endeavours to secure certain Turkish ports as her base of operations; if Turkey is master of the Black Sea, Russia is forced to operate farther inland, establishing her base, say, on the Pruth or on the Danube. In the latter case the Russian lines of communication must be of immense length, and difficult to keep open; moreover, if Austria joined Turkey, the Russian advance would be exposed to the risk of being taken in flank by an Austrian army.

The destruction by the Russians, in 1770, of the Turkish fleet in the Bay of Chesme gave the Muscovites the command of the Black Sea, and their plan then was to sweep forward through Moldavia and Walachia to the Danube, enter the Dobruja, capture Varna,

establish a sea-base there, and then proceed to Adrianople and Constantinople. That Russia in 1774 did not succeed in reaching Constantinople was due entirely to the outbreak of plague which, spreading rapidly, all but destroyed the armies of both combatants.

After fourteen years of peace Russia and Austria combined for the conquest of Turkey, and war was carried on from 1788 to 1791—principally in the vicinity of the Danube. The Austrian objective was Belgrade, which, as the most powerful Danubian fortress, the Emperor was very anxious to possess. The Russian army, advancing from the Bug, crossed the Dneister, and, after capturing Bendery, moved towards the Pruth. Then a forward wheel was made to the Danube, the passage of which the Turks were prepared to oppose. The war was not, however, pushed with vigour by the Austrians; they reduced Belgrade in 1789, but left the field in the following year. Russia continued the war alone, and the remainder of 1790 was occupied in the siege of the fortress of Ismail, the key of the Lower Danube. The storming of this fortress by Suwarrow's army was the one event of importance in the campaign, and the accounts given of it place it among the most bloody struggles in the annals of war. No quarter was given, and upwards of 30,000 Turks perished. The invaders soon crossed the Danube, the defence of which was abandoned; Bulgaria was overrun; and Turkey immediately sued for peace.

The war of 1806-1807 between Russia and Turkey was brought about by the intrigues of Napoleon, who was

anxious to divert a portion of the Russian army from the operations that were in progress in the West. There was no local cause for war, but Russia invaded the Danubian provinces and drove the Turks to the south of the Danube. She was unable, however, from want of men, to follow up the advantages that she had gained, and England came to her support, sending an expedition to Egypt and a fleet against Constantinople. The former was a total failure, and the latter, though a brilliant undertaking, proved abortive. Admiral Duckworth sailed through the Dardanelles under a heavy fire, anchored off Constantinople, delivered his ultimatum, and threatened to bombard the capital unless the Sultan joined Russia and England against Napoleon. But the Sultan, by making excuses, tried to keep the Admiral waiting until the Turks should have time to defend Constantinople and blockade the English fleet; and he was on the point of succeeding, when the Admiral saw his danger, and forthwith extricated his fleet by forcing the Dardanelles under a brisk bombardment. Soon after this peace was concluded.

In 1810 war again broke out, Russia intending to formally annex Moldavia and Walachia, which she had not evacuated after the peace of 1807. Her outposts were on the Danube, and in March she attempted the passage of that river, but, being strongly opposed, did not succeed in crossing until May. The army then advanced to Bazarjik, while the Turks fell back to Shumla. The events that immediately followed were mostly repeated in the campaigns of 1828-1829, which

will be described fully later on, and they need only be summarized here. The Russian army was divided, one column moving on Varna, and the other occupying Central Bulgaria. Varna could not be captured, and the Russians, giving up the attempt, besieged Shumla, which also they failed to reduce. They then retired, and took up the siege of Rushchuk, which capitulated at the end of September. The winter was spent in inactivity, but in the spring of 1811 the Turks made strenuous efforts to drive the Russians out of the country, and eventually forced them to retreat to the north of the Danube. Reinforcements came up towards the end of the year, when General Kutusov was able to assume the offensive.

His plans were quickly formed, and as quickly put into execution. A large force was ordered to cross the river secretly, and fall on the Grand Vizier's camp near Rushchuk, while another force was held ready to attack the entrenched camp of the Turkish army on the north bank of the Danube. The river was successfully crossed, and the Turks taken by surprise; the Grand Vizier and his followers fled, abandoning everything; and the Russians, capturing the enemy's guns, turned them on the entrenched camp across the river. Kutusov then moved up the rest of his army, and the Turks were bombarded from both banks of the river. Cut off and hemmed in on all sides, the defenders fought with their accustomed valour, and were only in the end starved into surrender. The Russian victory was complete; the Turkish army was practically annihilated, and

Kutusov, having established his headquarters at Bucharest, retained his Turkish prisoners until the Sultan agreed to the terms of peace.

The Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828 and 1829.

Whatever may have been the cause of this war, one undeniable fact remains—Russia had been preparing for it for years. Her immutable ambition was the possession of Constantinople, and to attain that ambition she was ever ready to find a pretext for a quarrel with her neighbour. But it was not Russia's desire to appear the aggressor, and she therefore secretly fanned the flame that was threatening Turkey. Matters came to a head with the Greek revolt against Turkish rule; and, as usual, much capital was made out of the Muhammedan oppression of Christians, with the result that all Europe turned on Turkey in order to procure the independence of Greece. The destruction by the Powers of the Turkish fleet at the Battle of Navarino in 1827 failed, however, to produce the desired effect on the Sultan, who saw in the attitude of Western Europe a wish to interfere in the internal government of his country, if not also a wish to drive Islam out of Europe. Russia was not slow to seize the opportunity for which she had been long waiting; and, now that her naval supremacy was assured, she put herself forward as the protector of the members of the Greek Church. Yet she hesitated to declare war on Turkey, and ultimately mutual recriminations concerning the violation of treaties became ostensibly the cause of

war, the badly-worded Turkish note being considered by Russia an ultimatum.

STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES AT OUTBREAK OF WAR: Turks, about 150,000 (one-third of whom were cavalry); Russians, about 100,000 (weak in cavalry, but superior to the Turks in artillery).

DISPOSITIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR: Turkish troops stationed as follows:

At Constantinople and on the Bosporus ...	30,000
Dardanelles	7,000
Forts outside the theatre of war	25,000
Thessaly, holding the Greeks in check ...	10,000
Along the Danube and in the Dobruja ...	25,000
In reserve at Adrianople	30,000
At Shumla	25,000

The Russian army of invasion was assembled on the line of the Pruth in three corps, with reserves in Russia.

INVADERS' OBJECTIVE: Constantinople.

The Russo-Turkish frontier at this time, starting from the Black Sea, ran in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the Pruth and the Danube. Thence it followed the course of the Pruth, which separated the Russian province of Bessarabia from the Turkish province of Moldavia. Three successive natural obstacles presented themselves to an invading army moving by land from Russia on Constantinople—the Pruth, the Danube, and the Balkans; while the Dobruja, from its very nature, might also be considered an obstacle. Between the Pruth and the Danube the inhabitants of Moldavia and Walachia, suffering from long years of Turkish oppression, were unlikely to impede a Russian invasion. So also in Bulgaria the

people could be counted on, if not to assist the invaders, at any rate not to oppose them. As far as the Balkans, therefore, the Russians would have the inhabitants with them; and, although the greater part of Eastern Bulgaria was a barren country, a considerable amount of provisions would be available from the fertile districts of Walachia.

Between the Pruth and the Danube, again, fairly good roads connected one town with another, but they were few and far apart; in Bulgaria there were six roads that crossed the Balkans (*cf.* p. 54), as well as several branch roads, but they were all indifferently constructed. Of artificial obstacles may be mentioned the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, viz., Vidin, Rahova, Nikopoli, Svištov, Rushchuk (with detached works at Giurgevo), Silistria, Hirsova, Braila, and Tulcea. Then came what may be considered the second line of defence, consisting of the fortress of Varna (on the Black Sea), Pravadia, the fortress of Shumla (due south of Silistria, and due west of Varna), and Trnovo, to the west again. From the Balkans up to within a few miles of Constantinople there were no obstacles worth mentioning, but the Turks' last line of defence, outside the walls of the capital, was both naturally and artificially of great strength. As regards sea-influence on the campaign, everything was in favour of Russia, who possessed in the Black Sea alone a fleet of sixteen line-of-battle ships, six frigates, and seven corvettes, whereas the Turkish fleet had been practically annihilated by the Powers at the Battle of Navarino.

The INVADERS' PLAN OF CAMPAIGN was to cross the Pruth and the Lower Danube; then, with the left pivoted on the Black Sea, to wheel forward to the Danube—the right extended to Vidin. One corps, after crossing the Lower Danube, was to march through the Dobruja and Bulgaria, and, if possible, capture Varna; a second corps was to besiege and capture Braila; a third corps was to occupy Moldavia and Walachia, and capture Silistria. This done, it was intended to cross the Danube, advance to the Balkans —either capturing or masking the entrenched camp at Shumla—pass the Balkans, and march on Adrianople and Constantinople. The Black Sea was to be used as a base, and the Russian fleet was to assist in keeping the army supplied.

The DEFENDERS' PLAN OF CAMPAIGN was a passive defence. A strong force was to be retained near the capital until it was certain that a Russian army would not land thereabouts; the Danube fortresses were to be held from the first, and the garrisons of Varna and Shumla were to be reinforced.

The THEATRE OF OPERATIONS included the Lower Danube, Eastern Bulgaria, and Roumelia; and the DURATION OF CAMPAIGN was from May, 1828, to August, 1829, active operations being suspended for about five months of the intervening winter.

Turkey's apparently defiant message to Russia was despatched in December, 1827, but no notice was taken of it until the following April, for Russia preferred to wait until the weather in the Black Sea was favourable

to the movements of her fleet. At last, on May 7, the invaders crossed the Pruth by temporary bridges constructed for the purpose, and within a fortnight all the country north of the Danube had been occupied by the Russians without opposition. Meanwhile the siege of Braila, the strongest fortress on the Lower Danube, had been commenced; and, though the Turks defended the place with great determination, it capitulated on June 16. While this was in progress, the 3rd Corps had entered the Dobruja, and was marching south, waiting at Karasu until June 25, when the news of the fall of Braila arrived. It then moved on to Bazarjik, where the Turks laid a very successful ambush, resulting in the loss of nearly 12,000 Russians, thereby checking the advance of the invaders, who awaited reinforcements from the 7th Corps that had been engaged at the siege of Braila.

It was now the middle of July, and the 6th Corps (in occupation of Walachia) had not yet succeeded in capturing Silistria or in crossing the Danube. The other two corps had combined and were marching on Varna, which was then held by about 7,000 Turks. When within a short distance of this place, however, the Russian general changed his plans, and decided to attempt first the capture of Shumla, which was said to be garrisoned by 40,000 men. Shumla was soon invested, but the Russians failed to make any impression on it; and on August 3 the Emperor Nicholas (who had joined his army), leaving sufficient troops to continue the siege, withdrew the remainder and marched on Varna.

The capture of Varna was all-important to the Russians, as it afforded a most desirable base for the landing of supplies; but, while the Russians had been devoting their attention to Shumla, the Turks had thrown reinforcements into Varna, which was now capable of considerable resistance. The Russian fleet arrived in Varna Bay, and the Emperor's army completed the blockade by land, yet it was not until it had withstood a siege of eighty-nine days that, on October 12, the place capitulated; and even then its surrender was only effected by the treachery of the second in command, who accepted Russian bribes.

The investment of Shumla was of no avail. The Turks made frequent sorties, and their cavalry harassed the Russians on all sides; moreover, the investing force suffered great hardships both from the extreme heat and from want of food and of water, and eventually could do no more than act on the defensive. At length, Wittgenstein, who commanded in front of Shumla, decided to withdraw; and shortly after the capture of Varna he commenced his retreat to the north. This began on October 15, and so vigorously did the Turkish cavalry pursue him that it was all he could do to reach the Danube by the now almost impassable roads of Bulgaria. Half his baggage and a third of his force were lost on the way. The remnant of his army, however, was able to join the 7th Corps, which had been besieging Silistria since July 21, and take up the investment of that place. But it was too late in the season to prosecute the siege, and the Russians left the Turks

in possession on November 10. Elsewhere also, in Walachia, the invaders had been unfortunate, and were hardly able to hold their own.

The Russians now went into winter-quarters, and the campaign of 1828 was at an end. During the winter they occupied the following positions: At Varna, Pravadia, Bazarjik, and the neighbourhood, the 6th and 7th Corps; in Moldavia and Walachia, the 2nd and 3rd Corps; in Bessarabia, the Guards Corps. The whole extent of their front was about 250 miles, their left being at Varna, and their right at Craiova; but the Turkish positions at Silistria and at Rushchuk cut into the Russian line and rendered it most insecure. The Turks did little, however, during the winter, and it was not until May, 1829, that active land operations recommenced, though as early as February the Russian fleet had seized Sizebolu, a fortified seaport on the Black Sea which afforded an excellent base for an advance on Adrianople.

The Russians at the opening of the campaign of 1829 were in possession of a most satisfactory base on the Black Sea, extending all along the Dobruja coast and from thence on to Sizebolu. General Diebitsch, who assumed command of the Russian army towards the end of February, spent the next two months in reorganizing his troops and formulating his plans. The Sultan, also, devoted this period to the improvement of the Turkish army. Early in May the Russians began to move; and, though the weather was unfavourable, the roads in bad condition, and the water of the river high,

the Danube was crossed by a bridge at Hirsova, and portions of the 2nd and 3rd Corps joined the 6th and 7th Corps about Varna and Pravadia. Diebitsch, in order to clear his way, now undertook the siege of Silistria, which held out from May 17 till July 1, when, after resisting with the greatest bravery, the garrison of 9,000 men surrendered.

Meanwhile the Turkish army at Shumla—numbering between 30,000 and 40,000—assumed the offensive, the Grand Vizier having determined to attack the Russians at Pravadia. Marching out of Shumla, the Turks took up positions on the heights round Pravadia; but Diebitsch, at Silistria, on hearing of the movement, drew off such of his investing force as he could spare, and made a dash to interpose himself between the Turks and Shumla. This brilliant stroke was entirely successful, and, though the Turks fought with desperation and valour at Kulewtscha, the combined movements of the Russian corps resulted in the rout of the Turks, who fled from the field, only reaching Shumla by circuitous routes.

Diebitsch's army was not numerically strong enough to advance farther at once; he had barely 25,000 men, Silistria was still holding out, and Shumla was held by some 30,000 Turks. He was joined, however, on July 16 by the force set free by the fall of Silistria, and this reinforcement enabled him to leave 10,000 men to invest Shumla, and push forward with the remainder. The advance was made in two columns, the right keeping along the coast, and occupying Misivri and Burgas

without opposition, while the left moved direct on Aitos, passing the Balkans without difficulty. Aitos and all its stores were abandoned on his approach, so that the Russians were plentifully supplied, apart from their having established communications with their fleet at Burgas. But at this moment the Russian General began to reflect that his rapid advance had left his army scattered over an immense area, that his communications with the Danube had practically ceased to exist, and that, if the Turks displayed any activity, his communications might be cut. Consequently, he concentrated his two columns, and marched westward to Sliven with 25,000 men. He fully expected to encounter a large Turkish army, but he met nothing more formidable than a small body of cavalry.

Leaving troops to secure his communications, Diebitsch resumed his advance, and marched into Adrianople on August 20, the garrison of 20,000 men having retreated to Constantinople. His communications again caused him uneasiness; the army was running short of supplies, and to open up communications with the fleet at Burgas would delay his advance. The force of about 21,000 which he had with him, was too small to effect anything of importance, and he felt that, unless peace could be immediately brought about, he would probably be cut off and his army destroyed. He was, however, favoured by fortune, for the Turks were under the impression that he had with him some 80,000 men, and he determined on a bold course. He was aware that a Russian envoy was at Constantinople

trying to arrange the terms of peace, and he saw at once that inaction on the part of his army would disclose its weaknesses to the Turks and induce them to carry on the war. Consequently, he forthwith divided his small force into three columns. The left he despatched to the shores of the Black Sea, where, in conjunction with the fleet, it overcame everything as far south as Midia, which was occupied on September 7; the right column made for the port of Enos, on the Ægean Sea, which was captured on September 8, whereby communications were established with the Russian fleet that had been blockading the Dardanelles; the central column meanwhile advanced to Baba Eski, halfway to Constantinople.

The result of these combined movements was that the Russians held a line, from sea to sea, about 100 miles in length, within 120 miles of Constantinople, with 20,000 men, and the Turks fully believed that each of the three columns was merely the advanced guard of a large force. Before the movements were completed, the Powers brought pressure to bear on the Sultan, and a treaty of peace was signed at Adrianople on August 28, 1829. Nothing but peace could have saved the Russian army, which was already suffering, not only from the hardships of the campaign, but also from that dreadful disease—the plague—which had similarly affected the operations of 1774.

It must, of course, be borne in mind that the campaign of 1828-1829 took place before the days of telegraphs, railways, or steamships; that the weapons then

in use were—to modern ideas—primitive in the extreme; and that, consequently, it is difficult to compare this campaign with those of later date. The absence of the telegraph certainly favoured Diebitsch in 1829, for, if he had been hampered by having to refer proposed movements to St. Petersburg, the bold strokes by which he succeeded in hoodwinking the Turks, would never have been effected. With regard to the sea, Russia's supremacy enabled her to supply her army largely from the Black Sea coast, to blockade both the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and thus to shut up the few Turkish ships that survived Navarino. Without the Black Sea fleet, the coast base could not have been secured, and want of supplies would have delayed the advance of the Russian army in 1829 until too late to be of any use. Further, the knowledge that there was a Russian fleet in the Ægean as well as in the Black Sea undoubtedly influenced Diebitsch in his final advance. The natural obstacles encountered by the invaders were all surmounted without difficulty; even the Balkans, which hitherto had been considered an impassable barrier, were crossed with the greatest ease, principally because the Turks had not the energy to defend the passes. Yet so remarkable was the passage of the Balkans in those days considered, that Diebitsch afterwards received the official title of Zabalkanski (Crosser of the Balkans).

The fortresses of Braila, Silistria, and Shumla impeded the advance, but not so much because they barred the way, as because it was dangerous to leave

the Turkish garrisons behind, and thus give them the opportunity of cutting the Russian communications. In 1828 Braila checked the invaders until the middle of July; Silistria prevented any forward movement of the 6th Corps; and Shumla held out so tenaciously that it brought the campaign to a close, the Russians having to raise the siege and retreat to the Danube. In 1829 again the sieges of Silistria and Shumla kept the Russians back until the middle of July, and even then Shumla had to be left behind with 10,000 Russians to invest it. The garrison of Vidin on the Danube had also been able to hold Geismar's corps to Walachia until it was too late for his advance to be of any service to Diebitsch.

But the greatest difficulty with which the Russian General had to contend, was the reduction of his army by disease. The water was everywhere bad, and in places scarce; the food was often scanty and unwholesome; but such things are common to all campaigns. From the very outset, however, the Russian troops had to combat with the plague; quarantine was imposed, every possible precaution was taken to prevent the spread of the disease, and during 1828 it was held in check. But Walachia, whither the bulk of the Russian army retired for the winter, was a hotbed of plague; and it was impossible to check its spread amongst the troops, who suffered enormously. During January, 1829, 6,000 men died; in February even more deaths occurred; and throughout the campaign of this year the disease spread rapidly. In June Varna was attacked,

and an average of 1,000 men a week were admitted to hospital; the doctors all died, and it was difficult to replace them; while the bodies of the dead remained for the most part unburied. The Russian army investing Shumla was itself invested by a cordon of quarantine sentries; and Diebitsch's columns, when passing through suspected places, filed between a double row of guards, preventing the troops from communicating with the inhabitants. So successful were these measures that Diebitsch, on crossing the Balkans, outmarched the plague; but his army was attacked at Aitos by virulent fevers and other diseases, and at one time, of the whole army of invasion, more than 40,000 men were in hospital—almost 50 per cent. After peace had been concluded, the disease spread more rapidly, so that the Russians were forced to remain in the country all through the winter; and, of the 100,000 original invaders, it has been estimated that not more than 15,000 returned to Russia.

The Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1853-1854.

This campaign was the opening phase of what is better known as the Crimean War, and took place before England and France joined forces with Turkey. The real cause was, as usual, Russia's desire to possess the Golden Horn; the nominal cause was the refusal by Turkey to grant to the Greek Church certain concessions connected with the keeping of the Holy Places in Palestine. Early in 1853 Russia reiterated her demands; Turkey refused them. Negotiations went

on for several months, until, in June, Russia delivered an ultimatum, and in a few days her troops crossed the frontier, though war was not actually declared by Turkey for another three months.

The STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR was—Russian invading army, about 80,000; Turks, about 70,000 effectives.

As to the DISPOSITIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, the Russians were already well advanced, through Moldavia and Walachia, to the Danube. The Turkish army was mostly concentrated at Vidin, with garrisons holding the Danubian and other fortresses. The INVADERS' OBJECTIVE was Constantinople.

The fact that the invaders established themselves on the left bank of the Danube long before the declaration of war, and before Turkish troops could be pushed forward to hold the line of the Pruth, gave Russia an advanced base, with Walachia and Moldavia to draw on for supplies. At the same time her troops were scattered over a wide front, while the Turks were well posted on the right bank of the river, and had the choice of attacking the invaders' flanks from the directions of Vidin or Turtukai, or of piercing their centre. The defence of the line of the Danube was therefore favourable to the Turks; and although, if they had been able to defend the line of the Pruth, the resources of the principalities might have been denied to the Russians, it is doubtful whether much good would have resulted to the defenders. Other geographical conditions which might have had an influence on the campaign, were very

similar to those which obtained in the last war; the roads were no better; railways did not exist; and there was no telegraph. But both the Russians and the Turks now possessed a certain number of steam-vessels on the Black Sea, which were likely to expedite the transport of troops and supplies. Russia's Black Sea fleet was, at the outbreak of war, superior to that of Turkey.

What ultimate intention the Tsar had in occupying Moldavia and Walachia does not appear evident. At the outset he declared the occupation to be, not an act of war, but merely a means of obtaining the Sultan's compliance with Russian demands. No plans were divulged, and it seems as if the Russians meant to act on the defensive, until the Turks had worn themselves out. Later, however, the Tsar called Marshal Paskewitch to his councils, and a definite plan of invasion was drawn up as follows: To cross the Lower Danube early in the spring of 1854, capture Silistria by May 1, push on to Shumla, cross the Balkans, and advance on Adrianople and Constantinople. In opposition to this, the TURKISH PLAN OF CAMPAIGN was, to defend the line of the Danube to the last, assuming a vigorous offensive wherever opportunity should offer.

The THEATRE OF OPERATIONS was the Danube below Vidin, including the Dobruja; the DURATION OF CAMPAIGN was about nine months.

By crossing the Pruth with three Army Corps on July 7, 1853, Russia, who even then proclaimed herself to be well disposed towards Turkey, violated all the ordinary laws of friendship. Turkey was not ready to

take the field, and was also restrained from doing so by the action of the Great Powers of Western Europe, who expressed themselves as inclined to support the Ottoman Government in resisting the aggressions of Russia. Attempts to patch up peace continued until October 23, 1853, when a Russian flotilla entered the Danube from the Black Sea, and endeavoured to force a passage up the river, and Turkey forthwith declared war. The Turkish army had never been in a better state of organization; the whole nation was smarting under the insults heaped on it by Russia; and the knowledge that England and France were prepared to assist them gave great confidence both to the troops and their leaders. The Turks were certainly fortunate in having in Omar Pasha a Commander-in-Chief such as they had never previously had—a man capable of seeing his opportunities and of seizing them—and no sooner was war proclaimed than Omar determined to attack the invaders established on the left bank of the Danube.

By November 4 Omar succeeded in crossing the river near Vidin, Rushchuk, and Turtukai, and, after brilliant operations, drove the Russians out of Kalafat (near Vidin) and Turtukai, though he was unable to effect the capture of the bridge-head at Giurgevo (opposite Rushchuk). These advantageous positions he continued to hold throughout the winter, and by frequent incursions prevented the enemy from making any forward movement. Meanwhile, however, disaster had fallen on a portion of the Turkish Black Sea fleet anchored in the Bay of Sinope, on the Asiatic coast,

which on November 30 was suddenly attacked and destroyed by a small Russian fleet. England and France, until this moment hopeful that war might be averted, now ordered their fleets, anchored in the Bosporus, to prevent a recurrence of the Sinope affair; and on January 4, 1854, the allied fleet entered the Black Sea.

The Tsar, in spite of the fact that Austria was massing troops on her frontier, and thus threatening the Russian flank and rear, and though aware that England and France were on the eve of joining his adversary, still determined to carry out the plan of invasion advised by Paskewitch. The invaders were, however, late in commencing operations; the Dobruja was entered towards the end of March, but the siege of Silistria was not begun until May 19, by which time England and France had taken up arms in the Sultan's cause. Silistria defied every attempt at capture, and on June 22 the Russians, learning that the allies were assembling in the neighbourhood of Varna, raised the siege and retired to the north of the Danube. A fortnight later the Turks at Rushchuk crossed the river, and drove the invaders out of Giurgevo, whereupon the Russian General withdrew to Bucharest. Here he remained only for a short time, as Austria now pressed for the immediate evacuation of the principalities, and the Tsar considered it advisable to yield to the demand.

Austrian troops forthwith occupied Moldavia and Walachia, and the Russians retired behind the Pruth, whereupon the seat of war was changed to the Crimea, and Turkish territory was freed from the Russians.

CHAPTER X

LATER MODERN CAMPAIGNS

Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878.

In spite of the vigorous protests of the European Powers, Turkey had for a long while continued to deal harshly with the Christian inhabitants of her provinces, and Russia, considering this a sufficient *casus belli*, constituted herself the champion of Christendom, and on April 24, 1877, declared war on Turkey.

At the outbreak of war the Russian invading army numbered about 200,000 men — viz., 180 battalions of infantry, 200 squadrons of cavalry, and 800 guns; Turkey had about 250,000 men—viz., 360 battalions of infantry, 85 squadrons of cavalry, and 450 guns. The Turkish armament was also superior to that of Russia.

Dispositions at Outbreak of War: Russian army assembled at Kishinev, and extended along the Russo-Roumanian frontier from Ungheni to Kubei.

Turkish troops stationed as follows:

In the western province from Bosnia to Thessaly, including the army operating against Montenegro	85,000
On the Upper Danube at Vidin	60,000
In the quadrilateral of fortresses: Rushchuk, Silistria, Varna, Shumla	50,000
In detachments at minor points along the whole length of the Danube	15,000
South of the Balkans, at Sofia, Philippopolis, Adrianople, and Constantinople	40,000
	250,000

The INVADERS' OBJECTIVE was again Constantinople.

Between Russia and the general course of the Danube was situated Roumania, still tributary to Turkey, though much under Russian influence. The Russo-Turkish frontier, starting from a point on the Black Sea a few miles south of Odessa, ran in a westerly direction to Kubei, whence it passed north-west, along the eastern limits of Roumania, until the Austro-Roumanian frontier was reached. In 1856, it will be remembered, Russia was prohibited from maintaining a fleet on the Black Sea; and, although this prohibition became a dead letter after 1871, she had not as yet had time to build a Black Sea fleet of any importance, whereas Turkey possessed a considerable fleet of warships of all descriptions. A descent by Russia on the Turkish ports of the Black Sea was, therefore, out of the question, and a treaty was made with Roumania whereby the passage of troops through that country was secured for Russia. At one point only was the Russo-Roumanian frontier crossed by a railroad—viz., that running between Bendery and Yassy, and onwards to the main-line which came down southwards from Austria to Galatz. From Galatz the railroad continued to a point a few miles north of Bucharest, where it bifurcated, one line passing south-east, through Bucharest and Rushchuk to Varna, the other west through Pitesci and Slatina. But, though the railroads in Roumania were few,* the roads were good, and sufficiently numerous for the movement of troops.

* A railway was made from Bendery to Galatz during the war.

The INVADERS' PLAN OF CAMPAIGN was to advance to Galatz. One Army Corps was to cross the Danube at Braila and hold the Dobruja. The remainder were to advance through Roumania and force the passage of the Danube between Nikopoli and Rushchuk. Strong flanking parties were then to line the Isker River or the Vid River on the west, and the Yantra River or the Lom River on the east, while the main force proceeded to cross the Balkans and advance on Adrianople, thence marching on Constantinople.

The DEFENDERS' PLAN OF CAMPAIGN was a passive defence, south of the Danube, on practically no preconceived plan.

As to the THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, the invaders passed through Roumania—which was friendly to Russia and provided a contingent of 35,000 men—to the Danube; and the Dobruja was occupied and held by the Russians without molestation, but the quadrilateral fortresses remained in the uncontested possession of the Turks throughout the war; the war itself was carried on almost entirely in Bulgaria. The DURATION OF CAMPAIGN was forty-five weeks.

The Russians advanced by three different roads to Bucharest, and one corps was sent a little later by rail to Slatina, eighty miles west of Bucharest. By May 24 the invaders were in position on the north bank of the Danube between Nikopoli and Rushchuk, as had been intended. There they remained until June 24, while stores of all kinds were being brought up by the railway

(single line). June 6 had been fixed for crossing the river, but delays were caused by the break of gauge on the Russo-Roumanian frontier, which necessitated the transfer of all stores to different railway-trucks, and by the unusually wet season, which produced floods that destroyed several bridges. The Turks possessed a large fleet of gunboats on the Lower Danube; and, while waiting to cross the river, the Russians, who had brought launches and torpedoes overland, engaged the Turkish flotilla, destroyed many vessels, and succeeded in completely crippling the Danubian naval resources of Turkey for the remainder of the campaign.

Between June 12 and 16 a bridge was thrown across the Danube at Braila, for the purpose of passing over the corps destined to occupy the Dobruja. The Turks did not oppose the construction of the bridge, but a rise in the river rendered it useless, and on June 22 Russian troops crossed in boats and rafts at Galatz. An engagement took place on the right bank, resulting in the retirement of the Turks from that part of the country.

The Turks, on becoming aware of the fact that the Russians intended their main army to cross the Danube somewhere opposite Bucharest, brought up troops to guard the likely crossing-places, and improved the fortifications of Nikopoli, Rushchuk, Turtukai, and Silistria, their forces lining the Danube from Vidin to the Dobruja, with reserves at Vidin and Shumla. On June 24 the Russians decided to attempt to cross the river about midway between the fortresses of Nikopoli and Rush-

chuk, from Zimnița to Svištov, as the river there was made favourable for a crossing by the presence of an island in midstream, under cover of which the pontoon boats could be assembled. On this day and the next, siege batteries, established opposite Nikopoli and Rushchuk, commenced a heavy bombardment; and on the night of the 26th one corps was sent towards Nikopoli as a feint, while the advanced guard of the Russian army proceeded to cross the river in boats, under cover of darkness. The Turkish outposts on the heights above the river discovered the crossing of the first party, and were soon in position to oppose the landing. The Russians, however, though suffering somewhat from the Turkish fire, continued to cross to the south bank, and by 2 p.m. on June 27 had carried the heights behind Svištov, with a loss of about 800 men, the Turks retiring to Trnovo and Nikopoli.

Bridges were now thrown across the river from Zimnița to Svištov, and completed by July 2, when the bulk of the Russian army crossed. In order to carry out the plan of campaign, General Gourko advanced towards the Balkans, and on July 7 captured Trnovo, upon which two corps pushed forward to the east and took up position along the Lom River, thus covering the left flank of the advance. The right flank was to be covered, as was stated, by corps occupying the line of the Isker River or of the Vid River, and with this object General Krudener, marching from Svištov, captured Nikopoli and 7,000 prisoners on July 16, the Russian losses amounting to 1,300 men.

Before he could move westward and take up his flanking positions, however, the Turks had realized the situation and marched to oppose him. Osman Pasha brought 40,000 men from Vidin, and another 10,000 were pushed forward from Sofia, and occupied the strong works at Plevna, without the knowledge of the Russians, who on July 20 attempted to drive the Turks out. The assault was a complete failure, and the assailants were driven off with a loss of some 3,000 men (about one-third of their force). The Russians were now reinforced, and the Turks did all in their power to strengthen their position. On July 30 Plevna was assaulted for the second time, and after a desperate battle the Russians were again defeated, with a loss of 7,000 men (out of 30,000). During August further Russian reinforcements were brought up, until the invaders' army in the neighbourhood of Plevna amounted to 100,000 men, and on August 31 the Turks issued out of Plevna, and temporarily assumed the offensive. The day's fight was a stubborn one, and, though each side suffered equally (losing about 1,000 men), the Turks eventually withdrew to Plevna.

The Russians had not anticipated so much opposition on their right flank; but their plans were in reality so far being carried out, for the Turks were kept off both on the left and on the right, while Gourko was making his advance towards the Balkans.* On July 12 he issued orders for a forward movement from Trnovo.

* See 'General Gourko's Advanced Guard, 1877,' by Colonel Epauchin (of the Russian Staff); translated by H. Havelock.

The Turks were known to have taken up a strong position at the Shipka Pass, and Gourko decided to separate his forces, sending Mirsky with about 2,500 men straight towards the pass, while he himself, with about 12,000 men, moved east to the Hainkioi Pass by an indifferent mountain track. From Hainkioi Gourko proposed marching west, and attacking the Shipka Pass from the south, while Mirsky cooperated from the north. Not being able to keep up communications between the two columns, Mirsky and Gourko were ignorant of each other's movements; but the simultaneous attack on the Shipka Pass had been fixed for July 17, and consequently Mirsky, who had reached his destination up to time, proceeded to deliver his attack forthwith. Gourko, however, in marching from Hainkioi towards Shipka, met with more opposition than he had anticipated, and was thus delayed by a day, the result being that Mirsky's isolated attack on July 17 failed signally.

During the night Gourko endeavoured to communicate with Mirsky, and sent, by a Bulgarian, a note asking for his support in the attack next day; but the difficulties of the country prevented the delivery of the message, and Gourko, unaware of its non-delivery, attacked the Turkish position and was repulsed. During the night of July 18, however, the Turks evacuated the position, abandoning their wounded, guns, ammunition, and supplies, and on the 19th the Russians were in possession of the Shipka, Travna, and Hainkioi Passes.

Gourko's cavalry now did excellent service, cutting the railway-line and raiding in all directions, up to within seventy miles of Adrianople. The Turks had meanwhile fallen back to Philippopolis, and a new army of some 50,000 men (known as the 'Balkan Army') had taken the field under Suleiman Pasha. The advance of Gourko's comparatively small force was, therefore, checked, and early in August it was obliged to withdraw to the north of the Balkans, leaving only a small detachment at the Shipka Pass.

The situation in August, 1877, was as follows: The Russians held the Danube between Nikopoli and Rushchuk, and the country enclosed by perpendicular lines from those two points to the Balkans, with about 135,000 men and 650 guns, while another 28,000 men held the Dobruja. The Turks had in the field some 200,000 men, of whom Osman commanded 50,000 at Plevna on the west, Mehemet Ali 65,000 at Razgrad on the east, and Suleiman 40,000 at Nova Zagora on the south, the remainder being distributed in strong detachments between the above three points. The invaders' plan had failed from want of men—from underestimating the strength of the enemy, and it was necessary to await reinforcements; but, fortunately for the Russians, the Turks had no Commander-in-Chief, each of the three main armies acting independently.

Towards the end of August the Turks assumed the offensive. Suleiman with about 30,000 men attacked the Russians holding the Shipka Pass, and, though a fierce battle raged for five days, the Turks failed to

capture the pass. Mehemet Ali at about the same time commenced operations against the invaders' left wing posted along the Lom River, and eventually, after some hard fighting, succeeded in driving the Russians back behind the Yantra River, where he left them. So far, therefore, the Turks had not caused the Russians to make any material alteration in their dispositions, and early in September the Russian army (including the Roumanian forces) in the neighbourhood of Plevna was strong enough to give battle to Osman. The Russians numbered about 90,000 men, the Turks possibly 60,000; but, although Plevna was bombarded for several days, and many of the outworks carried, the Russians were unable to drive out the defenders. An investment was then decided on, but it was not until December 10 that the place capitulated, by which time Plevna had cost the defenders 30,000 men and the assailants 40,000.*

On the fall of Plevna, Servia declared war on Turkey, threw in her lot with Russia, and put some 25,000 men into the field, when the allies had no fewer than 250,000 men in Bulgaria. Plevna had delayed the invaders' plans considerably, had diverted half the Russian army, and had thus prevented any forward movement through the Balkans until the rigours of the winter had set in. With the surrender of Osman's army, the Turkish

* See Greene's account in his 'Russian Army and its Campaign in Turkey in 1877-1878'; 'The Defence of Plevna,' by W. V. Herbert; 'Défense de Plevna,' by General Mouzaffer Pasha and Lieutenant-Colonel Talaat Bey.

forces were reduced to something like 150,000 men; and, though the Russians dreaded a winter campaign, it was deemed advisable to deny the Turks the opportunity of recuperating their strength. Gourko had already marched round to the south-west of Plevna, in order to prevent the Turks coming to the assistance of Osman, and immediately after the capitulation of the latter strong reinforcements were sent forward, when Gourko with 80,000 men made for the Balkans to the north of Sofia.

The Russian dispositions for the winter campaign were as follows: The original Dobruja force to remain where it was, a strong force to continue to guard the left flank from Rushchuk to the Balkans, Radetsky with 65,000 men to force the Balkans at the Shipka Pass and march on Adrianople, where he was to be joined by Gourko, who was to drive the Turks out of the Baba-Konak Pass, capture Sofia, and then proceed to Adrianople by the old Roman road through Philippopolis.

The plan was immediately put into execution. Gourko fought his way through the Balkans, routed the Turks, and occupied Sofia on January 4, 1878. A fortnight later he entered Philippopolis, having completely broken up Suleiman's army of about 60,000 men, with a loss to the Russians of barely 2,000. Meanwhile Radetsky crossed the Balkans in the vicinity of the Shipka Pass in three columns, and after some desperate fighting, in which the Russians lost 5,500, surrounded and captured the Turkish army of 36,000

men. By January 27 the united Russian forces had occupied Adrianople without resistance, and two days later the cavalry had advanced almost halfway to Constantinople. The Turks then sued for peace, and an armistice was signed on January 31. On February 12 a British fleet passed through the Dardanelles with the avowed intention of protecting the Christian inhabitants of Constantinople, and on the 23rd portions of the Russian army were allowed to encamp at San Stefano and the neighbouring suburbs of Constantinople. The Treaty of San Stefano, which concluded the war, was signed on March 3.

Although Turkey had such an extensive seaboard, the sea played little part in the actual war; its use was, as we have explained, denied to the Russians, and the Turks only utilized it on three occasions, viz., to land Suleiman's Montenegrin army at Enos, to bring the Egyptian contingent of 12,000 men to Varna, and in January, 1878, to transport the remnant of Suleiman's defeated army from Enos to Constantinople, which did not, as events turned out, affect the issue of the campaign, because peace was signed before the men again took the field. Still, the sea was undoubtedly the indirect means of ending the war; for the passage of the Dardanelles by the British fleet in February was considered by Russia a hint that she had trampled on the Turks sufficiently, and that it was time to stay her hand. Neither, in all probability, was Russia sorry for the opportunity of coming to terms with the Turks. Constantinople could not be invested, and

from the land side was almost impregnable; moreover, the Russians had suffered heavily from the effects of the winter campaign, they found immense difficulty in obtaining supplies owing to the distance from their base (some 800 miles) and the state of the Balkan passes, and were consequently only too glad to be able to revictual by means of the Black Sea. It was the sea, therefore, that saved Constantinople from the Russians, and the Russians themselves from starvation and disease.

Two great natural obstacles were encountered by the invaders in their advance—a river and a mountain range—neither of which could be avoided. The Danube was certainly crossed without much difficulty, principally because the Turks had not at that phase of the campaign been aroused from their normal state of lethargy; but later on, when the Russians advanced farther south, and the importance of maintaining open communications for sending forward supplies daily increased, the Danube became a serious obstacle—the bridges were washed away by the winter floods, and the water froze sufficiently to make the use of ferry-boats difficult, but not hard enough to render the ice capable of bearing the transport train.

The Balkans presented a more serious obstacle to the advance; the principal passes and the minor trails were all known (by report) to the Russians, but so rugged was the country that columns moving by adjacent passes were unable to keep up communication with each other. Yet in the summer Gourko succeeded

in crossing the Balkans, only, however, to be obliged to retire to the north again for want of support; and, when the winter campaign commenced, and the mountains had to be recrossed, not only were the Turks better prepared for resistance, but the elements increased the difficulties of the Russians a hundredfold. Passes were blocked with 10 feet of snow, roads became mere ice-slides, and to the 10,000 Russians who fell fighting in the Balkans, must be added an equal number who perished from the hardships endured in the mountains. That the Turks suffered even heavier losses is certain.

The chief artificial obstacles that influenced the strategy of the campaign were the fortresses of the so-called quadrilateral, viz., Rushchuk, Silistria, Varna, and Shumla, which the Russians had no intention of assaulting, and higher up the Danube the fortresses of Nikopoli, Rahova, Lom, and Vidin; while, after the campaign had been in progress for some little time, the remarkable entrenched camp at Plevna* delayed the invaders for four months, thus necessitating a winter campaign with its attendant horrors.

So bad were the roads in Bulgaria that it was with the greatest difficulty that, even during the most favourable months of the year, the Russians were able to get up supplies. For the greater part of the war they subsisted on the country and on the stores captured

* An excellent plan of the defences of Plevna will be found in Tovey's 'Elements of Strategy,' new edition, revised by Dr. Miller Maguire (1904).

from the enemy. The only railway was that from Rushchuk to Varna, and thus outside the theatre of war.

Græco-Turkish War, 1897.

Greece claimed the right to protect the Christians in Crete, although the Powers had undertaken to see that reforms in the island were carried out. Accordingly she sent a fleet and a land force to Crete, and engaged the Turkish troops and Muhammedan inhabitants, hostilities being eventually checked by the armed intervention of the Powers, whose warships were on the spot. The war party in Greece, being thwarted in their attempt to make Crete a cause for war with Turkey, set to work to stir up Pan-Hellenic feeling, and early in April independent Greek bands commenced to cross the Macedonian frontier and engage the Turks. On April 18 Turkey declared war.

As to a Plan of Campaign, it is doubtful whether either side had formed any plans beyond those for the immediate future. Possibly each intended making for the other's capital. The Theatre of Operations was Thessaly.

When war was declared, the opposing forces were all ready in position, and at once commenced hostilities along the frontier. The mountain range forming the frontier immediately to the north of Larissa is crossed by the Meluna Pass, the possession of which was necessary either for the invasion of Greece by the Turks or for the invasion of Turkey by the Greeks; and it became

the scene of the first conflict. The Turks, who were superior both in numbers and in artillery, assaulted the pass, at the same time attacking the Greeks at two or three other points in the vicinity; and, after some considerable resistance, the latter were driven out of the mountains on to the plain of Larissa. Within a few days Tyrnavos was in the hands of the Turks, and the Greeks took up a position in front of Larissa, which they abandoned in a panic caused by a small body of Turkish cavalry that had been pushed forward during the night for reconnoitring purposes.

Meanwhile the Greek fleet bombarded several Turkish ports both in the Ionian Sea and in the Gulf of Salonica, and small parties of Greek troops gained some slight advantages in Epirus, only, however, to be eventually routed by the Turks at the Pentepigadia Pass.

As the Turkish army advanced from Larissa, the Greeks withdrew to a position farther south, with their left on Pharsalos, and their right extended to Velestinos and Volos, the latter being their base of supply, to which troops, etc., were sent by sea from Athens. Two short railway-lines traversed this part of the country, the one from Kalabaka, viâ Trikkala, Karditsa, and Pharsalos, to Velestinos; the other from Larissa, viâ Velestinos, to Volos. A good road ran by the side of the railway from Kalabaka to Pharsalos, and thence south by Domokos, Lamia, and Atalanti towards Thebes and Athens. Another good road followed the Larissa-Volos railway. The Greek position was a weak one, and far too extended for the number of their troops;

the Turks attacked their flanks and pierced their centre, and early in May had occupied Pharsalos, Velestinos, and Volos, thus possessing themselves of the railway-line and cutting off the Greeks from their sea-base. The Greeks retired to Domokos, and, aware that they now had no prospect of success, submitted to the will of the Powers by withdrawing from Crete and seeking their mediation for the arrangement of terms with Turkey. Negotiations were immediately commenced, but the Turks continued hostilities, and on May 18 drove the Greeks out of Domokos. At the same time some desultory fighting went on in Epirus, where the Greeks successfully held their own. Finally, on the intervention of the Tsar, Turkey agreed to an armistice, and the Ambassadors of the Powers were engaged from June 3 until September 18 in arranging the terms of peace.

From a geographical point of view the campaign furnishes few lessons worthy of much attention. It lasted barely a month, strategy played no part in it, and such operations as took place were of a purely tactical nature.

CHAPTER XI

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SKETCH

SOME knowledge of history and politics is necessary for a clear understanding of the problems which for centuries have confronted the Great Powers of Europe, and which still remain to be solved. Year by year we find in the newspapers such ever-recurring topics as 'The Eastern Question,' and 'Unrest in the Balkans'; and, when war again breaks out in the peninsula, one or the other of these will be the direct or indirect cause. The former has been summed up somewhat tritely thus: Russia desires Constantinople, and the other Powers are afraid to allow her to have it; the latter is due to the unblendable natures of the various peoples who inhabit the land, and to their religious differences. Time may find a solution for the Eastern Question, and from that solution there may result peace and tranquillity for the turbulent peoples; but such a happy state of affairs appears still far off.

By the sixteenth century Turkey was master of the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, a large portion of what is now Austria-Hungary, the Crimea, and the greater

part of the northern shores of the Black Sea; and long before that time the majority of the conquered peoples had embraced Christianity—a fact which made their conquest by Muhammedans all the more bitter. That a numerically inferior Moslem invader should have been able to reduce the Christian population to a condition bordering on servitude seems, at first sight, remarkable. Yet it was the natural result of the state of the country; for there existed no unity either of race or of religion—and the same may be said to-day. There were (as there are now) Slavs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Roumanians, Hungarians, and others, living in small communities in fear and hatred of each other. The sole bond of union amongst this heterogeneous collection of people had hitherto been their religion, which, however, just at the critical moment of the Turkish inroad, gave rise to fierce controversies. All hope of sinking their differences in a general attempt to uphold the Cross against the Crescent was abandoned; and the resistance that the Turks encountered was consequently only half-hearted.

Under such circumstances, and possibly smarting under the knowledge that their ruin was the outcome of their own folly, it is hardly astonishing to find that the Christian inhabitants should have been always ready to strike for liberty, and to attempt to cast off the Muslim yoke. It is only fair, however, to the conquerors to say that they dealt far more leniently with the Christians than was the wont of the fanatical followers of the Prophet at that period. The Christians were allowed to

retain their religion, on the understanding that by so doing they were debarred from having any voice in the internal government of their country—whereas hitherto the war-cry of Islam had usually been, 'Conversion or the sword.' Still, whether it was that Turkish kindness was considered weakness, or that Asiatic methods of government were unsuited to Europeans, the fact remains that before many years the Turkish wave of conquest began to recede.

As early as 1699 the Ottoman Empire was shorn of several of its outlying provinces. By the Treaty of Karlovicz, of that date, the Sultan was forced to let go his hold on Transylvania and the country between the Danube and the Theiss, to hand over the Morea to the Venetians, Podolia and the Ukraine to Poland, and Azov to Russia. Turkey, however, regained Azov in 1711, and the Morea in 1715; then in 1718 she lost part of Servia and Walachia, but recovered them in 1736. But this flow of the Ottoman tide did not last long, and the time soon came when there was no recovery of lost territory. By the close of the eighteenth century the Turks had withdrawn on the north-east to the line of the Dneister, and on the north-west to the Danube, though the Sultan still ruled over Moldavia, Walachia, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and the whole peninsula to the south.

With the opening years of the nineteenth century the contraction of Turkey set in rapidly and steadily. Servia in 1817 obtained her semi-freedom, becoming a principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Greece, after a long and memorable struggle for independence,

was ultimately formed into a separate kingdom in 1829. Moldavia and Walachia in 1859 gained a step towards independence as the Danubian Principalities under Turkish suzerainty, and in 1878 shook themselves free from Turkey, and were united under the title of the kingdom of Roumania. At this latter date, also, Russia acquired Bessarabia, and Turkey transferred the Dobruja to Roumania. By the same treaty (Berlin, 1878), the independence of the principality of Montenegro, over which Turkey had previously claimed suzerainty, was recognised; and some small additions of territory were made to it. Servia also gained her independence, and in 1882 was declared a kingdom. Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia became autonomous provinces, under the Sultan's suzerainty, but in 1885 were united, and have since been known as Northern and Southern Bulgaria—'an autonomous tributary principality, with a national Christian Government and a native militia.'

It will thus be seen that Turkey in Europe has now shrunk to almost insignificant dimensions, the area of the country being barely half that of England, and its total population about equal to that of London and the suburbs, while the true Turks number no more than the inhabitants of Liverpool. Yet, small as it is, Turkey, by reason of its peculiar situation, is able at times to convulse all Europe—hence the Eastern Question, which is of sufficient importance to have acquired a literature of its own.*

* See Appendix IV.

At the present moment the Sultan's power in Europe may be said to be upheld only in such parts of his empire as are inhabited by a preponderating number of Muhammedans, viz., the home districts of Constantinople and Adrianople. Elsewhere Turkish rule is more or less nominal, or, at any rate, is only made to be felt by force of arms. Bulgaria desires complete independence, and Macedonia, for the same object, is frequently in a state of insurrection. But for the intervention of the Western Powers, the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire from Europe would doubtless have been an accomplished fact long ago, and but for their continued intervention the Sultan would a few months hence be forced to seek a new capital in his Asiatic provinces.

The maintenance of the integrity of Turkey in Europe has long been acknowledged by the Western Powers to be a vital necessity—not because any particular nation desires to befriend the Turks for themselves, nor from any philanthropic motives whatever, but solely because the downfall of the Turkish Empire would mean a disruption of the balance of power in the East. Although future generations may consider that England and France fought in the Crimea for the cause of the weak, and that England in 1878 brought an Indian contingent to the Mediterranean and sent a fleet to the Bosporus for the purpose of displaying her friendship for Turkey, yet in reality such actions had far wider motives than the mere protection of a feeble Power from the aggressions of her weighty neighbour. A Russian conquest of Turkey, without the intervention of the other Powers,

would result in the establishment of Muscovite rule at Constantinople, accompanied by the control of the Dardanelles, supremacy in the Black Sea, the rapid acquisition of its Asiatic shores, and the subsequent conquest of Asiatic Turkey to Mesopotamia and the head of the Persian Gulf. The whole trade of the East would thus be controlled by the one Power, and the rest of Europe would be robbed of a rich commercial area.

Russia, of course, disclaims any desire to possess Constantinople or to break up Turkey; the history of her policy for the last two centuries, however, is proof enough against her. As early as 1736 an alliance was made with Austria, and again in 1786 another alliance, for the partition of Turkey. In 1807 the Tsar and Napoleon formed similar plans, while just before the Crimean War Russia approached England on the same subject. Her ambition is only natural, and more so now than when she had no Black Sea fleet, for to be unable to take her ships out of the Black Sea without the consent of Turkey more or less fetters Russia's naval designs.

As on the north-east, so on the north-west Turkey has a neighbour who would benefit to a great extent by her downfall; for, though the encroaching policy of Austria is not, perhaps, so apparent as that of Russia, still, her absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina has doubtless whetted her appetite for the extension of the empire until it includes, not only Albania, but also its contiguous districts to Salonica. Austrian ambition to possess the port of Salonica is perhaps no less strong than Russian

ambition to possess the Golden Horn. But this much-desired partition by two Powers of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire is distasteful to the Western Powers, who have their own interests to safeguard. England, Germany, and Italy have, each and all, weighty reasons (apart from the general policy of maintaining the balance of power) for checking the encroachments of both Russia and Austria. Italy would certainly object to Albania passing into the hands of Austria; Germany, with the Bagdad railway scheme before her, would not be likely to stand by and watch the Russians pushing into Asiatic Turkey; while England, with her many interests in Egypt, India, and elsewhere, might find a Russian occupation of Constantinople a source of the greatest inconvenience—'a pistol levelled at the head of India,' as it has been described. With regard to France, it is somewhat difficult to say to what extent her alliance with Russia would persuade her to go, but there is little doubt that, commercially, France, like the other Western Powers of Europe, would be a heavy loser by a substitution of Russian for Turkish rule at Constantinople.

It is worth while considering what would result from a new Austro-Russian alliance, or understanding, in connection with the future of European Turkey. The only check to a Russian invasion of Turkey by land is the situation of Austria on the flank of the line of advance; both Powers, as has been mentioned, have equal interests in the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and a combined invasion might carry everything before it, or throw the whole of Europe into war. Austria,

however, has always shown herself weak and vacillating, bold for the moment, but fearful of plunging too deeply. She prefers to bide her time—to allow others to do the work, and to watch her opportunity. Open aggression forms no part of her policy, and for the very good reason that she does not desire to bring down the hosts o Germany and Italy on her western frontiers. It is improbable, therefore, that Austria will ever join Russia in a cold-blooded attack on Turkey; but it would be folly for the other Powers to imagine that she has at heart any wish to uphold the authority of the Sultan in his dominions. Her line of action is made perfectly clear by the Austro-Russian Reform Scheme, which, with the consent of the principal Powers, was presented to the Sultan in 1903. By this scheme the Powers proposed, amongst other things, to appoint officers of all nationalities for a joint administration of Macedonia and for the reorganization of the gendarmerie—to appoint Austrian and Russian civil agents for the purpose of upholding the rights of the Christian population—and generally to coerce the Porte into better treatment of the non-Moslem inhabitants. Should, therefore, this scheme be carried out in its entirety, both Russia and Austria will have succeeded in gaining a definite footing; and by ingratiating themselves with the anti-Turk population they will be in a position, when the time comes, to pretend to the rest of Europe that their presence is a necessity. In any case the net is being drawn each year more and more closely round the Sublime Porte.

The whole question of the pacification of European Turkey is full of intricate details. It is not solely a matter of religious differences, although the constant insurrections are usually considered to be a protest on the part of the oppressed Christian population against Muslim rule. Even if the Turks were to leave Europe altogether, tranquillity would not be assured for the Balkan Peninsula; on the contrary, in all probability the state of unrest would increase. Lord Palmerston wrote fifty years ago:

'I have no partiality for the Turks as Muhammedans, and should be very glad if they could be turned into Christians; but, as to the character of the Turkish Government in regard to its treatment of Christians, I am well aware that there are a vast number of Christians under the Governments of Russia, Austria, Rome, and Naples, who would be rejoiced to be as well treated, and to enjoy as much security for person and property as the Christian subjects of the Sultan. To expel from Europe the Sultan and his two millions of Mussulman subjects, including the army and the bulk of the land-owners, might not be an easy task; still, the five Powers might effect it, and play the Polish drama over again. But they would find the building up still more difficult than the pulling down. There are no sufficient Christian elements as yet for a Christian State in European Turkey capable of performing its functions as a component part of the European system. The Greeks are a small minority, and could not be the governing race. The Slavonians, who are the majority, do not possess the conditions necessary for becoming the bones and sinews of a new State. A reconstruction of Turkey means neither more nor less than its subjection to Russia, direct or indirect, immediate or for a time delayed.'

The half-century that has elapsed since the above was written has made little alteration in the conditions

referred to. Certain provinces have thrown off the Turkish yoke, but their populations have in reality benefited little by their change of circumstances; and, though for the time being independent, these petty kingdoms must ultimately be incorporated in one or the other of the neighbouring empires—unless, contrary to expert opinion, it may be found possible to raise up a united Balkan Empire with a Christian Government.

Besides the kingdoms, principalities, and provinces which we are including in the Balkan Peninsula, there are other old Slavonic provinces which are equally interested in the general upheaval, viz., those now considered to be part and parcel of Austria-Hungary—Dalmatia, Herzegovina, and Bosnia—as well as a small district to the north of the Danube between the Save and the Drave. The bulk of the population of all these Balkan countries is hostile to the Turks, and would welcome their removal from Europe; at the same time, those who are independent are by no means willing to be taken over by either Russia or Austria, while jealousy of one another prevents any concerted action.

The KINGDOM OF ROUMANIA (consisting of Moldavia, Walachia, and the Dobruja) has for many years been friendly to Russia. Nearly all the people belong to that division of the Greek Orthodox Church known as the Church of the Kingdom of Roumania. There are practically no Muhammedan inhabitants.

The KINGDOM OF SERVIA is still suffering from the effects of the military revolution of 1903, when the King

and Queen and many adherents were assassinated. The religion is the Servian Greek Church, and some proportion of the people are friendly to Russia, although the Progressives lean more towards Austria, with whom nearly all the trade of the country is carried on. Still, most of the Servians are alive to the danger of Austrian ambition, and fear lest the position assumed by their powerful neighbour in the matter of the Macedonian reforms may lead eventually to serious complications. Servia blocks the way to Austrian extension to the south; Austria would be glad enough to absorb her, and, aware of this, the Servians are afraid to give her a pretext for aggression. Otherwise, doubtless, Servia would combine with Bulgaria in supporting the Macedonians in their fight for liberty and the expulsion of the Turks.

The PRINCIPALITY OF BULGARIA is a hotbed of insurrection against Turkish rule. About one-sixth of the population are Muhammedans, the remainder being Christians, mostly of the Bulgarian Greek Church. The reigning Prince, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who served in the Austrian army, and is possessed of considerable landed property in Hungary, is supposed to be inclined towards Austria; but there is a strong political party, known as the Zankoffists, who are practically in the hands of the Russians. The country, therefore, is divided in its feelings between Austria and Russia, but is united in its hatred of the Turks, and is prepared to take up arms in defence of the Christians of the peninsula. Bulgaria single-handed is not strong enough to

make any way in a fight with Turkey; and, if Austria or Russia went to her assistance, the price of the support would probably be the conversion of Bulgaria into an Austrian or a Russian province. Whether Bulgaria is misguided enough to wage war unaided on Turkey, or whether she waits to throw in her lot with the next Russian invasion, her fate will depend on the fiat of the Powers. The kingdom of Bulgaria may be created, but in the end it will doubtless have to take its place as one of the outlying provinces of the Tsar of all the Russias.

Should there arise any general Pan-Slavonic agitation, there is always the possibility of its spreading among the Slav population of Southern Hungary, principally in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina also (which are nominally Turkish provinces, occupied and administered by Austria since 1878) would be likely to be affected by a call to arms to support the Christians against the Turks, though doubtless, if she thought fit, Austria could hold them in check. In these two latter provinces the Muhammedans are numerous—nearly 40 per cent. of the population—and include the principal land-owners, while of the Christians the greater number belong to the Greek Church (Servian), the remainder being Roman Catholics (Croats).

The PRINCIPALITY OF MONTENEGRO is too small and too poor to wish to fight except in self-defence. There are a few Muhammedans living in the country, but the religion of the people is the Greek Church (Church of Montenegro). Russian influence is fully developed, and

the Montenegrins are none too friendly to Austria-Hungary, which possesses Cattaro, the only seaport available to them.

ALBANIA, a province of Turkey, is divided into the vilayets of Scutari, Yanina, and part of Monastir; its inhabitants are mostly Muhammedans (perverts and their descendants), and the Christians are half Greek Orthodox Church and half Roman Catholics (under the protection of Austria). Family feuds and religious differences are the cause of constant fighting among the people, though there is a strong party in favour of the formation of an independent Albanian State. Montenegro and Greece, however, have designs on part of the country, but Italy would certainly oppose any territorial change—more especially on the coast. What attitude the Albanians would adopt in the event of a conflagration in Balkan affairs, it is not easy to say. Although the recruiting-ground for the Sultan's body-guard, Muhammedan Albania is by no means loyal to the Ottoman Empire; and the people have recently resisted the Austro-Russian reforms, even taking up arms against the Turks. The Muhammedans are at all times ready to turn on the Christians, but it is not at all certain that they would not join them in the endeavour to shake themselves free from Turkey.

MACEDONIA, another Turkish province, comprises the vilayets of Kossovo (Old Servia), Salonica, and part of Monastir. The situation here is acute, the population containing a great number of different nationalities—Greeks, Jews, Turks, Roumanians, Bulgarians, and others.

There is no unity even in religious matters ; the Albanian Muhammedans from the west, and the Turks from the east, oppress the Christians with intense malignity ; and the Bulgarian Christians (under the Exarch of Bulgaria) are at open war with the followers of the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church. Yet it is hoped that the Reform Scheme, now on its trial, may avert further bloodshed, and may be able to cope with the many difficulties of the situation.

In EASTERN TURKEY there are the vilayets of Constantinople and Adrianople, the former the headquarters of the Osmanli Turk, the latter partly loyal to the Sultan and partly Bulgarian in its views. The population is mostly Muhammedan, and the Christians are under the Patriarch of the Greek Church at Constantinople. The capital itself, however, is perhaps the most cosmopolitan city in the world ; almost every country and every religion is represented, and the Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Franks, and others have their own particular quarters.

The KINGDOM OF GREECE, with the exception of a few Albanians and Roumanians, is peopled entirely by Greeks, who belong to the Greek Orthodox Church, under an independent Metropolitan in Athens. Although thoroughly hostile to the Turks, and anxious to extend her boundaries, it is not at all certain that Greece would join a general Balkan rising. Religious rivalry between the Church of Athens and the Bulgarian Church is almost sufficient to prevent the Greeks from actively assisting the Macedonian Christians. The Government, however,

in 1903 showed its sympathy for them by protesting to the Powers against the reported massacres by Bashi-Bazouks.*

From the above summary of the condition of the Balkan Peninsula, it would appear that everyone's hand is turned against the Turk, and that he must shortly disappear from Europe. At the same time it is also apparent that, even among the Christians themselves, race hatred is so strong, suspicion and jealousy are so intense, that no man is safe from the attacks of his neighbours. Consequently it is difficult to understand how any united action against the common foe is possible. Moreover, it must be remembered that, although the Ottoman Empire is said to be in a state of decay, yet in the ranks of the Sultan's army is to be found magnificent fighting material. Badly organized and indifferently officered it may be, but the Turkish army is quite capable of suppressing the insurrectionary movements in the various provinces, provided always that the Sultan is allowed liberty of action. Turkey defeated Greece in 1897 within a month, and would probably make equally short work of Bulgaria or any wholly-Balkan combination that attempted to try conclusions in the open field. But Turkish methods of policing outlying districts are too sanguinary for civilized Europe, and thus the Powers are by way of relieving the Sultan of the trouble of restoring order amongst his refractory subjects. It seems fairly obvious that each of the provinces now on the

* The word 'Bashi-Bazouk' means simply a *civilian* Muhammedan.

verge of revolt will sooner or later receive a measure of autonomy, and that they may even become independent, but only eventually to undergo the process of absorption into a neighbouring empire—Russian, Austrian, or Italian. One thing is certain: European Turkey will gradually dwindle away, until her territory includes no more than Constantinople and the northern shores of the Dardanelles and Bosporus. From beyond that limit the Western Powers will probably hesitate to allow her to recede.

APPENDICES

I. Useful Words

II. Armed Strength

III. Weights and Measures

IV. Books of Reference

APPENDIX I

USEFUL WORDS IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

NOTES ON PRONUNCIATION, CALLIGRAPHY, ETC.—*Turkish* is a distinct language, written in its own character (from right to left); the letters are represented (below) as nearly as possible by their Roman equivalents. The consonants are sounded much as in English, J being always hard, as in *jelly* or *jam*. The vowels in Turkish (as in all the Balkan languages) have the French or Italian sound, not the English. *Roumanian* is written in Roman character. D, S, and Ţ are pronounced like Z, Sh, and Ts respectively; C and G as in Italian; H like *ch* in *loch*. *Bulgarian* is written in the Russian character, and has the same pronunciation as Russian, except that the Russian letter *shch* is in Bulgarian pronounced *sht*. J is a consonant and pronounced *Zh*. *Servian* and *Montenegrin* are akin to Russian. The Cyrillic or Russian character is used officially and by the bulk of the people; the Roman character by the minority. There are a few compound letters not found in the Russian alphabet. J is pronounced like Y. *Modern Greek* has no connection with any of the other languages of the Balkan Peninsula, and its printed characters are similar to those of Ancient Greek, but the written hand is slightly modified.

ENGLISH.	TURKISH.	ROUMANIAN.	BULGARIAN.	SERVIAN.	MODERN GREEK.
Advance-guard	Isstikshaf-asskeri	Avant-gardă	Aván-gvárdia	Avangarda	Embrosthophylakí
Afternoon	Ikindi	După prânz, or Dup' amiadĭ	Podir obéd	Po-podne	Apógevma
Ammunition-waggon	Djebhané arabassi	Wagon de munitie	Amoonitziónna-kolá	Moonitziona-kola	Phortigós ámaxa polemephódion
Animal	Haĭvan	Dobitoc; Animal	Jivótna	Zhivotnia	Zöon
Arms	Silah	Arme	Orújia	Orooshije	Oplismós
Army	Ordou	Armată	Voiská; Armia	Vojska	Stratos [polemou
Arsenal	Tersané	Arsenal	Arsenál	Arsenal	Apothiki ylikou
Artillery	Topdjou, or Topd-joulik-Kesmé	Artilerie	Artiléria	Artilerija	Pyrovolikon
Asleep	Ouykou	Adormit; Dormind	Záspal	Oospavan	Kemómenos
Barracks	Keshla	Cazarmă	Cazármi	Kasarna	Stratónes
Battalion	Tabour	Batalion	Droújina	Batalon	Tagma
Battery	Tabia	Baterie	Batéria	Baterija	Pyrovolarchia
Bayonet	Sunghu	Baionetă	Shtik	Bajonet; Nozh	Longchi
Bed	Yatak	Pat	Legló	Krevet; Postela	Klini; Krevvati
Boat	Sandal	Luntre; Barcă	Várca	Goon; Gamats	Lemvos; Varka
Bread	Ekmek	Pâine	Chleb	Khleb; Krookha	
Bridge	Keupru	Pod	Most	Most; Gooprija	Géphyra
Brigade	Liva	Brigada	Brigáda	Brigada	Taxiarchia
Bullet	Kourshun	Gloute	Bómba	Metak; Tane	Sphera oplou
Calibre	Tchap	Calibru	Calíbr	Kalibar	Olki pyrovolikou
Cavalry	Suvari	Cavalerie	Cavaléria	Konitsa	Ippikón [oplou

Cart	Yuk arabassi	Cărută	Kolá	Kola	Phortigos amaxa; Karro
Cartridge	Fishenk	Cartuşă	Cartoúsh	Fishek	Physingion
Cattle	Davar	Vite	Govéda	Vo	Ktene; Zoa
Coffee	Cahvé	Cafia	Café	Kava	Kaphes
Cold	Soghouk	Frig; Rece	Stood (*noun*); stoodéno (*adj.*)	Khladno	Psychos (*noun*); Kryomenos (*adj.*)
Colour	Renk	Colóre	Tzvet	Boja	Chroma
Come (to)	Ghelmek	a veni	Dohójdam	Dodji	Erchomai
Company	Shirket	Companie	Róta	Geta	Lochos
Corn (grain)	Zakhiré	Grăne; Grăn	Jíto	Zhito	Sitos
Cow	Inek	Vacă	Crava	Crava	Agelás
Day	Ghün	Di (dina = the day)	Den	Dan	Eméra
Deep	Dérin	Adîne	Dlubóco	Duboco	Vathys
Dinner	Taam	Prînz; Cină	Obéd	Rugak	Gevma
Distance	Messafé	Depărtare; Distanța	Rastoiánie	Odstojanie	Apóstasis
Down	Ashaghi	Jos	Dólo	Dole	Káto
Drink (to)	Itchmek	a bea	Piá	Piti	Pino
Dust	Toz	Praf	Prah	Prashina	Koniortós; Skóni
Early	Erken	Timpuriu; de Vreme	Ráno	Ranije	Enoris
Eat (to)	Yémék	a mînca	Iadá	Jesti	Esthio; Trogo
Eggs	Youmourta	Ouă	Iaítza	Jaja	Oa; Avgá
Eight	Sekiz	Opt	Osem	Osam	Okto
Enemy	Dushmen	Vrăjmas; Inamie	Nepriatel	Neprijatel	Echthros
Enough	Kiafi	Destul	Dósta	Dosta	Arketon
Evening	Aksham	Sără	Vécher	Vedje	Espéra; Vrathy
Far	Ouzak	Departe	Daléch	Daleko	Makran
Fire	Atesh	Foc	Ógon	Vatra	Pyr; Photya
Fish	Balek	Pesce	Ríba	Riba	Ichthys; Psari
Five	Besh	Cinci	Pet	Pet	Pende
Flour	Oun	Făina	Brashno	Brashno	Alevron
Fodder	Uluf	Nutreț	Fooráj	Stogna Khrana	Voské
Food	Yemek	Mîncare; Hrană	*Chraná*	Proviant	Trophe; Phageton
Ford	Ghetchid	Vad; Rîuletă	Brod	Gazh	Richon
Fort	Kalé	Fort	Ookreplénie	For. Gradidj	Phróurion
Four	Deurt	Patru	Chéteri	Chetiri	Téssera
Fowl	Taouk	Găină	Píley	Kokosh	Ptena; Kotópoulo
Friend	Dost	Prietin; Amic	Priátel	Prijatel	Philos
Fruit	Yemish	Póme; Fructe	Plod	Vodje	Oporikon; Frouto
Go (to)	Ghitmek	a merge	Otívam	Idje	Ypágo

English.	Turkish.	Roumanian.	Bulgarian.	Servian.	Modern Greek.
Goat	Ketchi	Ţap (*m.*); Capră (*f.*)	Cozá	Koza	Ex; Katsíka
Guide	Klaghouz	Călăuză; Guid	Vodách	Vodcha (or Puto-vodcha	Odegós
Gun	Tufenk	Tun	Orúdie	Top	Touphéki
Hill	Dagh; Tépé	Deal	Mogíla	Breshoolak	Lophos
Horse	At	Cal	Kon	Kon	Ippos; Alogo
Hot	Sedjak	Cald	Goréshto	Toplo	Thermos; Zestos
House	Khané	Casă	Dom	Kudja; Dom	Ikos; Spiti
Hungry	Adj	Flămând	Gláden	Gladan	Pinasménos
Ice	Bouz	Gheaţă	Led	Led	Pagos
Infantry	Piyadé asker	Infanterie	Pehóta	Peshadija	Pezikon
Interpreter	Terdjeman	Interpret; Tălmaciŭ	Prevodách	Tumag; Dragoman	Dhiermenefs; Dhragomanos
Lake	Gueul	Lac; Baltă	Ézero	Jezero	Limni
Letter	Mektoub	Scrisóre; Epistolă	Pismo	Pismo	Epistoli; Gramma
Little	Az	Mic; Mărunt	Malco	Malo	Mikrós; Olígos
Man	Adam	Om	Chelovék	Govek	Anir; Ánthropos
Marsh	Batak	Marş	Pohód	Bara	Elos
Meat	Et	Carne	Méso	Meso	Kreas
Messenger	Moukhbir	Curier; Mesajer	Prátenik	Odatsija	Angeliophóros
Milk	Sud	Lapte	Mléco	Mleko	Gála
Money	Akdjé	Banĭ; Parale; Numĕrar	Parí	Novats	Chrimata
Morning	Sabah	Dimineata	Utro	Jutro	Proia
Mountain	Dagh	Munte	Planiná	Breg; Gora	Óros; Vouno
Much	Tchok	Mult	Mnógo	Mlogo; Vishe	Polý
Name	Issm	Numĕ	Ímey	Ime	Ónoma
Near	Yakin	Aprópe	Blízo	Blizu	Plisíon; Konda
Night	Ghédjé	Nópte	Nosht	Nodj	Nyx; Nykta
Nine	Dokouz	Noně	Dévet	Devet	Ennéa
No	Khaïr	Nu	Nev	Ne	Óchi
Now	Shimdi	Acuma; Acuş	Segá	Sada	Nyn; Tóra
One	Bir	Unu	Ednó	Jedan	Es (mia, en)
Oxen	Eukuz	Boĭ	Volóve	Volovi	
Path					Monopáti
People	Ahali	Popor; Omenĭ	Naród	Narod	Laós
Pig	Domouz	Porc; Rîmător	Svinyá	Svina	Chiros; Gouróuni

Quick	Tchabouk	Curînd; Repede; Inte	Búrzo	Brzo	Tachys; Ogligora
Railway	Demir yol	Cale Ferată	Jeléznitsa	Zheleznitsa	Sidheródhronos
Rain	Yaghmour	Ploe	Dujd	Kisha	Vrochi
River	Tchaï	Rîu; Fluviu; Gîrlă	Reká	Reka	Potamos
Road	Yol	Cale	Put	Put; Drum	Odhós; Dhrómos
Sea	Deniz	Marea	Morey	More	Thálassa
Seven	Yédi	Şepte	Sédem	Sedam	Eptá
Sheep	Koyoun	Óe (*plur.*=Oi)	Óvtza	Ovtse	Próbaton
Shoot (to)	Avlamak	a împuşca	Gurmiá	Putsati	Pyrovolo
Sick	Hasta	Bolnav	Bólen	Bolestan	Asthenis; Árrostos
Sleep (to)	Ouyoumak	a dormi	Spu	Spavati	Kimóme
Smoke (to) [tobacco]	Tutun itchmek	(a) fuma [tutun]	Póosha	Pushiti [duvan]	Kapnizo
Snow	Kar	Zăpadă	Sneg	Sneg	Chión
Steamer	Vapor	Vapor	Parahód	Parobrod	Atmóploön
Stone	Tash	Pétra	Cámac	Kamen	Lithos; Petra
Straw	Saman		Sláma	Slama	Áchyron
Ten	On	Dece	Déset	Deset	Dhéka
Thanks	Teshekkur	Mulţumirî	Blagodará	Khvala	Efcharistíai
Thirsty	Soussamish	Setos (a avea sete)	Jéden	Zhedan	Dipsaménos
Three	Utch	Treî	Tri	Tri	Tris (Tria)
To	[Case ending]	a	Na	Do; kod; oo	Pros
Tobacco	Tutun	Tutun	Tutun	Duvan	Kapnós
To-morrow	Yarin	Mâne	Ootrey	Sutra	Avrion
Town	Shéhir	Oraş	Grad	Varosh	Pólis
Translate	Terdjemé etmek	a tăduce; a tălmăci	Preveda	Prevoditi	Metaphrázo
Twenty	Yirmi	Douăzecî	Dvadeset	Dvadeset	Ikosi
Two	Iki	Două (*fem.*=Două)	Dvey	Dva	Dhío
Valley	Déré	Vale	Dolina	Dolina	Kelás
Village	Keuy	Sat	Sélo	Selo	Chorîon
Waggon	Araba	Vagon; Furgon	Vagón	Vagon	Phortigós ámaxa
Walk (to)	Ghuezmek	a umbla	Razhójdam	Shetati; Idji	Peripató
Want (to)	Istemek	a avea trebuinţa de...; a necesita...	Iskam	Zheleti	Thélo
Water	Sou	Apă	Vodá	Voda	Ýdhor; Neró
Way	Yol	Drum	Put	Put	Dhrómos
Wet	Yash	Ud	Mocro	Mokro	Vregménos
Wine	Sharab	Vin	Víno	Vino	Syrma
Wire	Tel	Sirmă	Tel	Zhitsa	Xylon
Wood	Orman	Lemne	Gora	Drvo	
Yes	Evvet	Da	Da	Jeste; Da	Nai; Málista

APPENDIX II

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE ARMED STRENGTH OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

(FIGURES APPROXIMATE.)

	ROUMANIA.	BULGARIA.	SERVIA.	MONTENEGRO.	TURKEY.	GREECE.
Area (square miles) ..	46,314	36,943	18,757	3,436	66,500	24,977
Population	5,912,250	3,744,283	2,500,000	230,000	6,000,000	2,500,000
ARMED STRENGTH.						
Peace Footing :						
Total of all Ranks ..	130,000	43,000	18,000	Nil	208,000*	28,000
Infantry Battalions ..	120	72	52	Nil	320*	42
Cavalry Squadrons ..	69	30	16	Nil	197*	12
Artillery Batteries ..	65	81	45	40 guns	249*	33
Engineer Companies ..	28	21	10	Nil	39*	9
Fortress Artillery Companies	20	9	9	Nil	123*	—
War Footing :						
Total of all Ranks ..	190,000	313,000	200,000	40,000	1,500,000*	130,000
FLOTILLA	One gunboat, 8 armoured gunboats, 2 torpedo-boats, and 5 transports.	One cruiser, 8 armed coastguard vessels, 5 small gunboats, 7 torpedo-boats, 4 torpedo-sloops, and 1 screw steamer.	One transport steamer, and 6 tugs on the Danube.	Nil.	Eighteen ironclads,† 25 torpedo-boats, and about 60 steam vessels partly armed, but mostly obsolete.	Three ironclads, 2 armoured vessels, 1 cruiser, 10 gunboats, 4 steam-corvettes, 8 schooners, 7 torpedo-boats, 3 transports, and 7 various vessels.

* Including Asiatic Turkey.

† Three protected cruisers, 6 torpedo vessels, 4 torpedo-boat destroyers, 2 submarines, and 3 protected cruisers (building).

APPENDIX III

WEIGHTS, MEASURES, AND MONEY OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

Weights and Measures.

The *Metric System* is used in Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, and Roumania; but Bulgaria and Servia also use the *Turkish System*. The Metric System was officially established in Turkey in 1882, but is only used in Government offices.

THE METRIC SYSTEM.

Length.

1 millimètre = $\frac{1}{1000}$ mètre = ·03937 inch (Eng.).
*1 centimètre = $\frac{1}{100}$ mètre = ·39371 inch (Eng.).
1 decimètre = $\frac{1}{10}$ mètre = 3·93708 inches (Eng.).
1 mètre = 39·37079 inches (Eng.).
1 kilomètre = 1093·6 yards, or ·621 mile (Eng.).

[Approximately, 10 centimètres = 4 inches (Eng.); 8 kilomètres = 5 miles (Eng.).]

Square Measure.

1 centiare = 1 square mètre.
1 are = 100 square mètres.
1 hectare = 10,000 square mètres = 2·471 acres (Eng.).

* As the diameter of a halfpenny is 1 inch, so the diameter of a centime (French) is 1 centimètre, and 100 centimes in a row measure 1 mètre.

Capacity.

1 millilitre = $\frac{1}{1000}$ litre.
1 centilitre = $\frac{1}{100}$ litre.
1 decilitre = $\frac{1}{10}$ litre.
1 litre = 1·76 pints (Eng.).
1 hectolitre = 100 litres = 176 pints (Eng.).

Weights.

1 gramme = $\frac{1}{1000}$ kilogramme = ·5644 Avoirdupois drams (Eng.).
1 kilogramme = 2·204 pounds Avoirdupois (Eng.).

TURKISH AND GREEK METRICAL EQUIVALENTS.

Metric.	Turkish.	Greek.
Decimètre	parmak	palame
Mètre	arshine	pecheus
Kilomètre	mili (10 mili = 1 farsang)	stadion
Gramme	—	drachme
Kilogramme ..	oke	1,000 drachme
1½ Kilogrammes ..	—	1 mna
10 Kilogrammes ..	batman	—
100 Kilogrammes ..	kantar	—
Millilitre	—	kybos
Centilitre	—	mystron
Decilitre	—	kotyle
Litre	eultchek	litra
Decalitre	kileh	—
Hectolitre	—	koilon

OLD TURKISH WEIGHTS AND MEASURES (TURKISH SYSTEM).

Weights.

1 oke = 2·828 English pounds.
1 kantar = 44 okes.
1 cheki = 4 kantars.

Measures.

1 pik, or arshin	= 26·772 English inches.
1 kileh	= 1·018 bushels (Eng.).
1 deunum	= 1,099·37 square yards (Eng.).
1 berri	= 1·0378 miles (Eng.).
1 agatsch, or farsang*	= 3·1131 miles (Eng.).

MONEY.

Decimal coinage is used in all the Balkan countries. Greece belongs to the so-called 'Latin Union,' and has coins similar in weight and fineness to those used by France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy. Roumania, Bulgaria, and Servia, though not belonging to the Latin Union, employ a similar system.

ROUMANIAN COINAGE.

100 bani = 1 leu = 1 franc (French).

Pieces in Circulation.

Gold: 20, 10, and 5 lei.
Silver: 5, 2 lei; 1, ½ leu.
Bronze: 10, 5, 2, 1 bani.

BULGARIAN COINAGE.

100 stotinki = 1 lev = 1 franc.

Pieces in Circulation.

Gold: 100, 20, 10 leva.
Silver: 5, 2 leva; 1, ½ lev.
Nickel: 20, 10, 5, 2½ stotinki.
Bronze: 10, 5, 2 stotinki.

* It will be noticed that the old farsang is half the length of the new (metrical) farsang. The old farsang is considered an hour's journey, but in describing distances guides invariably employ the word *saat* (*i.e.*, hour) as equivalent to about three English miles.

SERVIAN COINAGE.

100 paras = 1 dinar = 1 franc.

Pieces in Circulation.

Gold: 20, 10, 5 dinar.
Silver: 5, 2, 1, ½ dinar.
Nickel: 20, 10, 5 paras.
Bronze: 10, 5 paras.

GREEK COINAGE.

100 lepta = 1 drachma = 1 franc.

Pieces in Circulation.

Gold: 20, 10, 5 new drachmai.
Silver: 5 new drachmai; 1 new drachma; 50 and 20 lepta.
Copper: 10, 5 lepta; 1 lepton.

TURKISH COINAGE.

40 paras = 1 piastre = about 2¼d. (Eng.).
100 piastres = 1 Turkish pound (*lira turca*) = about 18s. (Eng.), but fluctuating.

Pieces in Circulation.

Gold: 5, 2½, 1, ½, ¼ lira.
Silver: 1, ½, ¼ mejidieh, and 2, 1 piastre.

MONTENEGRIN COINAGE.

100 novcics = 1 florin = about 2s. (Eng.).

APPENDIX IV

A LIST OF MODERN BOOKS DEALING WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA

A. General.

Hogarth : 'The Nearer East' (1902).
Odysseus : 'Turkey in Europe' (1900).
Samuelson : 'Bulgaria, Past and Present' (1888).
Hulme-Beaman : 'Twenty Years in the Near East' (1898).
Curtis : 'The Turk and his Lost Provinces' (1903).
Richardson : 'Vacation Days in Greece' (1903).
Frazer : 'Pausanias, and other Greek Sketches' (1900).
Philippson : 'Der Peloponnes' (1892); 'Thessalien und Epirus' (1897).
Abbott : 'The Tale of a Tour in Macedonia' (1903).
Mallat : 'La Serbie Contemporaine' (1902).
Durham : 'Through the Land of the Serb' (1904); 'The Burden of the Balkans' (1905).
Benger : 'Rumania in 1900.'
Avelot and Negrière : 'Montenegro, Bosnie, Herzogovine' (1896).

B. Military.

For Earlier Wars.

'Annals of the Wars of the Eighteenth Century' and 'Annals of the Wars of the Nineteenth Century, 1800-1815,' by Sir E. Cust (1858-1863).

'Russian Wars with Turkey,' by Colonel F. S. Russell (1877).

'The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829,' by Baron Von Moltke (1854).

'The Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828 and 1829,' by Colonel F. R. Chesney, R.A., D.C.L., F.R.S. (1854).

Kinglake's 'Invasion of the Crimea.'

For Later Wars.

'The Russian Army and its Campaign in Turkey in 1877-1878,' by F. V. Greene, U.S. Army.

'With the Armies of the Balkans and at Gallipoli in 1877-1878,' by Lieutenant-Colonel Fife-Cookson.

'The Russo-Turkish War,' by Captain H. M. Hozier.

'The War in Bulgaria,' by Valentine Baker Pasha.

'The Defence of Plevna,' by W. V. Herbert.

'Défense de Plevna,' by General Mouzaffer Pasha and Lieutenant-Colonel Talaat Bey.

C. Language.

Morfill: 'A Short Grammar of the Bulgarian Language' (1897); 'A Grammar of Serbian' (1887).

Torceneau: 'A Simplified Grammar of Roumanian' (1883).

*Gardner:** ''A Short and Easy Modern Greek Grammar' (1892).

Zompalides: 'Course of Modern Greek' (1887).

Thimm: 'Turkish Self-Taught' (1896).

Tarring: 'A Turkish Grammar' (1886).

MAPS.

1. Steinhauser's Karte von Südost-Europa; scale, 1 : 2,000,000. Vienna, 1903. One sheet.
2. Karl Peucker's Karte von Bulgarien mit Ostrumelien und Türk: Thrakien; scale, 1 : 864,000. Vienna, 1903. One sheet.

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* Greek is really the most useful language, especially round the coast; and Mrs. Gardner's book is excellent.

3. Karl Peucker's Karte von Makedonien, Altserbien und Albanien; scale, 1 : 864,000. Vienna, 1904. One sheet.
4. Russian General Staff Map of part of the Balkan Peninsula (south of the Danube and east of Servia); scale, 1 : 126,000. St. Petersburg, 1884. Sixty-two sheets.
5. Austrian Staff Map of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia; scale, 1 : 200,000. Not yet completed. It forms part of the General Map of Central Europe in 260 sheets.
6. French Staff Map of the Balkan Peninsula (not north of Bucharest); scale, 1 : 1,000,000. 1903.
7. General Map of the Kingdom of Greece; scale, 1 : 300,000. Vienna Military Geographical Institute, 1885. (Northern Greece was revised in 1897.) Eleven sheets.
8. Special Map of the Principality of Montenegro; scale, 1 : 75,000. Vienna Military Geographical Institute, 1893. Nineteen sheets.
9. Government Map of Roumania; scale, 1 : 200,000. Bucharest. Not yet completed.
10. Roumania (part of Russian '10 verst' Map); scale, 1 : 420,000. General Staff, St. Petersburg, 1898.
11. Government Map of Servia; scale, 1 : 75,000. War Office, Belgrade, 1895. Ninety-five sheets. (Special Map of Belgrade; scale, 1 : 50,000.)
12. Stieler's Atlas. Scale 1 : 1,500,000. 1904. Four Sheets.
13. Postal Map of Turkey-in-Europe; scale, 1 : 1,000,000. Constantinople, 1894. One sheet.

NOTE.—Austrian maps reckon longitude from Ferro Island (Canaries) = 18° 9′ W. of Greenwich.

Russian maps reckon longitude from Pulkowa = 30° 19′ E. of Greenwich.

Servian and Roumanian Government maps reckon longitude from Paris = 2° 20′ E. of Greenwich.

Some of the maps give in the margin the corresponding longitude reckoned from Greenwich.

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ABBREVIATIONS: *b*=bay; *c*=cape; *g*=gulf; *i*=island; *l*=lake; *m*=mountain; *r*=river.

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